CHANGING CAIRO:THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBAN FORM

By Dona J. Stewart

Source: International Journal of Urban & Regional Research, Mar99, Vol. 23 Issue 1, p128, 19p

Introduction

Successive and divergent political economic regimes have imprinted the landscape of Cairo in greatly dissimilar patterns. Through an analysis of Cairo's one thousand year history four distinct political economic periods -- Islamic, Imperialist, Arab Socialist and Transitory -- have been identified. Each of these periods contains a dominant ideology which, articulated on the landscape, can still be located within modern Cairo. In addition to these general spatial foci, distinct dominant features, such as architectural style and specific examples of built form, are identified as symbolic representations of the primary characteristics of each political economic regime.

There is a great need to develop political economic approaches within urban geography which are truly comparative in scope and are particularly applicable in nonwestern, developing world contexts. A rich body of literature on urban-economic change in the United States is available, including Beauregard's (1989) work on the postwar economic restructuring of the city and Harvey's (1985) exploration of the impact of capitalism on the city. Other significant approaches, with a primary focus on the western experience, include work by Vance (1990), which traced the development of western cities in response to technological change and economic development, and Cybriwsky's (1991) examination of Tokyo.

While such approaches have greatly expanded our knowledge of the dynamic relationship between the economy and political forces within the western context, they offer limited utility for understanding non-western cities which engage the world capitalist system in a dissimilar manner. Cities in the developing world do not share the common history of the industrial economic development model which originated in Europe and the United States, thereby further limiting the applicability of such western-based analysis. In striving to locate a more relevant approach for the analysis of cities in the developing world, a key theoretical concept derived from the western-centered literature -- that local economic forces, which are embedded in a larger global economy, shape the form of the city -- must be preserved.

This approach owes an additional debt to cultural geography, and specifically the linking of physical landscape and cultural symbolism in geographic thought. Landscape analysis, perhaps more often articulated today as the deconstruction of landscape, and based on a tradition established by J.B Jackson (Zube, 1970), offers an important tool for disassembling the landscape of Cairo. By directly linking landscape and ideology, Cosgrove (1984: 15) has extended the analytical capabilities of landscape analysis, arguing:

It [landscape] represents a way in which certain classes of people have signified themselves and their world through their imagined relationship with nature and through which they have underlined and communicated their own social role and that of others in respect to external nature.

Yet, the linkages between landscape symbols and social processes are rarely examined (Rowntree and Conkey, 1980). The analysis presented here shows that, over a 1000 year period, Cairo's urbanscape responded to acute political and economic change as political control shifted and the economy responded to a changing relationship with the external world. Though this analysis focuses on Cairo as a particular case study, the methodology is appropriate within the general context of lesser developed countries where information on actors is limited and the state dominates. The urbanscape, therefore, can be viewed as a social product which reflects changing societal values and perceptions. Analysis of the urbanscape is limited in that, inevitably, less powerful groups, which had little ability to impact on urban form, will be underrepresented. In reading the urban landscape it is important to recognize that the strongest voice is likely to belong to those who hold power and therefore dictate the dominant urban ideology.

Political economic regimes

Throughout much of Cairo's long history the city played a pivotal role in world history. Its influence secured it a place in Arab culture as the 'mother of the world'. In this investigation, Cairo's urban political economic history has been divided into four periods, Islamic, Imperialist, Arab Socialist and the current period, labeled Transitory, in which the political economic regime is transforming from socialist to capitalist in economic ideology (see Figure 1). The term 'regime' is used here to indicate the dominant group controlling the political and economic arena and may include internal governmental actors, external governmental actors and non-governmental actors. Reducing the history of Cairo to neatly labeled regimes, of course, belies the true complexity of the political economic shifts and subtle political economic changes within the identified historical periods -- the Islamic period, for example, covers more than 800 years. Furthermore, the nature of the Islamic city remains in dispute among specialists in the field.

However, these four periods provide a useful analytical tool for disaggregating Cairo's long history. The early history of Cairo coincides with the great Islamic period of city-building, during which Cairo was founded by the Fatimid dynasty in 969 AD. For the next 800 years Cairo was a contested arena for successive Islamic dynasties including the Ayyubids (1171-1250), Mameluks (1250-1517) and the Ottoman Empire (1517-1882). The transition from one political economic regime to another is a gradual process, with elements of the successor regime appearing before the end of the preceding regime. For example, during the Islamic era considerable influence from the Imperialist regime was present well before the end of Ottoman control, including a significant, though short-lived period of French control (1798-1802). Formal British imperialism of Egypt began in 1802, and the incorporation of Egypt into the imperialist-controlled world economy then defined Cairo until the middle of the twentieth century. In 1952 Egypt experienced a radical regime shift when Gamal Abdel Nasser and a group of military officers overthrew the British-backed monarchy and established an independent Egypt. The government of the new country was eventually modeled on socialist principles, accordingly government policy was characterized by property redistribution, housing reform and construction of large-scale building projects. Finally, the current Transitory political economic stage in Egypt, which began in 1987, is a bridge between the socialist past and a presumed future characterized by privatization, capitalism and a market-driven economy. This era is just now beginning to alter the existing landscape, yet emerging trends can already be identified.

