THE REGIONAL SOURCES OF POWER-SHARING FAILURE: THE CASE OF LEBANON

By Brenda M. Seaver

Source: Political Science Quarterly, Summer2000, Vol. 115 Issue 2, p247, 25p.

Intercommunal violence and national disintegration are among the most pressing problems facing scholars and practitioners in the late twentieth century. The international media have recently spotlighted several deeply divided or "plural"[sup1] societies, including Bosnia, Russia, Sri Lanka, Canada, Rwanda, Northern Ireland, India, South Africa, and Lebanon. What makes the persistence of subnational group identity over national identity especially interesting is its occurrence despite powerful homogenizing social and economic forces sweeping many regions. Somewhat surprisingly, the dissemination and popularity of Western ideas, institutions, and values cannot seem to eradicate traditional group ties in many societies.

The central problem facing social scientists and policy makers is how to achieve "democratic stability"[sup2] in these fragile states. Reducing inter-communal violence in plural societies by creating stable regimes of any kind is clearly the priority. However, engineering democratic arrangements becomes the next goal in many cases because of liberal democracy's widely recognized Status as the most legitimate type of political regime. Not only does liberal democracy allow citizens the widest degree of political participation, it also provides for the rule of law, guarantees civil liberties, and supplies states with institutions and conflict resolution norms that reduce the chances of war with other democracies.[sup3]

The challenge of building democratic regimes in deeply divided societies becomes even more complicated in regions where groups with shared identities transcend state boundaries. The transnational nature of many communal groups has the potential of transforming domestic policy issues into regional crises involving several states (for example, Kurds, Palestinians, Serbs, Tutsis). When intercommunal conflicts become regionalized, the threat of interstate war is superimposed on the existing threat of civil war.

The purpose of this article is to contribute to the debate concerning the prospects for achieving stable democracy in plural societies. Although a vast literature exists that deals specifically with this issue, this article tackles the problem from a different angle: Rather than focus on how to engineer power-sharing arrangements in burgeoning democracies or how to facilitate conditions favorable to building democracies in such states, it emphasizes the determinants of democratic breakdown in deeply divided societies. More specifically, its goal is to examine the failure of consociational democracy. The consociational power-sharing approach has been touted as the most promising model of political mechanisms for achieving sustainable democracy in societies beset by severe communal cleavages.[sup4]

Method

Rather than conducting a comparative study examining various cases of consociational failure (Cyprus, Nigeria), this article will utilize the plausibility probe approach to analyze only one case--the Lebanese civil war of 1975-1990. A plausibility probe is a preliminary test of hypotheses or candidate-theories that is used to determine if more rigorous tests would be worthwhile.[sup5] The analysis is restricted to a single case for theoretical purposes rather than for the sake of convenience, as Lebanon represents the only durable consociational democracy to date that ultimately resulted in failure. For example, Cyprus's consociational democracy lasted only three years (1960-1963), primarily because the Greek and Turkish elites never quite agreed to cooperate.[sup6] Nigeria's lasted only nine years (1957-1966) and was only marginally consociational.[sup7] Although Malaysia has been referred to as an example of consociational breakdown, its power-sharing arrangements never quite collapsed; rather, Malaysia's grand coalition experienced a temporary breakdown during the 1969 riots but was never fully abandoned.[sup8] The Lebanese consociational system, in contrast, persisted for thirty-two years and endured periods of severe internal strain, including the 1958 civil war and the influx of Palestinian refugees and guerrillas following three critical regional events: the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, the Six-Day War of 1967, and the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) expulsion from Jordan in 1970-1971. Moreover, all major consociational principles initially operated in Lebanon, which served as the glue that held the fragmented society together. Although Lebanon's confessional system has always been fragile, it represents the most successful case of consociational democracy in the developing world. Consequently, its breakdown came as more of a surprise than the failure of other consociational democracies in the Third World. Although a single case cannot falsify a hypothesis or theory, it can provide powerful empirical support for a theory, especially when very few cases of a phenomenon exist.

The comparative literature on consociational democracy largely revolves around the work of Arend Lijphart, among others. This literature offers the most promising domestic explanation of consociational failure. For although Lijphart's elite-centered research has emphasized the political determinants of consociational success, it is reasonable to apply it to failure as well. According to consociational theorists such as Lijphart, failure will occur when the elites comprising the ruling coalition cease to cooperate and compromise with one another and/or when the power-sharing arrangements no longer incorporate every significant communal group in the society. Many comparativists interested in democratic transitions, moreover, tend to share Lijphart's emphasis on the strategic choices of key actors and the importance of elite pact-making to the success or failure of nascent democracies.[sup9]

This article, however, focuses on the following "deeper" hypothesis of consociational failure which links internal regime instability to external (that is, regional) conflicts: "Consociational failure is a product of inauspicious regional factors and turbulent regional systems. Although consociational failure stems from the cessation of elite consensus, regional factors represent important antecedent variables that contribute to elite dissension and ultimately regime collapse."[sup10]

This alternate hypothesis not only incorporates the importance of elite fragmentation for regime failure but goes beyond consociational theory because of its emphasis on how turmoil and developments occurring within the region upset the elite consensus, ultimately triggering regime collapse. In short, this hypothesis subsumes the hypothesis derived from Lijphart's work and represents a better explanation for consociational failure due to its ability to explain the origins of elite fragmentation and the atrophy of power-sharing arrangements. According to Karl Popper, it has more depth, since it specifies an ultimate cause of consociational breakdown rather than emphasizing a more proximate cause.

This research hypothesis is derived from the recent resurgence of regional studies in international relations, which focus on the analytic importance of regional dynamics and subsystems as distinct from the field's more typical emphases on the international and domestic sources of interstate behavior.[sup11] Moreover, during the 1960s and 1970s there was strong interest in the regional level, both in subsystem research and in integration studies.[sup12] Although much of the recent literature emphasizes the sources of regional cooperation (often treating regional dynamics as a dependent variable), it is also reasonable to deduce hypotheses from this literature concerning the domestic consequences of regional relations.

The Consociational Democracy Model

Consociational democracies, according to Lijphart, share four general characteristics.[sup13] First, political elites representing all significant segments of the plural society must participate in some form of grand decision-making coalition. Second, a mutual veto must exist, allowing elites of each group to challenge decisions detrimental to their particular groups. Third, proportionality must be the standard principle of political representation, civil service appointments, and the allocation of public funds. Fourth, each segmental group must be allowed to run its own internal affairs. In his later writings, Lijphart distinguishes between primary and secondary consociational characteristics, with the grand coalition and segmental autonomy belonging to the former category and proportionality and the minority veto belonging to the latter.[sup14]

At the core of his theory is the necessary condition of elite accommodation institutionalized in consociational devices that can produce stability. In his earlier works, Lijphart identifies four prerequisites for elite cooperation: awareness of the dangers inherent in fragmented systems; commitment to system maintenance; ability to transcend subcultural cleavages; and ability to forge appropriate solutions that can meet the demands of the subgroups.[sup15] In addition to these prerequisites, Lijphart introduces five favorable conditions for elite cooperation and the stable support of nonelites: first, a multiple balance of power--all segmental groups are minorities and three or four subgroups are preferable to two subgroups of roughly equal power or one hegemonic subgroup; second, size of country--small is better; third, the presence of overarching loyalties (moderate nationalism); fourth, segmental isolation (even federalism); and finally, a prior tradition of elite accommodation.[sup16] In his older works he suggests five other favorable conditions: the unifying effect of external threats; widespread support of the elite cartel system; distinct lines of cleavage; socioeconomic equality among segmental groups; and a low decision-making load on the political system.[sup17]

Lijphart is careful to caution his readers against perceiving his list of favorable conditions as either necessary or sufficient conditions: "I should like to emphasize that the most important aspect of these favorable factors is they are not decisive: They are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for the adoption or success of power-sharing. They are merely helpful factors. This means that even when all or most of the conditions are favorable, the success of power-sharing is by no means guaranteed. And even when many conditions, or the most crucial ones, are unfavorable, success is still possible."[sup18] According to Lijphart, consociational devices may or may not produce democratic stability.

