The limits of democracy in the Middle East:  The case of Jordan

Quintan Wiktorowicz
The Middle East Journal, Vol 53, Issue 4, Autumn 1999

Despite movement toward democracy throughout the Middle East, limitations
to political participation persist. In Jordan, the accomplishments of democratic
political reform are marred by continued authoritarian tendencies. The
presence of repression in the midst of democratic change reflects the regime's
intent to perpetuate its political control. This article examines the limiting
effect of regime practices on voluntary organizations, demonstrations,
the press, and formal political institutions.

Despite the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East, recently
there has been sp Pe Y movement toward democracy in the region.' Egypt,
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen have all enacted political
liberalization measures which provide new opportunities for expanding the
scope of participation. Political parties, elections, and civil society
organizations have become more common and incorporate broader segments
of society into the political process.

Formal institutions, practices, and participatory structures, however,
do not inexorably lead to liberal democratic polities; and lingering authoritarian
practices limit the prospects for liberal democracy in the Middle East.
Multi-party politics (ta`addudiyya) and elections-the symbols and institutional
face of democracy-are frequently accompanied by political repression and
manipulation which sabotage the underlying principles of democracy. Though
many regimes have curtailed the use of raw coercion, they continue to project
power through legal codes, the administrative apparatus, and instruments
of repression to constrain opposition and dissent. Democratic institutions
and authoritarian practices are temporally juxtaposed as incumbent elites
perpetuate their political control. Samih Farsoun and Lucia Port describe
such a political system as "an electoral regime embedded in an authoritarian
state."2 It is a "facade democracy," guided by regime imperatives rather
than democratic precepts.3

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan provides an interesting case study for
examining the limitations of democracy in the Middle East. Since 1989,
the regime has held three relatively free and fair Parliamentary elections
(1989, 1993, 1997); supported the National Charter (a blueprint for democratic
reform); legalized political parties; lifted martial law; and enacted political
liberalization measures. Jordan is arguably one of the most democratic
countries in the region. Yet, despite these remarkable reforms, repressive
practices persist. Grassroots voluntary organizations are tightly controlled
and managed by the state; public demonstrations are strictly limited; and
the press is under siege. There is a disconnect between democratic principles
and actual reform.

This article argues that these authoritarian tendencies in the midst of
democratic change can be viewed as part of an attempt to channel political
participation into a discrete, state-delineated political space, a process
which has not changed since King `Abdullah II came to power in February
1999. As in other Middle East countries, democratic reform in Jordan was
initiated from above as a tactical strategy to maintain social control
in the face of severe economic crisis. Political change was driven by a
stability imperative, not by a benevolent desire for enhanced political
participation. As a result, the regime attempts to limit political participation
to a narrow, relatively stable political space comprised predominantly
of formal political institutions such as parties, elections, and Parliament.
Political activism outside this space is discouraged by regulative and
repressive state practices. After briefly explaining the process and underlying
imperative of democratization in Jordan, this article outlines how the
channeling process affects the prospects for broader political participation
by examining its effects on grassroots voluntary organizations, public
demonstrations, and the press.

THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN JORDAN

Most explanations of democratic reform in the Middle East link the process
of political change to the contemporary crisis of the render state.4 Render
or semi-rentier states derive substantial revenues from exogenous sources
rather than domestic production or taxation.5 In Jordan, "rent" historically
derived from workers' remittances and subsidies provided by the British,
United States, and other Arab countries. Reliance upon "rent" weakens a
regime's accountability to society, since it can function without extracting
substantial revenues from domestic sources. In other words, "no taxation,
no representation."6 Instead, the rentier social contract is one in which
the state provides goods and services to society (such as subsidies on
basic commodities) without imposing economic burdens, while society provides
state officials with a degree of autonomy in decisionmaking and policy.
Legitimacy rests upon the ability to enhance quality of life rather than
democratic principles. The state thus reduces "formal politics to the issue
of distribution, and participation to the realm of consumption.117

While the render social contract perpetuates non-democratic political structures
and practices, it is also vulnerable to external factors which undermine
sources of rent. The decline in oil-related revenues during the 1980s undermined
the logic of the social contract in many Middle Eastern countries, and
the subsequent financial crisis served as an important catalyst for democratization
and political liberalization. In Jordan, high levels of debt, inflation,
and the return of expatriate Jordanian workers from the Gulf strained the
financial capabilities of the state. The kingdom was forced to capitulate
to an International Monetary Fund structural adjustment package which included
harsh austerity measures and weakened regime legitimacy.8