An understanding of the changing world context is critically important for the interpretation of Cairo and its various political economic regimes. In analyzing these political economic eras, the approach utilized here is influenced by world systems analysis (Wallerstein, 1974; 1980) and its application to world city systems (Friedmann, 1986; Knox and Taylor, 1995). The nature of exchanges between the city and the broader global economy have played an active role in shaping the city. According to Smith (1995: 288): 'At the same time, the nature of any particular city's embeddedness, through these exchanges, in the world system influence its own peculiar character'.

Within Cairo as a whole, it is possible to locate specific loci for each political economic period (see Figure 2). Conceptualized as 'urban spheres', these areas can be viewed as locales where each regime created a physical representation of itself on the urbanscape. Naturally, successive political economic regimes have transmogrified the urban patterns of the previous eras; however, elements of the original political economic regime can be clearly identified. These spheres are articulated as a conceptual tool, since lines of demarcation on the urbanscape are not as distinct on the ground and arguments could undoubtedly be made for alternative renderings of these spheres.

Cairo in the Islamic period 969-1798 AD

Cairo, in Arabic 'al Qahira', meaning the victorious, was established in 969 AD by military forces of the Fatimid dynasty. Cairo was actually the fourth Islamic capital of Egypt. Its most important predecessor was Fustat, located south of al Qahira and today incorporated into the Greater Cairo Region. Fustat played a crucial role in the development of Cairo, for it was only with the decline of Fustat that al Qahira came to dominate. Later in the Islamic period al Qahira grew to become one of the great Arab capitals, enjoying a dominant position in the world economy and creating a 'world city', with classical Islamic design.

Islamic foundations

Like many Middle Eastern cities founded during the expansion of Islam, the original functions of al Qahira were religious and military. Al Qahira was established as the royal seat of the Fatimid dynasty. From here the dynasty was able to direct its military conquest of the surrounding areas and exert leadership over the resident Muslim community. 'Power was concentrated in the hands of the caliph and expressed through magnificence and elaborate ceremonial. It was the practice of the Fatimid caliphs to show themselves to the people of Cairo in solemn processions' (Hourani, 1991: 40). Al Qahira, therefore, was the seat of the Fatimid political and religious leadership, for the two were inexorably intertwined, and the dynasty's power was manifested on the streets of al Qahira.

The main focal point of the city was an open parade ground, Bayn al Qasrayn, located between the east and west Fatimid places (MacKenzi, 1992). Perhaps the most significant element of the urban landscape was the al Azhar Mosque. Constructed in 970 AD, the mosque was the center of Fatimid politico-religious life and to this day holds a prominent position in Islamic theology. The construction of al Azhar mosque also shifted focus from the pre-Fatimid Ibn Tulun mosque (constructed in 878 AD), which was the centerpiece of the previous capital of al Qata'i[1] (Abu Lughod, 1971).

In addition to these military/defensive functions and religious functions, al Qahira soon developed markets to supply the city's residents. In the markets and residential areas a pattern of occupational and social segregation was established which persisted in Cairo until the nineteenth century and can still be evidenced to some degree today. The internal organization of the market was inherited from Roman and Byzantine rule under which:

the various trades and crafts in urban centers throughout the empire had been organized into corporations or "guilds", in which membership was compulsory and through which commercial activities were regulated by the state. The Arab conquerors of Egypt left these inherited occupation corporations relatively intact (Abu Lughod, 1971: 23).

Despite al Qahira's internal markets, the primary economic and commercial functions under Fatimid rule were still performed in the former capital of Fustat to the south. The dominance of Fustat was in part due to port facilities, which al Qahira lacked. However, by the middle of Fatimid rule, al Qahira began to assume a larger economic role, and associated growth of the city eclipsed its original walls by 1046-47 AD. The years 105455 saw the beginning of a twenty-year period of famine and epidemic, which ultimately hastened the decline of Fustat by focusing urban development on al Qahira. A flood of refugees from Fustat, fleeing fire and military invasion, were resettled into al Qahira, further speeding the transformation of the city. The very nature of the city, from ceremonial/religious to more residential was altered by the actions of the caliph:

The refugees from the fire were lodged in the mosques, schools and baths of the royal enclave. They were never to leave the once exclusive city. They were instead to make it their capital. The bazaars of goldsmiths and coppersmiths would stand where an avatar of God had withdrawn from his people. The grandiose palace blocks, the superb parade grounds, the tree-surrounded villas, became the grand plan of twisting narrow lanes, of mysterious cul-de-sacs, which remains the nucleus of Cairo today (Stewart, 1968: 83-5).