Criticisms of Lijphart's Model

Before reviewing some of the criticisms leveled against Lijphart's model, it is only fair to acknowledge its merits. First, consociational theory is able to explain the stability of democracy in the smaller European countries better than other theories that predicted democratic failure in societies lacking overlapping memberships, cross-cutting cleavages, and a considerable degree of homogeneity or cultural-ideological consensus.[sup19] Lijphart's list of favorable and unfavorable conditions, too, is persuasive. Many of the states that experienced consociational failure did lack several of the favorable conditions.

In spite of its strengths, consociational theory has been attacked on a variety of grounds for legitimate reasons. First, political scientists have emphasized that power-sharing devices have not consistently yielded peace and stable democracy, and that the connection between consociational democracy and stability has not been sufficiently demonstrated. All one has to do is glance at the list of consociational failures (Lebanon, Cyprus, Nigeria) to see that consociational devices cannot always prevent intercommunal conflict, especially in the developing world.

Second, many scholars have asserted that some of the smaller European countries from which the model was derived, particularly Switzerland and the Netherlands, are not truly consociational.[sup20] Switzerland, for example, possesses an initiative and referendum procedure that undermines other consociational devices because of its emphasis on what the majority (mass) desires.[sup21] Still others have identified factors other than consociational devices that promoted stability in the smaller European cases. High levels of prosperity following World War II, for instance, may have played a greater role in preserving peace in Switzerland and Austria than consociational devices.[sup22]

Third, social scientists have argued that consociational democracy may exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, intercommunal tensions.[sup23] In one study, for example, it was argued that the Netherlands became a more deeply plural society after consociational devices were instituted in 1917.[sup24] Other studies blame Lebanon's collapse entirely on the extent to which its political arrangements embodied, rather than tried to eliminate, confessionalist differences.[sup25] The confessional schism built into the system, according to one scholar, produced the high level of intercommunal hostility that culminated in the 1975 civil war. A number of social scientists, moreover, assert that consociational devices increase friction in plural societies, because many socioeconomic problems are ignored to avoid intersectarian conflicts. The depoliticization of serious problems renders the decision-making apparatus virtually immobile--an important problem that even Lijphart addresses. When serious policy problems are ignored and therefore unresolved by the bureaucratic machinery, citizens desiring changes or reforms become increasingly frustrated, resulting in protests and in some cases violence.

Fourth, several critics have charged that consociational democracy is either not democratic or not sufficiently democratic. The emphasis that consociational theory places on deferential attitudes toward elites and the secretive nature of elite decision making seem to be at odds with normative democratic theory. Certain critics have even referred to consociational democracy as "consociational oligarchy" or "elite conspiracy."[sup26] Many of these critics dislike the lack of opposition in consociational democracies. Lijphart persuasively defends the democratic nature of the consociational model, however, by emphasizing the degree to which it conforms to Robert Dahl's definition of polyarchy, as well as the fact that minorities are guaranteed representation by the model while majoritarian arrangements deprive minorities of a political voice.[sup27]

Fifth, Lijphart's favorable conditions have been attacked on the basis that they are not really conditions at all.[sup28] These critics are frustrated by Lijphart's admission that his conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient. The problem is that when scientists try to falsify hypotheses derived from a theory that includes conditions that may or may not have an impact on the dependent variable, falsification becomes extremely challenging if not impossible. If Lijphart's theory is narrowed to include only its theoretical core--the institutionalization of elite cooperation through certain consociational devices--then it is potentially falsifiable.[sup29]

Sixth, Lijphart's research has been challenged on the basis that it does not fulfill Imre Lakatos's early criteria of a good research program.[sup30] According to Ian Lustick, Lijphart rejects precision of concepts and measurement, consistency, and standards of evidence and is therefore practicing "impressionistic" social science. Additionally, Lustick argues that Lijphart has undertaken an epistemological shift away from positivist science and altered his scholarly commitments in the direction of prescription in his later works, particularly in his 1985 book on South Africa and his American Political Science Review article on India. Moreover, David Laitin's criticism that Lijphart recommends power-sharing mechanisms irrespective of whether conditions are favorable seems to resemble Lustick's point that Lijphart tends to confuse explanation and prescription.[sup31]

Finally, and most relevant for this article, social scientists have argued that elite willingness to compromise is a better explanation for democratic stability in plural societies than are consociational devices, and that the determinants of elite cooperation are consequently more important in explaining stability than specific political mechanisms.[sup32] Even Lijphart openly admits that elite behavior can be mystifying, which is one of the reasons why he includes his various favorable conditions, which are easier to identify than the determinants of elite behavior.[sup33] Thus, elite willingness to cooperate may be the only necessary condition. If this is the case, scholars should focus on identifying the sources of elite cooperation rather than on the effects of certain political mechanisms that may not even be necessary for democratic stability, or on myriad conditions that do not even achieve the status of necessary conditions.

Lebanon's Power-Sharing Arrangements

In order to evaluate the Lebanon case and the extent to which it supports the research hypothesis, it is necessary to review briefly the power-sharing arrangements in place in 1975. Prior to the civil war, Lebanon was one of the few liberal democracies in the Middle East. What made its democratic regime extraordinary was its persistence in spite of a multiconfessional society with an overarching Muslim/Christian cleavage and seventeen different sects. Whereas Lebanon's Muslim population consists primarily of three sects (Shi'ite, Sunni, and Druze), its Christian residents are divided into several sects (Maronite, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, and Armenian Catholic, among others). Protestants and Jews also reside in Lebanon, though in much smaller numbers. The Palestinians that resided in Lebanon at the time were composed of primarily Sunni Muslims (85 percent) and secondarily non-Maronite Christians (15 percent).[sup34] In the case of the Palestinian Muslims, most were not legal citizens of the state.

When Lebanon achieved independence from France in 1943, two popular Lebanese elites, Bishara al-Khuri (the Maronite president) and Riyad al-Sulh (the Sunni prime minister) devised the National Pact. A carefully-crafted verbal agreement, the National Pact stipulated that the Christians of Lebanon would forego European protection and all military pacts with Western powers, while the Muslims agreed to set aside any pan-Arab desires and accept Lebanon's existing geographical boundaries. Rather than aligning with either the Western or the Islamic camps, the hope was to build a sense of overarching Lebanese national identity that would pacify both Muslims and Christians. In addition, the pact-makers incorporated into the political system a confessional schism when they reconfirmed that future Lebanese presidents would be Maronite Christians, premiers would be Sunni Muslims, and the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies would be Shi'ite Muslim. It was further agreed that Christians and Muslims would be represented in parliament according to a 6:5 ratio (based on the 1932 census), and civil service appointments and public funding decisions would also be made on a sectarian basis.

Lebanon's national covenant supplements the 1926 constitution crafted by the French in conjunction with Lebanese jurists. According to the constitution's provisions, a parliament popularly elected every four years elects a president of the republic who serves a six-year term. The president appoints the prime minister, while the prime minister forms a cabinet that will hold the confidence of the parliament. By the 1970s the president had developed a considerable amount of independence by making use of powers granted him by the French-inspired constitution. These powers included veto authority, the power to dissolve the parliament, decree powers, and the authority to appoint and dismiss the prime minister and cabinet. Lastly, the constitution included a general provision that the confessional groups in Lebanon be represented proportionately in parliament.

Prior to 1975 Lebanon's power-sharing arrangements had been praised by policy makers and scholars alike for their ability to sustain a limited democracy and maintain civil order in a deeply divided, modernizing society set in a tumultuous region.[sup35] Other scholars such as Michael Hudson, however, correctly recognized the weak edifice upon which the regime's political consensus rested.[sup36] Lebanon's brief civil war in 1958, according to Hudson, was only one indication of the political system's inherent frailty. Modernization and its concomitant force, social mobilization, were more important indicators of instability due to the host of problems they create for democratic regimes. Most notably, these processes increased the decision-making demands on the Lebanese system and contributed to unevenness in regional development within Lebanon, while at the same time elites proved unable to integrate the increasing number of nontraditional interest groups and parties into the system due to their well-justified fear that it would result in a more radicalized Muslim state.

The Outbreak of Civil War

Despite the enduring quality of these power-sharing arrangements, events in 1975 proved too formidable for the regime and its ruling coalition. Two events are widely cited in the historical record as marking the beginning of the Lebanese civil war.[sup37] The first occurred in February 1975, during which time Lebanese fishermen's unions in Sidon, Tyre, and Tripoli jointly protested the establishment of the Protein Company, a modern high-technology monopolistic fishing company owned in large part by former President Camille Chamoun, a Maronite Christian. In contrast to the Tripoli strike, which passed relatively quietly, the strike in Sidon on 25 February provoked the Lebanese Army, which promptly began firing upon protesters, mortally wounding Ma'ruf Sa'ad, the Sunni Muslim leader of the Popular Nasserist Organization of Sidon. During the following two weeks, demonstrations convulsed virtually all of Lebanon's major cities, with the most intense fighting occurring between troops and gunmen in Sidon. In an effort to prevent the Lebanese Army from taking over the city, Palestinian commandos fought alongside radical Lebanese militiamen. This level of Palestinian-leftist cooperation exemplified the extent to which socioeconomic and political discontent was becoming inextricably intertwined with the Palestinian issue.

The second event erupted on 13 April 1975, at which time Pierre Gemayel, the leader of the Maronite-dominated Kata'ib party (the Phalangists) attended the consecration of a new church in the Christian Beirut suburb, Ayn al-Rumana. Unknown assailants approached the church in two cars and opened fire, killing three Christians. Within a matter of hours, a group of Maronite militiamen at Ayn al-Rumana retaliated by ambushing a bus containing mostly Palestinian as well as some Lebanese passengers who were on their way to the Tel al-Za'atar refugee camp after attending a gathering in Sabra. Twenty-seven passengers were killed and twenty others wounded. The incident incited heavy fighting throughout the country between the Kata'ib and the Palestinian militiamen and leftist-Muslims, resulting in over 300 dead in three days.[sup38]

As a result of the upheaval, Kamal Jumblatt, head of the Progressive Socialist party and leader of the burgeoning Lebanese National Movement umbrella organization, declared a boycott of any government containing Kata'ib representatives, while PLO leader Yasir Arafat took the opposite tack and tried to calm the situation. The Maronite parties (Kata'ib, National Liberal, National Bloc) removed their ministers from the cabinet, which led to Prime Minister Rashid al-Sulh's resignation. Despite their opposition to the political demands made by Jumblatt, the traditional Sunni, Shi'ite and Druze leaders (zu'ama) finally sided with Jumblatt a few days later and consequently boycotted the Kata'ib. In the meantime, the country was in the process of polarizing into two broad movements--the "progressive" Lebanese National Movement and the "conservative" Lebanese Front. The Lebanese Front was led by Maronite elites Pierre Gemayel, Camille Chamoun, Suleiman Franjiyeh, and Father Kassis of the Lebanese Monastic Orders, and was backed by the Lebanese Forces. Heavy fighting continued between the two movements through October 1976, at which time general hostilities ceased owing to the assistance of other Arab governments (the Riyadh and Cairo conferences) and the subsequent presence of an Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) composed primarily of Syrian troops. Unfortunately for Lebanon, internecine fighting punctuated by interludes of relative calm would continue for fifteen years, largely fueled, but sometimes mitigated, by Syria's dominant presence in Lebanon and Israel's occupation of part of southern Lebanon.

Following the outbreak of civil war and Syria's intervention in 1976, social scientists and area specialists attributed the regime breakdown to a variety of internal factors, including the demographic shift that increasingly favored the Muslims over the Christians; the confessional schism that granted a privileged status to the Maronites over the Muslims; the rise of a radicalized intelligentsia supportive of sociopolitical change and pan-Arabism; and the inability of Lebanese elites to deal effectively with regional development and socioeconomic disparities which generally, though not exclusively, disadvantaged the Muslims. Moreover, many Middle East experts have emphasized that the collapse of the Lebanese system cannot be solely attributed to sectarian hostilities; class and identity cleavages coexisted with the communal cleavage to produce such an unfortunate outcome.[sup39] In the economic realm, rising prices, declining wages, high inflation, and low national production rates, together with a service- and export-oriented economy and the Middle East oil revolution of 1973-1974, magnified the disparity between the rich and the poor.[sup40] These adverse economic conditions coalesced with growing social unrest over the lack of attention paid to the poorer regions in southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and the Akkar region. In sum, though most scholars place considerable blame on Israel, Syria, the Palestinians, and the cold war for Lebanon's predicament, those focusing on the theoretical aspects of regime failure, as opposed to the civil war's causes, largely emphasize the deficiencies of the political power-sharing arrangement and its inability to regulate elite discord and elite-mass conflict as well as meet the needs of a modernizing country experiencing the forces of social mobilization.[sup41]

The Impact of Regional Instability

In order to comprehend fully the forces responsible for the Lebanese government's demise, it is necessary not only to identify the internal and external factors that converged to bring about its collapse but also to take the additional step of assessing the relationship between the two sets of influences. Although the elite coalition in Lebanon faced considerable challenges and exhibited signs of fragmentation at various times after 1943, regional disputes and their consequences were the main sources of elite discord that fragmented the fragile ruling consensus and eventuated in regime failure in 1975-1976.[sup42] In more specific terms, the escalation of the Arab-Israeli dispute after 1967--particularly its Palestinian dimension--and the beginning of the Arab-Israeli peace settlement process in the 1970s increased the load on the Lebanese political system, which divided its masses and subsequently destroyed the elite consensus and Lebanon's proclaimed ideological neutrality. Furthermore, Arab nationalism and the synergy it generated with Palestinian nationalism augmented inter-Arab tensions by producing a shift in the region's balance of power. The new regional power configuration, in turn, accentuated divisions within Lebanese society and culminated in Syria's dominant presence in Lebanese politics, which persists even today. Moreover, the Arab-Israeli dispute, its attendant peace settlement process, pan-Arabism, and inter-Arab discord cannot be viewed as separate regional factors having impact on Lebanon's fate, since they interact with and mutually reinforce one another.

Had there been no Palestinian crisis--an inherently regional problem--the Lebanese regime might have persisted beyond 1975-1976 despite its internal centrifugal tendencies. At the very least, if the Palestinian problem had never existed, there would have been more time for strong elites to emerge who could have dealt with the difficulties of modernization by carrying on the Shihab tradition of social reforms and instituting moderate political reforms (for example, increased power of the prime minister and the cabinet, development projects, greater political representation for the Shi'ite sect) without completely threatening the Maronite population. Most importantly, these reforms would have been enacted in a less ideologically-charged society with far fewer militias and radical groups, since their raison d'etre would no longer exist.

The Palestinian Crisis

Whereas scholars disagree over whether the Lebanese regime would have imploded even if the Palestinian problem had not existed, virtually all Middle East specialists concede that the presence and activities of the Palestinian resistance movement and refugees in Lebanon significantly destabilized the regime in 1975-1976 because of the regime's weak conflict-regulating mechanisms and the pressures of modernization.