New walls were constructed around Cairo, in part to hide the view of Fustat's rubble. With this, the rise of al Qahira, which had acquired new residential and commercial functions, was ensured. Fustat lay in ruins and, even today, the area around old Fustat is extremely poor and economically marginal within the Cairo metro region.

Al Qahira -- 'Mother of the World'

While the Fatimid dynasty was important for the founding of al Qahira, it was under the Ayyubids that al Qahira flowered into a classical Arab capital and a global economic force. Furthermore, it was during this period that the form of the city was constructed, creating a framework which influenced its development for centuries. This period coincided with the rise of strong political leadership in al Qahira, under the famed Salah al Din, who established the Ayyubid dynasty (1169-1252).

Egypt's strong economy was based on control of the Red Sea and thus was integrated into the European global trade system. Egypt was able to control and dominate much of its economic relationships with Europe, for example, 'Egypt as middleman, raised by three hundred per cent the prices for pepper and other spices which had become more and more valued in European kitchens' (Stewart, 1968: 157). Egypt's strategic location, a central crossroads of Africa, Asia and Europe, facilitated the development of a strong, trade-based economy; the city's market areas grew and the famous Khan al Khalili market was founded during this period. Other buildings which specialized in trade functions, such as the wikalas, large buildings containing storerooms at ground level and hostel rooms for travellers and traders on the floors above, were also built. Like the markets, wikalas were segregated by merchant-type, catering to a host of specialized traders from coffee merchants to Armenian precious metals traders, to cloth merchants (see Figure 3).

Al Qahira was one of the largest cities in the world, smaller only than the Chinese cities of Hanchow and perhaps Zaytun (Abu Lughod, 1989: 212). Economic growth and political stability spurred al Qahira's population growth and spatial expansion during this period and by the early fourteenth century, the city's population reached half a million. Much of the city's urbanscape was altered by this economic and population growth. Salah al Din created new walls for al Qahira, expanding the city's territory by enclosing the area which had contained the former capitals of al Fustat, al Askar and al Qata'i (MacKenzi, 1992: 27). The new city walls were anchored by the Citadel. This large fortress complex, situated on a hi!i, commanded the view of al Qahira. The complex, still in existence, is massive and contains many large mosques, royal buildings and defensive towers.

The gradual westward movement of the shifting Nile River created new land on the western edge of al Qahira. This fluvial change led to the silting up of the port in Fustat and a new port zone, Bulaq, was created to serve al Qahira, thus guaranteeing the ascent of al Qahira over Fustat. Located to the west of the city, Bulaq developed into a new commercial/economic zone which would dominate throughout the rest of the Islamic period. Petty (1981: 135)offers this description of the new port:

Bulaq ... was a highly developed commercial zone, its pulse attuned to trade and transferral of goods to and from the inner city. As the port of the capital, Bulaq maintained a bustling cosmopolitan atmosphere heightened by the mercantile and foreign population, both oriental and occidental, that took up residence there during the later Middle Ages.

The area between the port and al Qahira consisted of a wide plain used for agricultural production and recreation, while further to the east, on the southern and western edges of the city, on the periphery of the original core, the undeveloped area was filled with gardens.

At the end of the Ayyubid empire in 1250 AD al Qahira was a vibrant city, economically integrated into the world economy of the time. The Ayyubids had completed the transfer from Fustat to al Qahira and created the city walls and the Bulaq port. These elements would define the essential form of the city for decades to come. The Ayyubids were succeeded by the Mameluks (1250-1516), former military slaves who revolted against their masters. The Mameluks focused their attention on al Qahira and during their reign the country's wealth flowed into the capital, creating a period of economic prosperity. The city expanded, though often at the cost of stagnation in the rural areas. Al Qahira's spatial expansion during the Mameluk reign included new residential areas both to the north and south of the city. The construction of the new Western Canal around 1313 opened new lands to the west of the city for orchards, farms and palatial residences (Abu Lughod, 1971).

In 1517 Ottoman rule replaced the Mameluks and Cairo entered into a period of decline. While plague and violence in the area, which had begun as early as 1340 under the Mameluks, certainly contributed to the decline of al Qahira, the city was largely a victim of a changing world economy. The development of alternative trade routes, bypassing the Red Sea, the discovery of the New World and Europe's mercantile economy shifted trade and global economic power away from Cairo. Cairo was further marginalized by its status under the Ottoman empire as a provincial capital, rather than the capital of the empire as it had been under every regime since the Fatimids. The sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries were marked by Egypt's slow slippage from the world stage until it was 'rediscovered' by the Europeans during the 1798 Napoleonic Expedition. The arrival of the French in Cairo set off a new wave of European interest in Egypt, and set the stage for transition from an Islamic political economic era to one dominated by European Imperialism.

Imperial Cairo

The French found a much less grand Cairo with the arrival of Napoleon's Expedition in 1798.[2] Once one of the largest cities in the world, Cairo then had a population of only 250,000, according to the French explorer Volney who visited the city in 1793 (Stewart, 1968). No longer a 'world city', Cairo's population had dwindled with the city's increased isolation. Although French occupation of Cairo lasted only three years, it had a profound effect on reawakening the greatly diminished linkages between Europe and 'the Orient'. In the case of Cairo, European values were quickly appropriated by the Egyptian elite who began incorporating them into life in the city. By the middle of the nineteenth century they were already establishing new Europeanized sections of Cairo, leading to a bifurcation of the city into 'traditional' and 'modern' sections. A new 'European' Cairo had been created by 1882 when formal British rule replaced Ottoman control.

It is interesting that while the dominant ideology of Cairo during the Imperial period was obviously European, it was originally replicated and reproduced on the urban landscape through the actions of the Ottoman Turkish hereditary governors who ruled Egypt. Egypt had already begun a modernization push under the rule of Mohamed All Pasha (1805-48), which continued, now with a very pro-European outlook, under Said Pasha (1854-63) and Ismail Pasha (1863-79) (Crinson, 1996). In creating a 'European' Cairo, their actions exemplify a near total rejection of traditional Islamic architectural values. So comprehensive was this rejection that according to Ibrahim (1987: 211), 'Ismail's vision of modernization was to turn Egypt into a piece of Europe and make Cairo a European city'. So complete was Ismail's identification with European values, he is reported to have stated: 'My country is no longer in Africa, it is in Europe' (Vatikiotis, 1991).

The Imperialist period both transformed portions of traditional Islamic Cairo and created new development in formerly underdeveloped areas. The transition from the Islamic to Imperialist political economic periods is perhaps best symbolized by the transfer of political power from the Islamic Citadel to Abdeen Palace, (constructed in 1863 by Ismail), the facade of which is completely European (Seton-Williams and Stocks, 1988). Located to the west of the core of the Islamic city, the construction helped to shift the city's center of gravity westward, and anchored the development of 'European' Cairo in the western section. Around Abdeen Palace the residential quarters of Ismailiya and the Ezbekeya garden district were developed. Along the bank of the Nile the new residential area Garden City was constructed. The Western Canal was filled in, ending production of agricultural products in the area. These new developments were distinctly European in focus and aided by European architects:

Much commercial development was undertaken by Ismail Pasha in the 1870s and Barillet-Deschamps redesigned the garden. 5000 gas lamps in tulip shaped glasses illuminated the gardens at night, it became the tourist as well as the business centre of Cairo and so it remained well into the 20th century (Seton-Williams and Stocks, 1988: 209).

Nearby stood Cairo's opera house, for which the opera Aida was commissioned.

In elite areas the European-style villa was the dominant residential style, reflecting the shift to European values. By the 1840s, use of the traditional Islamic mashribaya, the intricate wooden screens designed to allow light through windows while screening residents from view, was made illegal (Abu Lughod, 1971).

Other elite residential areas were constructed far to the east, in Heliopolis. Located ten miles from the center of Cairo, Heliopolis was built by a Belgian entrepreneur who modeled the suburb after Britain's new towns (Ilbert, 1985), To the south of the city, along the banks of the Nile River, the European-style suburb of Ma'adi was also created. A final locus of the Imperialist urban sphere is Gezira ('the island'), located in the middle of the Nile River. The island was home to the British Officer's club, and the Palace of Ismail Pasha as well as many residential villas.

Ismail displayed little concern for preserving the traditional Islamic city. To connect Ezbekeya to the Citadel he opened a wide boulevard, cutting through the Fatimid city:

It was two kilometers long, and in its path stood almost 400 large houses, three hundred smaller ones, and a great number of mosques, mills, bakeries and bath-houses. These were all destroyed, or cut in half and left standing like doll's houses with no outer wall, so that when the road was completed the scene resembled a city that has recently been shelled -- houses in all stages of dilapidation, though still inhabited giving most odd views of domestic interiors, frowning down upon you. (Mitchell, 1988: 65).

Cairo became divided into two realms which can be depicted as either east/west or traditional/modern, each defined in stark contrast to the other. Ironically, while the Egyptian elites sought to mimic the European style, Europeans who often came to Cairo in search of the 'Orient' retained a fondness for the traditional city. Lane-Poole (1973: 283), writing in 1898, describes the segmentation:

In front of the spacious verandah of Shepherd's Hotel -- the meeting place of all Frankish Cairo for gossip in the afternoon, and a delightful lounge when we are too lazy or tired to go sightseeing -- the eminently European shops of Ezbekiya display their plate-glass windows and the Greek, Italian, and Levantine rogues who stand smoking within, ready to cheat us; and we shall have to do some distance before we can find the picturesque cupboard-shop of the East, with its sedate occupant and its queer little stock in trade.