The presence of Palestinian refugees on the outskirts of Lebanon's major cities (Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon) and in southern Lebanon after 1948 was enough to weaken the Lebanese government for two reasons: it shifted the Muslim-Christian demographic balance in favor of the Muslims, which threatened the Maronite population; and it presented the host regime with additional social, political, and economic challenges. According to the 1932 census (the last census taken in Lebanon), Christians slightly outnumbered Muslims, and the Maronites constituted the largest sect.[sup43] By the mid- to late-1970s, however, it was estimated that the Muslims had surpassed the Christians in number due to higher Muslim birth rates.[sup44] These demographic changes concerned the Maronites, who feared that Lebanon would be converted into a Muslim state if the Muslims increased their political representation. This fear reinforced the Maronites' insecurity, which stemmed from their minority status in the broader Arab world. It was partly this fear that drove the Lebanese government to clamp down on the refugee camps. It sought to maintain order as well as prevent the Palestinians from organizing a nationalist movement that could lead to greater social and political demands by the masses as well as security problems with Israel.

But it was not until the 1967 Six-Day War. a pivotal regional event, that the Palestinians began to play a fundamental role in eroding the stability of Lebanon's regime. Prior to 1967, Lebanon had managed to remain detached from the Arab-Israeli dispute, with the exception of its limited participation in the 1948 war. After the 1967 war, however, the Palestinian population in Lebanon increased from roughly 140,000 to over 240,000, and the Fedayeen (Arab commandos) began launching raids across the Lebanon-Israel border with increased regularity, especially after the 1969 Cairo Agreement condoned such behavior.[sup45] In addition, the Israeli army's overwhelming victory and the unequivocal support provided to Israel by the United States following the outbreak of war mobilized the large Palestinian refugee camp population and its militias by igniting both Palestinian and Arab nationalist feeling. Given the crushing defeat of the Arab armies and the PLO's increasing awareness that the Arab regimes would subordinate the issue of a Palestinian homeland to each of their national interests, the PLO recognized that it was on its own and needed to achieve independence from the Arab regimes in order to fulfill its nationalist goal. Meanwhile, the PLO's guerrilla activities expectedly provoked the Maronite-led government, which sought to avoid a military confrontation with Israel.

Although most Westerners associate the PLO with the centrist al-Fatah organization led by Yasir Arafat, other Palestinian groups, often referred to as the Palestinian rejectionists, were far more extreme than Fatah in both their goals and methods. Whereas the Marxist groups sought to promote social revolution, Fatah's goal was more nationalist in character. Thus, the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), led by George Habash; the Marxist Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), led by Nail Hawatmeh; the PFLP-General Command led by Ahmed Jabril; Sa'iqa, sponsored by the Syrian Ba'athist Party; and the Arab Liberation Front, sponsored by the Iraqi Ba'athist party, all coexisted with Fatah in Lebanon, though not very peacefully. The rejectionist groups frequently organized their own attacks on Israel, often without Arafat's blessing after he became chairman of the PLO in 1969.

The 1967 war also had a direct impact on Syria's relationship with Lebanon, which would have telling consequences for the Lebanese regime nine years later. Syria has always sought to reserve for itself a patronship role over Lebanon, given the belief held by many Syrians that their country's boundary with Lebanon was artificially drawn up by France to suit its colonial interests, and given the presence of approximately 300,000 Syrian workers in Lebanon.[sup46] The immediate problem, however, was that Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights increased the strategic significance of Lebanon to the Syrian regime. For if the Israeli army was to penetrate southern Lebanon in addition to occupying the Golan Heights, it could potentially attack Syria from two fronts. Thus, if Israel were able to annex or occupy southern Lebanon, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) would only have to travel about eighteen miles to Damascus via the Bekaa Valley.

Alternatively, an Israeli/PLO conflict could have led to partition, which was also undesirable in Syrian calculations. Specifically, if PLO operations provoked Israeli intervention in Lebanon, Syria feared the Maronite Christians would solicit support from Israel and possibly create a state of their own in the Mount Lebanon area, while Israel annexed southern Lebanon. The remaining Lebanese territory would then take the form of a leftist guerrilla state supported by Iraq and Libya, which would be an ideal beachhead into Syria. Iraq and Libya directly threatened the Syrian Ba'athist regime, because of their intention to turn Lebanon into a confrontation state against Israel, which would inevitably endanger Syria's security. Another undesirable scenario involved the leftist-Muslim camp defeating the rightist-Maronite camp in a civil war, resulting in a radicalized Lebanon, which again would be permeable to Iraqi and Libyan influence. Consequently, Hafiz al-Assad, Syria's leader prior to and following the civil war, understood that although he needed to support the Palestinian resistance movement, he also needed to exert control over it in order to preserve the Lebanese regime and forestall Israel's occupation of Lebanon or other adverse outcomes.

The 1970-1971 Jordanian civil war further intensified Syria's interest in Lebanon. During the late 1960s, King Hussein found himself suffering increasing Israeli reprisals for the Fedayeen's commando raids against Israel. As a result, the Jordanian government was teetering on the brink of collapse, impelling King Hussein to confront the Palestinian resistance organizations and ultimately expel them from Jordan. This confrontation triggered widespread fighting between governmental forces and the Palestinian resistance organizations, as well as Syrian intervention designed to aid the Palestinians. Following the Palestinian resistance organizations' relocation to Lebanon, Assad tried to exert control over the Palestinian commandos but often found himself in conflict with Arafat and other Palestinian leaders who opposed foreign manipulation of the Palestinian resistance movement. Moreover, estimates indicate that Lebanon's Palestinian population during this time mushroomed to over 350,000, which made Assad's task of controlling the PLO and Arafat's goal of a united Palestinian front even more daunting.[sup47]

Finally, Israel's role in the Palestinian crisis and in Lebanon's spiral toward civil war cannot be overstated. In addition to representing a critical part of Syria's calculus, Israel's foreign policy toward Lebanon--namely, its policy of using air strikes, mortar attacks, and incursions to induce a response from the Lebanese government similar to that displayed in Jordan in 1970--played a fundamental role in intensifying conflict within the region as well as promoting instability in Lebanon. For example, Israel's raids on Beirut in 1968 and 1973, its support for the Maronite Christians during the civil war, and its sponsorship of the Southern Lebanon Army (SLA) and its leader, Sa'ad Haddad, dealt a serious blow to the Lebanese regime by fragmenting the Muslim camp and making the Lebanese Army appear impotent and sectarian.

Arab Nationalism, the Palestinian Crisis, and Inter-Arab Discord

In its purest form, the pan-Arab doctrine postulates the existence of a single Arab nation as a present and past reality. Due to the supranationalist nature of pan-Arabism, state boundaries are viewed as artificial constructions. In reality, pan-Arabism has been manipulated by various Arab leaders in a realpolitik fashion to benefit their regimes over others in the region.[sup48] Regimes in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Egypt have all sought the guardian role of pan-Arabism at various times. Unquestionably, Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser was the most successful of the Arab leaders in fostering pan-Arab unity--an effort that culminated in the creation of the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria (1958-1961). Following Nasser's death in 1970, Syria and Iraq have competed for the post, primarily by attempting to gain the leadership role of the Palestinian movement. The fierce competition between the two states stems in part from Iraq's Arab nationalist tradition and the regime's perception of itself as the "legitimate" headquarters of the radical Ba'athist party. Syria also asserts a similar historical claim, as it was Damascus rather than Baghdad that was chosen to host the first brief independent Arab state during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[sup49] This intense rivalry, however, also stems from another important source of friction addressed earlier: Iraq's preference for a radicalized regime in Lebanon that could serve as a confrontation state against Israel; and Syria's desire to avoid this outcome, since both Israeli-Lebanese military conflict and a Lebanese regime aligned with Iraq would endanger Syria's security.

Despite pan-Arabism's peak in the 1950s and early 1960s under Nasser, regional events have continued to influence its intensity and resonance, particularly with the Arab masses. Whereas the Arab regimes have often possessed equivocal attitudes toward Arab and Palestinian nationalism and have consistently used it as a weapon when national interests dictated, the masses have been extremely receptive. The outcome of the 1967 war and its attendant Arab territorial losses, for example, inflamed Arabs in Israel's neighboring states, re-suiting in even more fervent pan-Arab and Palestinian nationalist sentiment among many Muslims. This unity also briefly occurred at the regime level, for the war initially united the Arab regimes (including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) in their refusal to grant Israel recognition until their lost territories were regained. Most important for Lebanon, however, the ascendant activism that emerged among the Palestinians coincided with rising protests and discontent that manifested itself among the Muslim lower classes in Lebanon as well as in middle strata, both of which had been virtually shut out of the political system. Hence, the movement for social change quickly became linked with the Palestine liberation movement.

The 1973 Yom Kippur War, in contrast, produced ambiguous results for the Arab nationalist movement. While the war restored a sense of Arab pride and confidence due to a number of Arab military accomplishments early in the war and the power wielded by the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) during the oil embargo, its consequences proved extremely divisive for the Arab regimes. Rejectionist states such as Iraq, Libya, and Algeria continued to advocate the nonrecognition of Israel, while Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and even Arafat began to soften their positions on the existence of Israel, with the intent of focusing on social and economic problems at home and using more diplomatic means to regain their lost territories.[sup50] In the case of Syria, its focal concern was the return of the Golan Heights. Consequently, Assad wished to use the recognition of Israel as a bargaining chip to ensure the return of his territory. Meanwhile, Arafat's softened position produced a split in the PLO in 1974 in which the PFLP and Arab Liberation Front formed the Rejection Front.[sup51] Thus, the Arab nationalist movement began to be overshadowed by individual national interests after 1973.

The 1973 War also contributed to a seminal regional event that would dramatically alter the regional power configuration, divide the Arab world, and further endanger Lebanon's stability: Egypt's decision to chart a separate peace with Israel with the assistance of U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. It is no secret that one of Kissinger's primary goals was to break up the united Arab front by using a step-by-step approach, and the Arab states correctly recognized this at the time.[sup52] Not surprisingly, the Syrian, Iraqi, Libyan, and Jordanian regimes, as well as Arab nationalists and Palestinians residing in Lebanon, opposed Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's negotiations with Kissinger over the return of the Sinai to Egypt. One of the most divisive parts of these negotiations, however, involved the second disengagement agreement, the Sinai II interim agreement. The Sinai II negotiations agitated Arab nationalists within and beyond Lebanon's borders, in part because of Egypt's deviance from Arab goals but mostly because the Palestinian problem--the central regional issue-- was completely ignored in the agreement. As a result, Assad publicly attacked Sadat for having forsaken the struggle against Israel and demanded that Sadat promote international recognition of the PLO. Shortly thereafter, Sadat's 1977 trip to Jerusalem and the Camp David Accords of 1978 further deepened Egypt's isolation, which would continue to exacerbate sectarian and ideological divisions in Lebanon.

Perhaps most critical for Lebanon's future, however, the 1975 agreement and Egypt's decision to promote a separate peace for itself left Syria to face Israel alone. This development reinforced Syria's view of Lebanon as its protectorate, while it also contributed to Syria's broader strategy to form a new power bloc in the fertile crescent consisting of Syria, Jordan, the PLO, and Lebanon.[sup53] Syria's strategy, however, met with little success, as Assad could neither control the actions of the fragmented PLO nor exert control over King Hussein, who was increasingly following Egypt's more conciliatory path.

The destabilizing domestic repercussions of Arab and Palestinian nationalism suffered by many of the region's regimes, which stemmed from the Palestinian crisis, also contributed to inter-Arab friction and a negative outcome for Lebanon. Militant Palestinian nationalism in Lebanon posed a formidable challenge to the stability of the regime but also captured the attention of Saudi Arabia and other conservative regimes, which found it in their interests to assist the Maronite fight against the leftist-Muslim camp in order to establish a bulwark against the forces of radicalism. They simultaneously supported the PLO, because public opinion and some elites sympathized with the Lebanese Muslims and the Palestinians. Like Syria, Jordan, and Egypt, the Gulf states increasingly feared the effects of Palestinian nationalism on Muslims living within their own borders. In Jordan, King Hussein's conservative Hashemite regime increasingly tangled with the Palestinians who have represented a majority in the state since 1948, which led to the 1970-1971 civil war and conflict with Syria over a failed Syrian attempt to help the Palestinians during the war. In Syria, as part of the Alawi minority sect, Assad faced a Sunni Muslim majority that was highly sympathetic to Arab causes in general and the Palestinian problem in particular. During the civil war in Lebanon, for example, Assad found himself in the precarious position of having to explain to Syria's Sunni majority why he was trying to undermine the Palestinians in Lebanon, as well as why Syria was aiding the Maronite Christians at various points during the war. The problem was that Assad's regime could not withstand a radicalized Lebanon for two reasons. First, if Lebanon became an Arab confrontation state, Arab nationalism could spill over into Syria, disrupting Assad's more secular regime by animating fundamentalist elements in society and by arousing class consciousness among Syria's deprived groups. Second, during the late 1970s and 1980s, Iraq was a major rival to Syria in Lebanon, and a more radicalized Lebanon would have strengthened Iraq's influence in Lebanon at the expense of Syria's and would have made it easier for Iraq to act against Syria. In short, any regional event that had the potential for stoking the embers of Arab and Palestinian nationalism posed a direct challenge to the legitimacy of several of the region's regimes, impelling leaders to make policy choices that damaged prospects for inter-Arab unity and adversely affected the fragile Lebanese democracy.

Though many regimes in the Middle East experienced the effects of Arab nationalism and inter-Arab tensions in the 1960s and 70s, their consequences were most pronounced in Lebanon. Lebanon's multiconfessional character, ideological divisions, economic crisis, festering problems of socioeconomic inequality, Maronite political preponderance, and proximity to Israel made its regime vulnerable to interference and exploitation by other regional actors. Scholars have often referred to the Lebanese civil war as one of maneuver in which conservative/moderate states in the region (Saudi Arabia, Egypt) sought to deny influence to the radical/progressive states (Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Libya), while both sets of states armed Lebanon's various militias and parties.[sup54] In the case of Syria, for example, Assad's concerns about the security effects of a weak or radicalized Lebanon and his subsequent decision to intervene in 1976 when the leftist-Muslim camp was on the verge of defeating the rightist-Maronites is only the most obvious example of foreign interference. Israeli retaliation in southern Lebanon and Beirut prior to, during, and after 1975, and its later occupation of part of southern Lebanon, represent another salient example of foreign intrusion that would have catastrophic effects for Lebanon. Specifically, although leaders such as Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam would instruct the Lebanese Army to punish the Israelis and protect Lebanon's southern residents (particularly after the 1973 Israeli attack on Beirut), the army's fear of disintegration along communal lines prevented it from acting.[sup55] Consequently, the Israelis attacked with impunity; and many Muslims and some Christians increasingly believed the Maronite-led army was plotting to destroy the resistance movement, thereby fueling Muslim discontent and radicalism.[sup56]

Another form of interference involves the degree to which other regional regimes supplied Lebanon's factions with materiel and capital, both voluntarily and upon the request of the various factions. The conservative Gulf states provided the Lebanese government and the Palestinian combatants with financial and military assistance, while Iraq, Libya, Syria, Algeria, and Israel, among others, provided the various militias with a substantial amount of capital and weaponry. In terms of material assistance, Lebanon's militias came to possess more weapons than did the Lebanese Army, largely because of foreign suppliers. The collapse of the Lebanese state has not been attributed to the prevalence of militias per se, because they were largely a consequence of the Palestinian crisis and the inability of the Lebanese Army to control the situation. Yet, the militias should be accorded some causal status, because they increased the probability of a violent outcome to Lebanon's problems and contributed to the war's longevity.