Economic dependency

While Cairo was becoming more 'European' in its urban form, the economy was becoming incorporated into the broader world economy through its relationship with Europe. However, while Egypt's interaction with the world economy during the Islamic period was characterized by dominance, Egypt's interaction in this period was marked by growing dependency and increasing external control:

From a country which formed one of the hubs in the commerce of the Ottoman world and beyond, and which produced and exported its own food and its own textiles, Egypt was turning into a country whose economy was dominated by the production of a single commodity, raw cotton, for the global textile industry of Europe (Mitchell 1988: 16).

The groundwork for formal European imperialism in Egypt was laid during the early part of the nineteenth century. Economically, Egypt grew deeply in debt to European creditors under Muhammad All and his successors, especially Ismail. Socially, their 'Europeanization' policy had created an indigenous class of highly educated Egyptians, many of whom took note of liberal European political philosophies. Their adoption of European political and social thought resulted in, under Ismail, a desire to limit the ruling powers of the monarch. Culminating in the Orabi Revolt, the desire for political change led to the removal of Ismail from power and British military occupation of Cairo by 1882 (Vatikiotis, 1991).

As British influence increased in Cairo, the city took over more of the functions traditionally identified with colonial cities, such as political control of The Sudan and Egypt's agricultural areas. The British became more deeply entrenched in the control of cotton in the surrounding countryside. Following British control of Egypt, Cairo's population began to increase rapidly as a result of rural-urban migration, especially in the periods following the world wars (see Table 1). Much of the city's spatial expansion was to the north, as new residential areas for migrants were created.

Cairo for the people -- the socialist revolution

In July 1952 Egyptian military officers overthrew the British-backed monarch, establishing an independent Egypt. The urban development of Egypt in this Arab socialist period, has been little examined. Investigative efforts have been hampered by limited access to national data, and a paucity of in-country field work by foreign academic experts. Under the new regime, urban policy experienced a fundamental shift towards large-scale urban projects, designed to cope with the rapidly expanding Cairo, industrialization and a massive effort to 'redesign the population map of Egypt'.

Arab socialist ideology

The 'socialist' regimes of Egypt, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser and his successor Anwar al Sadat, gradually reorientated the country's ideology to one identified as Arab Socialism or Nasserism. Though influenced by Soviet and Chinese interpretations of communism, Arab Socialism was not as rigid or authoritarian in practice. Although this regime represented a shift towards a focus on 'the masses', there remained little in the way of an avenue for popular participation in either politics or urban development. The socialist regime was inherently anti-imperialist in its stance and the elites which had dominated the imperialist period found themselves directly threatened, both in their political situation and their control of wealth. To the socialist interpretation, these elites represented the bourgeoisie and the excesses of imperialism. Much of socialist regime ideology was a direct reaction to imperialism (Tripp and Owen, 1989: 62):

Its anti-imperialist stance (Nasserist stance), the victories and successes it was able to realize in confrontation with the Imperialist West, the attacks it made on the landed aristocracy and later on big private capital, the great industrialization drive and the associated construction of an enlarged working class, all formed the basis for a feeling of 'identity of interest' between the wider popular classes and the regime.

Indeed, the symbols of imperialism, the cinemas, cabarets and hotels, became targets of violence during the struggle for independence (Stewart, 1968). Villas were broken up into smaller residences or used for state functions. Ismail Pasha's palace on Gezira, where Empress Josephine had stayed during the festivities to open the Suez Canal, became a government operated hotel (see Figure 4).

Nasserism witnessed a marked reduction of European influence on the landscape of Cairo. Following the Suez Crisis of 1956, foreign-owned businesses were nationalized, instigating an exodus of foreigners from Egypt. The economy of Egypt shifted from an external orientation towards supplying European markets to an internal focus on the development of the Egyptian economy. The new regime adhered to many standard socialist planning models; the economy was to be developed through a series of five-year plans, focusing on large-scale projects. An import-substitution policy -- which relied on Soviet 'turn-key' manufacturing operations -- was the keystone for Egyptian economic development (Waterbury, 1983). In reaction to the previous imperialist phase, little effort was made to attract foreign capital. In line with its socialist ideology, the state became involved in large-scale provision of welfare functions. According to the constitution, 'the state endeavors to secure a decent living-standard for every citizen, with the aim of providing food, housing, health, cultural and social services for all' (El Kammash, 1968: 282).