The assistance provided by Israel to the Maronite-rightist camp warrants special mention. The Israeli government viewed a weak Lebanon. permeable to influence by radical Palestinian groups as well as Syria, as a major threat to its security. In order to enhance its security, the Israeli government established ties with Major Sa'ad Haddad in southern Lebanon in 1976, where Christians were suffering at the hands of Palestinian resistance groups, as well as with Christians in the north aligned with Pierre Gemayel and Camille Chamoun. The intention of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's government at the time was not to rid Lebanon of the PLO and the Syrian presence. but rather to help establish a military force in Lebanon capable of standing up to the PLO.[sup57] And the best way to accomplish this goal was to supply the Lebanese Forces and the Kata'ib with light and heavy weapons and munitions. later supplemented by military training. However, the assistance provided by the Rabin government did not produce Christian militias strong enough to curb Palestinian guerrilla attacks against Israel, and it further enraged the leftist-Muslim camp in Lebanon.

Regional Turmoil and its Consequences for Lebanon's Elite Coalition

Unfortunately for Lebanon, the mutually reinforcing nature of the Palestinian crisis, pan-Arabism, and inter-Arab discord fragmented the Sunni-Maronite ruling coalition to the extent that it effectively dissolved in 1975. Put another way, the divisive nature of leftist-Muslim sociopolitical demands and the Palestinian issue together made it impossible for the Sunnis and Maronites to maintain common policy positions over time. Although both the Maronite leaders (Franjiyeh, Chamoun, Gemayel, Father Kassis) and the Sunni oligarchs (Karami, al-Sulh, Salam) agreed that the Sunni-Maronite ruling formula should not be altered, the Palestinian issue ultimately proved fatally divisive. While the Sunni leadership supported the Palestinians' commando raids against Israel, the Maronites were busy plotting their confrontations with the PLO. And in April 1973, the Sunni-Maronite partnership was seriously weakened after Israel raided Beirut, resulting in Prime Minister Salam's resignation. After this point, the Muslim half of the coalition was no longer effective, and it was only a matter of time before civil war would erupt.

Although the Palestinian and social reform issues fragmented the Christian elites to some extent, they divided the Muslim elites to a much greater degree. The main reason for this disparity is that the Maronites have traditionally been the sole representatives of the Christian camp. In effect, Christian elite solidarity was tantamount to Maronite elite cohesion. And although the Maronite elites that comprised the Lebanese Front (Chamoun, Gemayel, Franjiyeh, and Kassis) competed with and tried to undercut one another for the presidency on an ongoing basis, and they also had different views on collaboration with Syria and how to deal with the Palestinians, they maintained a relatively united front in 1975.

In the case of the Muslims, however, elite cooperation is complicated by the presence of three sects (Shi'ite, Sunni, and Druze) with strong leaders. Though the ruling formula prior to the civil war privileged the Sunnis over the Shi'a, Sunni elites could not discount entirely the policy positions of Shi'ite elites, especially since the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies was always a Shi'ite, and figures such as Imam Musa al-Sad'r commanded significant followings. Although they tried to, Sunni elites could not completely ignore the revolutionary demands made by Jumblatt. In short, while Sunni elites such as Prime Minister Salam struggled to maintain the sociopolitical status quo, Jumblatt was busy trying to foment a sociopolitical revolution, al-Sad'r was trying to improve the living conditions and representation of the Shi'ite population, and Kamel al-As'ad was seeking to maintain his power as speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, disagreeing with fellow Shi'ite elites including both al-Sad'r and Jumblatt.

In addition to fragmenting the elite ruling coalition, regional developments contributed significantly to the erosion of elite-mass solidarity within both the Christian and Muslin camps by 1975. The disintegration of subgroup cohesion was partly responsible for the growing elite dissensus. On the Muslim side, subgroup cohesion began to crumble as the intelligentsia, students, workers, unions, and peasants became increasingly radicalized following four seminal regional events that exacerbated Lebanon's social, economic, and political domestic problems: the 1967 war, the arrival of the PLO in Lebanon and its consequent Israeli reprisals, the spread of Arab nationalist and Palestinian nationalist ideologies, and Egypt's negotiations with Israel and the United States. Tension between the Muslim oligarchs and the radicalized masses was largely fueled by disagreement centered around social and economic changes desired by the leftists, as well as their political demands favoring greater Muslim representation in executive, military, security, and high-level administration positions. Furthermore, Muslims and the lower class residing in southern Lebanon and Beirut were becoming increasingly enraged by the Lebanese government's inability to protect them from recurrent Israeli mortar attacks, air strikes, and incursions. Hostility on the part of the oligarchs, on the other hand, centered around the militant activities of the radicals towards Israel, which Sunni Prime Minister Salam correctly recognized would unravel the Lebanese government because of the Israeli retaliation it provoked. Once the newer elites representing the leftist-radical Muslim groups recognized that they would not be integrated into the political system, they began to undercut establishment Muslims, weakening the clientelist foundations of Lebanese political culture.

Meanwhile, a large segment of the Sunni oligarchs' client base shifted its allegiance to the groups and militias comprising the National Movement. The disintegration of the Muslim camp was further amplified by Jumblatt, who made it his mission to deconfessionalize the political system so that he could have the opportunity to become president or prime minister. However, the most serious threats to subgroup cohesion were the members of the Marxist rejectionist Palestinian militias (PFLP, PFLP-General Command, DFLP) and Lebanese leftist groups, including Arab nationalist (Arab Liberation Front), Syrian nationalist (Sa'iqa, Syrian Social Nationalist party), communist, and other Nasserite groups. Like Christian militias such as the Phalangists and the Tigers, these Palestinian militias were notorious for undermining cease-fires at the beginning of the civil war. In addition, they were responsible for initiating and supporting Palestinian shelling and raids on Israel prior to the war.

On the Christian side, the Palestinian problem also placed considerable strain on intra-Christian elite-mass solidarity. At the same time Maronite elites such as Franjiyeh and Chamoun were publicly attempting to hold the ruling coalition together, militias controlled by some of these very same elites were undercutting elite cooperation and any beleaguered attempts to stave off civil violence. Specifically, President Franjiyeh controlled the Liberation Army of Zgharta, while Gemayel headed the Phalanges, and Chamoun's son, Dany, controlled the Tigers. Even Father Kassis was believed to sponsor a militia referred to as The Organization. The intent of many of these militias was to exert control over the Palestinians and maintain the privileged status of the Maronites in Lebanese politics. And unlike the Maronite elites who were trying to maintain the ruling coalition, the militias were in a less constrained position and could therefore use more aggressive means to accomplish these goals. Although experts on Lebanon have argued that Maronite elites who headed these militias were to some degree in control of them, experts also acknowledge that these militias often seemed to act in defiance of the Lebanese Front's leadership.[sup58] For example, they frequently refused to obey agreed-upon cease-fires, and they occasionally went "completely berserk" as happened to the Phalangists in December 1975, when they massacred 200 Muslims in Beirut allegedly in retaliation for the killing of four Phalangists.[sup59]

Other groups within the Christian camp that disagreed with the policy positions of the Lebanese Front included the student population, the Caucus of Committed Christians, and a group of moderate Christian politicians. As early as 1969, Catholic and Orthodox students, who were aroused by the violent campaign against the Palestinians in the late 1960s, began to support publicly the Palestinian resistance movement.[sup60] The Caucus was created by Christian clergy, theologians, and intellectuals. It offered an alternative to the fascistic line increasingly followed by a significant part of the Maronite community.[sup61] In general, it sought to combat the propagation of fear by the Maronites, while it also supported the Palestinian cause. In the case of the moderate Christian politicians, these leaders were willing to concede a large share of power in the confessional system to the Muslim communities and to reach some type of accommodation with the Palestinians in order to preserve the Lebanese state. Elias Sarkis, the former Shihabi politician who would become president in 1976, was the most prominent figure in this group, while Raymond Edde, formerly opposed to Shihab reformist policies, found himself being drawn closer to traditional Sunni politicians such as Sa'ib Salam and Rashid Karami.[sup62] Like Sarkis, Edde advocated compromise and moderation.

Conclusion: Prospects for a Post-Ta'if Lebanon

Although the Lebanese case confirms Lijphart's theory that elite consensus backed by consociational mechanisms is crucial for stable democracy in divided societies, the case also corroborates the deeper alternate theory proposed in this article that addresses the regional sources of elite fragmentation. Specifically, the Lebanese civil war supports the hypothesis that a turbulent regional system can strain the domestic elite consensus upon which power-sharing is based and can ultimately contribute to regime collapse. This finding, however, suggests two important questions: First, if regional developments are important in explaining consociational failure, what does this mean for the future of Lebanon now that the confessional schism has been reaffirmed--albeit in modified form--in the 1989 Ta'if agreement? Second, would a majoritarian system be more durable in deeply divided societies that face regional instability than political arrangements based on power-sharing principles?

With regard to the first question, the 1989 Document of National Understanding that emerged from the Ta'if negotiations strengthened Lebanon's confessional political system in a number of respects. First, the Ta'if agreement shifted executive authority from the Maronite president to the cabinet, thereby increasing the power of the Sunni prime minister. This represents perhaps the most important modification to the confessional system in that it increases the representation for the Muslim majority in Lebanon. Second, the agreement elevated the status of the Chamber of Deputies at the expense of the president. Specifically, it stipulated that the nomination of the prime minister by the president would require consultation with the speaker of the Chamber, who conveys the results of binding parliamentary consultations. Third, the 6:5 ratio of parliamentary seats, which had previously favored the Christians, was replaced by parity--a demand which has been made by the Muslims ever since the 1970s. Accordingly, nine new Muslim seats were added to the Chamber, creating a 54-54 seat balance. Fourth, the agreement eliminated sectarian criteria for recruitment of public servants with the exception of high-level posts. Fifth, the agreement required the dissolution of militias and the withdraal of Syrian forces to the Bekaa Valley within six months and two years, respectively, of the Chamber's ratification of the agreement. Sixth, the document called for implementation of UN Resolution 425, which demands the withdrawal of Israeli troops. An Israeli withdrawal, however, has not yet occurred. Seventh, like the National Pact, it states that institutionalized sectarianism is only intended to be transitional, while deconfessionalization remains the ultimate goal. Overall, while the Ta'if agreement improved the status of Muslims vis-a-vis the Maronites, it also benefited the Sunni Muslims more than the Shi'a, as the Shi'a gained only three of the new appointive seats. It also granted a privileged status to Syria, as it did not call for Syrian withdrawal from all of Lebanese territory.

Despite these institutional improvements, they have not made the Lebanese regime significantly less vulnerable to regional instability. Rather, the future of Lebanon and the success of the Ta'if agreement depend to a greater extent upon the current regional climate in the Middle East. Generally, the region is more stable now than it was in the late 1960s and early 1970s. For example, many Palestinians (excluding Hezbollah and other extremist groups) now support Arafat's Palestinian Authority and its attempt to find a political, rather than a military, solution to the problem of Palestinian autonomy. In addition, inter-Arab friction--between Syria and Iraq, in particular--is less intense today, which is due in part to Syria's successful bid to remove Iraqi influence from Lebanese politics. The Iranian government also has made a number of overtures to the West in general and to the United States in particular in an attempt to normalize relations and become less of a pariah state in the world community. Finally, the Israeli government led by the Labor party and Prime Minister Ehud Barak has demonstrated a commitment to promoting peace in the region by renewing negotiations with Syria and the Palestinian Authority.

Although the Middle East region is presently more stable than in the early 1970s, there are still reasons for pessimism when evaluating the stability of the Middle East and its impact on Lebanon's present power-sharing arrangements. First, the Gulf War of 1990-1991 temporarily divided the Arab world and impelled Syria to sign a mutual defense pact with Lebanon in May 1991.[sup63] Instead of helping to restore Lebanon's independence, the pact merely reflected the intimate relationship of the two states and virtually guaranteed the persistence of Lebanon's dependent status. Second, although the Ta'if agreement largely restored peace to Lebanon and the disarming of the militias has been moderately successful, Hezbollah remains intact and continues its war with Israel in southern Lebanon and northern Israel. The terrorist tactics of Hezbollah continue to undermine peace efforts by making it more difficult for the Israeli government to advance the peace process, as evidenced by the policies of Prime Minister's Benjamin Netanyahu's government between 1996-1999. Such policies include the expansion of Jewish settlements in Jerusalem and the West Bank, the decision not to withdraw from Lebanon, and the stalemate in negotiations with Arafat and the Palestinian Authority over the implementation of the 1993 Oslo Accord and the subsequent 1998 Wye River agreement. More recently, Barak discovered that any attempt to exchange land for peace with either the Syrians or the Palestinians would elicit a violent response from Hezbollah.[sup64]

Clearly, what is most important for the future of Lebanon is the resolution of the Palestinian crisis, for it is this problem that will continue to promote friction within and between Lebanon's Christian and Muslim populations. Until agreements such as the Oslo Accord are upheld granting the Palestinians autonomy in designated areas of the occupied territories, prospects for an independent Lebanon free of Syrian guardianship and Israeli interference remain dim. The seemingly intractable dilemma, however, is that whenever the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government make progress on the issue of Palestinian autonomy, it triggers an automatic response on the part of Jewish, Islamic, and Palestinian extremist groups who are opposed to it, undermining any prospects for peace in the region. The most poignant example of this dilemma is, of course, the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 at a point when Palestinian self-rule in areas of the West Bank began to appear imminent. Though the present regional conditions may not be adverse enough to destroy Lebanon's modified power-sharing arrangements, they will continually endanger its stability and virtually guarantee Syria's presence in Lebanon for the foreseeable future. In short, until the Palestinian problem is resolved (assuming it can be resolved) the Lebanese regime will remain unstable and will be vulnerable to any regional developments that may promote future Hezbollah-Israeli violent exchanges, that may further ignite leftist-Muslim sympathy for the Palestinian cause, and that will maintain the firm grip Assad has on Lebanese politics.

Would the implementation of a majoritarian (winner-take-all) system in Lebanon be more durable in the face of regional problems such as the Palestinian crisis? The simple answer to this complex question is probably not. Although the maintenance of elite consensus would no longer be problematical, an even graver problem would emerge--namely, the Muslims would in all likelihood continually dominate Lebanese politics due to their majority status, which would threaten the security of the Christians. Many Christians are already insecure because of their minority status in the Middle East. One thing the civil war made clear to most observers is that when the power of the Maronite Christians in Lebanon is in jeopardy, they, like other threatened minorities, will rely upon violence to strengthen their position and ensure their survival. A majoritarian system--even one that conferred basic minority and individual rights--would only exacerbate the effects of their minority status, which would increase the probability of civil violence in Lebanon.

In sum, it is more critical for the international community and regional actors to devise a solution to the Palestinian problem than for Lebanon to dramatically alter its political institutions at this point. A majoritarian system would be more problematical than power-sharing arrangements in a country as divided as Lebanon and would further complicate an already precarious situation. However, from an institutional standpoint, only the implementation of all of the Ta'if provisions would be beneficial to the regime.[sup*]

[sup1] Harry Eckstein, Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 34.