Administrative functions

With independence, Cairo, which had formerly been oriented towards Europe and played a primary role in facilitating the relationship between Europe and her Egyptian economic interests, strengthened its function as the internally focused administrative center for Egypt. The government of the new regime was strongly centralized, and sought more complete control of the Egyptian hinterland. A massive reorganization of the rural area and agricultural class ensued. Large-scale land redistribution was a key aspect of new organization, and large holdings of the landed class were subdivided and distributed to tenant farmers in small holdings. Other large land areas were devoted to collective farms which were 'scientifically' managed. Cairo served as the central control point for all policies relating to the rural areas. Huge ministerial buildings sprang up, such as the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Supply, to carry out the directives of the regime. The regime's organizational efforts were not limited to the rural areas, however, and an administrative structure to handle functions such as education, security and economic development also arose.

Much of the urban development associated with the bureaucratic growth of the new regime was focused around Midan Tahrir, an area which had been developed originally during the Imperial phase. The cornerstone of the socialist government presence was the mugamma, a huge central administrative building which handled most functions of civilian record-keeping (i.e. identity cards, drivers licenses) (see Figure 5). Indeed, the socialist era, with its promise of 'guaranteed employment' for college graduates, saw enormous growth of public sector employment, from 325,000 in 1952 to 1,035,000 in 1966-67 (Mabro, 1974). On the north-east edge of Cairo, another 'socialist' area was developed, which was the center for major planning functions under the new regime. Nasser City housed new governmental agencies, such as the Ministry of Planning, National Institute for Planning, CAPMAS (Central Agency for Population Mobilization and Statistics) and large-scale public recreation facilities, in contrast with the private clubs of imperialism. Nasser City also housed scores of high-rise apartment blocks, which included extensive housing for the 'technocrats', civil servants who worked for the new government.

Housing

The socialist government became deeply involved in the large-scale development of housing. There existed a critical need for affordable housing for the lower economic classes, many of whom had recently migrated to Cairo and were living in large slum and squatter areas on the urban periphery. The government created a public company which built thousands of apartments in poor areas of Cairo, such as Zeinhom, Helwan, Imbaba and Shubra al Khima (Mabro, 1974). Financial difficulties following the 1967 war limited the availability of funds for this endeavor, and as a result the housing was often of poor quality and neighborhoods offered little in the way of services provision. Typical housing consisted of large-scale buildings, Soviet-inspired in their design. These monoliths came to dominate the landscape in many areas, including new socialist areas as well as former Islamic or imperialist eras, where they tended to crowd out the urban morphology of previous periods (see Figure 6). These buildings differed considerably from traditional housing in Egypt which emphasized a close relationship with the surrounding community. Steinberg (1991: 75) provides this description of such new housing:

With its monotonous order of rows of apartment housing blocks it is a complete break-off from the prevailing architectural and urbanistic tradition. Known as an almost 'negative case' of public housing in the 1950s, it is presently in a pitiful state of degradation and dilapidation in terms of both its physical structure and its services. The area is marked by intensive overcrowding and rather abandoned 'public' space, which as a 'no maas land' is far from attracting the typical Cairene outdoor life.

The Nasserist government enacted a series of rent control laws which encouraged urban decay and, ironically, encouraged a high vacancy rate in the existing housing stock. Between 1952 and 1965, at roughly five-year intervals, laws were issued which reduced rents on new construction. In 1965, Law 7 reduced the rental rates on all buildings constructed after 1944 by an additional 20% -- with the result that rents for all buildings completed between 1944 and 1965 were lowered below their initial rent at the time of construction! Law 52, in 1969, replaced all previous laws regarding rent control, setting rents for new buildings at 8% of construction cost and 5% of land value. These regulations did not apply to older buildings. Rents in older buildings could only be raised by making improvements and charging tenants 12% of the cost of improvements. Without an economic incentive, landlords did not maintain their buildings, encouraging the decay of much of the older housing stock (Arab Republic of Egypt, 1977). A public-sector monopoly on building materials through 1977 ensured that construction of housing remained under state control and barred private actors from filling the housing gap.

Expansion of Cairo

Cairo's dominance of the Egyptian urban hierarchy also increased as its population swelled following the second world war (see Table 1). Increasing rural-urban migration, which began during the imperialist phase and continued after the revolution, was at first encouraged by the government to provide labor for the national industrialization effort. As a result, Cairo increasingly became the focus of the country's population. Between 1937 and 1960, Cairo's share of the urban population had risen from 34% to 37% (El Kammash, 1968) and by 1970 it had reached 42%. Cairo continued to expand westward, especially along the far bank of the Nile River which attracted much of the growth, as did the low-income areas to the north. In the midst of the imperialist sphere, along the east bank of the Nile River, the area around Midan Tahrir was redeveloped into 'socialist' space, containing the Mugamma and buildings such as the headquarters for the newly founded Arab League.