[sup2] Ibid., 228-29.

[sup3] For more information on the democratic peace literature, which focuses on the absence of war between democracies, see Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review 80 (December 1986): 1151-61; and Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[sup4] Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Arend Lijphart, "The Power-Sharing Approach" in Joseph V. Montville, ed., Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), 491-509; Arend Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1985); Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," World Politics 21 (January 1969): 207-25; Arend Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," Comparative Political Studies 1 (April 1968): 3-44.

[sup5] Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science" in F. I. Greenstein and N. W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 108-13.

[sup6] Stanley Kyriakides, Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis Government (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968).

[sup7] John P. Mackintosh, Nigerian Government and Politics (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966).

[sup8] Karl yon Vorys, Democracy Without Consensus: Communalism and Political Stability in Malaysia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 15 and 386-422.

[sup9] Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, eds. Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions To Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," Comparative Politics 2 (April 1970): 337-63; Guiseppe di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

[sup10] For an excellent interpretation of Karl Popper's definition of theoretical depth, see John Watkins, Science and Scepticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

[sup11] David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, eds., Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); Andrew Hurrell and Louise Fawcett, The Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Edward Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, The Political Economy of Regionalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Etel Solingen, "The Domestic Sources of Regional Regimes: The Evolution of Nuclear Ambiguity in the Middle East," International Studies Quarterly 38 (June 1994): 305-38.

[sup12] Leonard Binder, "The Middle East as a Subordinate International System," World Politics 10 (April 1958): 408-29; Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz, eds., Regional Politics and World Order (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1973). Excellent reviews of the regional subsystem literature are provided by Kay Boals, "The Concept 'Subordinate International System': A Critique" in ibid., 399-411; and William R. Thompson, "The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory," International Studies Quarterly 17 (March 1973): 89-117.

[sup13] Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 25-52.

[sup14] Seymour M. Lipset, ed., The Encyclopedia of Democracy, Vol. 3 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1995), 853-65.

[sup15] Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," 22-25.

[sup16] Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 53-103.

[sup17] Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," 25-30.

[sup18] Lijphart, "The Power-Sharing Approach," 54-55. (Emphasis added.)

[sup19] The importance of cultural homogeneity is emphasized in John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958).

[sup20] Brian Barry, "Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy," British Journal of Political Science 5 (October 1975): 481-90.

[sup21] Jeffrey Obler, Jurg Steiner, and Guido Dierickx, Decision Making in Smaller Democracies: The Consociational 'Burden' (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, vol. 6, Comparative Politics Series No. 01-064, 1977), 328-29.

[sup22] Barry, "Political Accommodation," 493-95; Obler et al., Decision Making, 337.

[sup23] Hans Daalder, "The Consociational Democracy Theme," World Politics 26 (July 1974): 604-21; Judith Nagata, "Review of Lijphart 1977," International Journal 34 (Summer 1979): 505-06.

[sup24] Daalder, "The Consociational Democracy Theme," 612-18.

[sup25] Hudson, "The Lebanese Crisis," 114; N. Kliot, "The Collapse of the Lebanese State," Middle Eastern Studies 23 (January 1987): 54-74.

[sup26] Samuel P. Huntington, "Reform and Stability in a Modernizing, Multi-Ethnic Society," Politikon 8 (1981): 14.

[sup27] Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South Africa, 110.

[sup28] Adriano Pappalardo, "The Conditions for Consociational Democracy: A Logical and Empirical Critique," European Journal of Political Research 9 (December 1981): 365-90; M. P. C. M. van Schendelen, "The Views of Arend Lijphart and Collected Criticisms," Acta Politica 19 (January 1984): 19-55.

[sup29] For more information on falisifiability and Karl Popper's philosophy of science, see Watkins, Science and Scepticism.

[sup30] Ian S. Lustick, "Lijphart, Lakatos, and Consociationalism," World Politics 50 (October 1997): 88-117.

[sup31] David D. Laitin, "South Africa: Violence, Myths, and Democratic Reform," World Politics 39 (January 1987): 265.

[sup32] Barry, "Political Accommodation," 500.

[sup33] Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 54.

[sup34] William W. Harris, Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 152.

[sup35] Elie A. Salem, Modernization Without Revolution: Lebanon's Experience (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973); Leonard Binder, ed., Politics in Lebanon (New York: Wiley, 1966); David R. and Audrey C. Smock, The Politics of Pluralism (New York: Elsevier, 1975).

[sup36] Michael C. Hudson, The Precarious Republic: Modernization in Lebanon (New York: Random House, 1968); Michael C. Hudson, "Democracy and Social Mobilization in Lebanese Politics," Comparative Politics 1 (January 1969): 245-63.

[sup37] Harris, Faces of Lebanon; Tabitha Petran, The Struggle Over Lebanon (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987); Charles Winslow, Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society (London: Routledge, 1996); Elizabeth Picard, Lebanon: A Shattered Country (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1996); Walid Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 1979); Iliya F. Harik, Lebanon: Anatomy of a Conflict (Hanover, NH: American Universities Field Staff, 1981); Kamal S. Salibi, Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon, 1958-1976 (Delmar, NY: Caravan Books, 1976); Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, 1970-1983 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Marius K. Deeb, The Lebanese Civil War (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980); and Harald Vocke, The Lebanese War (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1978).

[sup38] Harris, Faces of Lebanon, 161.

[sup39] Ibid.; Petran, The Struggle Over Lebanon; Elie A. Salem, "Lebanon's Political Maze: The Search For Peace in a Turbulent Land," Middle East Journal 33 (Autumn 1979): 444-63.

[sup40] Petran, The Struggle Over Lebanon, 126-30.

[sup41] Hudson, "The Lebanese Crisis"; Dekmejian, "Consociational Democracy in Crisis."

[sup42] Khalidi, Conflict and Violence, 101; Harik, "Economic and Social Factors," 209-41.

[sup43] Arnon Softer, "Lebanon--Where Demography Is the Core of Politics and Life," Middle Eastern Studies 22 (April 1986): 197-205; and Muhammad Faour, "The Demography of Lebanon: A Reappraisal," Middle Eastern Studies 27 (October 1991): 631-41.

[sup44] Petran, The Struggle Over Lebanon, 71.

[sup45] Picard, Lebanon: A Shattered Country 79-81.

[sup46] For details on Syria's interests in Lebanon, see Reuven Avi-Ran, The Syrian Involvement in Lebanon Since 1975 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991); Adeed Dawisha, Syria and the Lebanese Crisis (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980); and As'ad AbuKhalil, "Determinants and Characteristics of Syrian Policy in Lebanon" in Deirdre Collins, ed., Peace for Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 123-36.

[sup47] Picard, Lebanon: A Shattered Country, 81.

[sup48] Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon, 95.

[sup49] Michael Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 256.

[sup50] Ibid., 373.

[sup51] Ibid., 375.

[sup52] William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993), 182-222 and 239-43; Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1982), 614-66.

[sup53] Avi-Ran, Syrian Involvement in Lebanon, 21; Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, 36-37.

[sup54] Dekmejian, "Consociational Democracy in Crisis," 258-59.

[sup55] Petran, The Struggle Over Lebanon, 99-103.

[sup56] Ibid., 142.

[sup57] Ze'ev Schiff, "Lebanon: Motivations and Interests in Israel's Policy," Middle East Journal 38 (Spring 1984): 220-27.

[sup58] Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon, 70-71.

[sup59] Ibid., 71.

[sup60] Petran, The Struggle Over Lebanon, 152-53.

[sup61] Ibid., 152.

[sup62] Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon, 72-74.

[sup63] Maila, "The Ta'if Accord," 40-42.

[sup64] "Israel Willing to Talk with Syria despite Hezbollah Attacks," CNN World, 1 February 2000.