The Socialist government became increasingly concerned with the high concentration of population in Cairo. Not only was the population overwhelming the infrastructure and services of Cairo, but the concentration posed a serious national security threat in case of military attack by air. In response to this concern, a plan was formed to create four new satellite cities in the desert surrounding Cairo. These new towns were to redirect population growth from Cairo and provide alternative sites for urban development (Arab Republic of Egypt, 1983). Sadat developed the plan into an extensive new town program, calling for the construction of at least 14 new cities of various types). The goal was to create a 'new population map of Egypt' (see Figure 7). Construction began on the first city in 1977 and the plan, as a whole, represented an enormous national investment. Although policy did not result in limiting Cairo's growth or any significant relocation of the urban population, the new cities eventually attracted economic activity, especially during the transitional capitalism period (Stewart, 1996).

Although both the Nasser and Sadat administrations have been classified together in this analysis as socialist, considerable ideological differences existed. While Nasser's policies were often a reaction to the legacy of imperialism and tended to isolate Egypt from the western-dominated world economy, Sadat began the process of reconnecting Egypt with the world economy. Beginning in 1973, Sadat embraced a policy he called infitah (the opening). While there were many aspects to this policy, the goals included the limited reopening of Egypt to world capitalism. This coincided with the partial development of the private sector. The impact on the urban landscape was often very different and characterized not by state involvement, but by private initiative:

Sadat wanted to develop Egypt along a Western-style, with Western economic aid and with Western technology and experts. If Paris and Rome were favorite models for Ismail, Los Angeles and Houston were favorite models for Sadat. He let loose private developers and speculators. New luxury high-rise buildings mushroomed all over the city, replacing private villas, through massive slum clearance (Ibrahim, 1987: 214).

Cairo under capitalism

The infitah program under Sadat was never a complete transition to a capitalist economic system. The national economy remained dominated by the public sector and central planning, and only a very limited amount of capital was attracted from multinational companies. Moreover, it seems only a small circle benefited from the infitah, creating a new bourgeoisie with large amounts of wealth. The creation of this bourgeoisie, in a socialist state, contributed to a negative view of capitalism and limited the extent to which it was adopted under Sadat. Under Mubarak, who succeeded Sadat after his assassination in 1981, Egypt became more completely, if reluctantly, pushed into a capitalist system.

Egypt's transition to capitalism has been heavily instigated by outside forces, especially the World Bank and Egypt's other creditors, who viewed extensive economic reform as the only means to save Egypt's debt-ridden and low-productivity economy. It is difficult to identify a definitive date for the start of what may be termed the transitional capitalism period as negotiations with the World Bank tended to fail sporadically and then restart. However, in May 1987 the government announced economic reforms in order to meet the requirements for an IMF loan, gain access to credit and permit renegotiation of Egypt's $40 billion foreign debt (Springborg, 1989). With the institution of the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP), Egypt, somewhat unwillingly, embraced the World Bank ideology of capitalism and free market enterprise. The ERSAP created sweeping changes in the Egyptian economy, including the elimination of many consumer subsidies (Holt and Roe, 1993), privatization of state-owned industries, currency devaluation and large reductions in public spending (Sullivan, 1990).

Integration into the world economy

Egypt, therefore, is in a state of transition, moving somewhere along the progression from socialist to capitalist economic ideology. Moreover, change is occurring very rapidly, quickly undoing many of the socialist policies of the last 40 years. The most important change is the rapid and aggressive integration of Egypt into the world economy. Cairo, as the center of national economic activity, will, of course, be impacted by the change. This new phase is only beginning to make its permanent mark on the urban landscape, therefore this analysis must be considered only preliminary.

Perhaps the most obvious signs of the new political-economic phase is the large-scale penetration of agents of global capitalism into Cairo. Ten years ago, few foreign enterprises, especially outside the tourism industry, could be found in Cairo. Using an informal 'fast-food' index as a determinant of capitalist penetration, where there were once only a few Kentucky Fried Chicken and Wimpy restaurants, there are now nearly a dozen branches of Pizza Hut, as well as Arby's, TCBY, McDonalds, Taco Bell and even Chilis. Their fare, of course, can only be afforded by the well-off entrepreneurial class which has been able to make money during the economic transition. New shopping centers have proliferated, such as the up-market World Trade Center which also houses the local World Bank delegation. High quality imported goods such as Villeroy & Boch china, Clinique cosmetics and the latest videos and compact discs are now available, in part the result of more permissive import laws.

While evidence of integration into the capitalist world system can be found in many places throughout Cairo, a few areas are notable focal points, such as the Gamiyyat al Duwal al Arabiyya (Arab Union) Street in Mohandesin. The street has developed into a strip of high-class retail stores and food outlets, and is cruised nightly by fortunate young people in their imported Japanese and American cars. A further symbol of Egypt's new outward orientation is the new Foreign Ministry building, an elegant modern high-rise.

Throughout the city there has been a surge in private-sector building, the pace of which is likely to outrun overall governmental control. Perhaps the epitome of the reorientation towards the forces of capitalism is the creation of Al Rehab ('spacious'), which is being billed as the country's first privately built city. Located on the northeast fringe of Cairo, beyond Heliopolis, investors are creating affordable homes for the middle class. The 'city', really more a suburban development, is planned for 150,000 residents and 30,000 jobs. Phase one of the project has already been sold out; those homeowners can expect to take delivery in the year 2000 (Crawley, 1997). Similar projects are planned by other private developers on the outskirts of Cairo and are facilitated by the creation of the Cairo ring road. Exclusive residential communities with names such as Golf City and Beverly Hills have been newly opened or are under construction. For $250,000 a homeowner can purchase a modest villa in Golf City and live among 500 acres of artificial lakes and golf links (The Economist, 1996). As Egypt moves more deeply into the transitional capitalism period, it appears that a zone of suburbs, very similar in design and structure to American suburbs, will be created around the edges of Cairo (see Figure 8). What remains to be seen is whether or not older areas in central Cairo, created during earlier political economic eras, will be abandoned, as they were in the United States when the economically advantaged class shifted to the suburbs.

Conclusions

An analysis of Cairo's urban form from a political economic perspective gives a greater understanding of the dynamic relationship between urban form and the domestic and external political economic environments. Such an understanding is critically important in the case of cities such as Cairo, where long-term quantitative data is not available. Particularly important is the identification of dominant ideologies and their representation on the landscape. Wherever possible, the process by which the ideology is imprinted on the landscape should be analyzed and the major actors in this process identified.

While many of the western models of urban form and change are based, almost exclusively, on responses to economic transformation, political models may sometimes prove more applicable to the developing world. Economic restructuring has been the defining economic characteristic of urban change in the developed world since the 1970s. Cities in the developing world, however, have been more greatly impacted by ideological shifts, often from socialist to capitalism, and now to post-cold war 'global capitalism'. Therefore, changes in factors such as production processes, land use and transportation networks, which have dominated the transformation of urban morphology and city hierarchies in the United States, are less influential in the developing world context.

One final issue this approach raises is the transformation of urban form representing earlier political economic periods by agents in later political economic periods, as in the transformation of Islamic areas under the socialist period. How a current political economic period chooses to modify the urban form of older areas indicates the current value placed on the former political economic period. Ismail, in the imperialist period, carved a boulevard through Islamic Cairo, destroying a great many buildings. This is reflective of the low value Ismail held for the Islamic political-economic ideology and values. Conversely, the preservation of urban form relating to a particular political economic period can indicate identification with or support for the ideals represented by the particular urban form. For example, the government of Egypt in the current transitional period is actively conserving and restoring the Islamic urban sphere in an effort to show identification with Islamic values during a time of great conflict between Islamic groups and the government. This is only a partial explanation, however, as preservation of the Islamic monuments is also strongly supported by western experts and the Egyptian tourist industry. At the same time, a movement to preserve the imperial urban heritage has developed among the Egyptian upper class, perhaps reflecting their close identification with European thought and culture.

* I would like to thank Richard Pillsbury and Donald Reid, both of Georgia State University, and the anonymous referees for their comments on earlier drafts of this manuscript.

1 Al Qahira was actually the fourth Arab capital of Egypt. The earlier capitals were al Askar, al Qata'i (destroyed by the Abbasids in 950 AD) and Fustat.

2 The name 'Cairo', as the city came to be known, is thought to be a European corruption of the name al Qahira.

Table 1 Population of Cairo[a]

Year  Population
 
1882 398,000
1897 598,000
1907 678,000
1917 790,000
1927  1,064,000
1937 1,312,000
1947 2,090,000
1960 3,353,000
1966 4,220,000
1976  5,074,000
1986 8,762,000
1995 9,656,000

a The overall population of the Greater Cairo Region is significantly higher: unfortunately such data is inconsistently reported.

Sources: 1882-1976 = Sobhi (1987: 232); 1986 (excludes 95,000 daily commuters) = United Nations (1990: 3): 1995 = World Bank (1997).

DIAGRAM: Figure 1 Cairo: political economic periods

MAP: Figure 2 Urban spheres in Cairo

PHOTO (BLACK & WHITE): Figure 3 A Wikala in Khan al Khalili, now used as artisan workshops and a performance hall

PHOTO (BLACK & WHITE): Figure 4 The palace of Ismail Pasha on Gezira, now a Marriot hotel

PHOTO (BLACK & WHITE): Figure 5 The mugamma administrative building, Midan Tahrir

PHOTO (BLACK & WHITE): Figure 6 Large-scale middle-class housing crowds a mosque

MAP: Figure 7 The socialist 'New Population Map of Egypt'

MAP: Figure 8 Future suburban zones in the transitory period

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