Without avenues of political participation, those affected by the changes
were unable to voice their concerns through formal political structures
and instead carried their grievances into the streets. After fuel prices
increased, in April 1989, a series of riots erupted in several southern
towns and shattered the control of martial law. For the regime, what was
most disconcerting was not simply the protest itself, but rather who protested.
The southern towns are populated by Jordanian tribes loyal to the Hashemite
throne. The fact that traditional regime supporters, and not marginalized
opposition groups, were responsible for the riots signaled that political
change was necessary. Following the riots, King Husayn announced his decision
to hold elections and implement democracy. The King announced the decision
less than three months after the riots and elections were actually held
in November 1989. Democratization served as a means for reinforcing ties
to the King's traditional constituency of support by providing political
space for the frustrations of groups adversely affected by the economic
austerity measures.9

The transition was driven by the need to maintain stability and social
control. It was part of a "survival strategy" in the face of economic crisis.10
Economic reforms were necessary, but carried consequences for stability;
and political reforms were seen as a way of placating disaffected groups.
Daniel Brumberg refers to this as a "democratic bargain"an arrangement
by which democratic reforms are used as a device to obtain economic reform.""
It was a tactical strategy to ensure regime survival.

As a result, the regime has carefully crafted and coordinated democratization
from above to promote democratic reforms without fully relinquishing power.
Glenn Robinson describes the transition in Jordan as "defensive democratization,"
a strategy designed to maintain regime control through preemptive reform.12
In controlling the pace and scope of political change in the Kingdom, the
regime has retained particular authoritarian tendencies to prevent the
mobilization of political activism outside formal, statedelineated institutions
and political space. It uses repression and administrative practices to
channel participation into this space, and these practices threaten the
prospects for liberal democracy in Jordan.

GRASSROOTS VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS

Social movements and a myriad of other political actors prefer to mobilize
through grassroots voluntary organizations, but have met a host of legal,
bureaucratic, and repressive barriers erected by the state to prevent the
politicization of civil society." Cultural organizations, in particular,
have clashed with the state over the definition of the political. While
grassroots organizers claim that issues such as human rights, democracy,
Jerusalem, and Islam are cultural, the regime charges that activities in
these areas of concern often cross into the purview of the political.

In an attempt to prevent such activities and political mobilization outside
statedelineated space, the regime strictly prohibits grassroots voluntary
organizations from engaging in political activism. This separation is supported
by two laws. The first is the Law of Societies and Social Organizations,
Law 33 of 1966. This law governs the activities of all voluntary organizations,
which can only be formed "to provide social services without any intention
of financial gains or other personal gains, including political gains."14
This limitation prevents nontraditional political actors, such as social
movements, from promoting political mobilization through grassroots organizations.
The second legal mechanism is the Political Party Law, Law 32 of 1992,
which stipulates that "The use of the premises, instrumentalities, and
assets of associations, charitable organizations and clubs for the benefit
of any partisan organization, shall be prohibited."'Partisan activities
are only allowed in political parties, and civil society organizations
are prohibited from transgressing the boundaries of the political, as defined
by the state.

The boundary of the political, however, is itself inherently ambiguous,
and this has engendered conflict between voluntary organizations and the
regime. Many activities or issues are both cultural and political, and
discrete categories are impossible. Many cultural organizations. therefore,
tread a fine line between the cultural and political spheres because of
the nature of their activities. For example, activists from the women's
movement formed the Center for Women's Studies to analyze women's rights
in the Kingdom. In 1996, members from the Center met to discuss how to
promote female candidates in the 1997 elections. This is a cultural issue
(the role of women in society) with political import (elections). After
the meeting, leaders in the organization were detained by the mukhabarat
(intelligence/security forces) for questioning and told to desist from
such activities.16

In another example that same year, an Islamic cultural society invited
a guest lecturer to discuss the Egyptian Islamist ideologue Sayyid Qutb.
In the lecture, the speaker used Qutb's arguments and interpretations as
a framework for understanding contemporary issues such as the crisis in
Bosnia, the role of the United Nations, United States hegemony, the Taliban
movement in Afghanistan, and the Palestinian struggle. The lecture was
obviously not simply cultural; it was imbued with political meaning. The
following day, mukhabarat agents searched the premises and accused members
of organizing a political movement.17

Conflict between the regime and cultural organizations accelerated after
1997, after a series of moves by the Ministry of Culture to curtail overtly
political activities in civil society. In January 1997, opposition activist
and Islamist Layth Shubaylat gave a speech at the Karak Cultural Forum.
Allegedly, he criticized the government, a common pattern for Shubaylat,
and as a result the society was dissolved for "political activities." Members
from the society attempted to form a new organization, but the Ministry
of Culture demanded that they first create a new administrative committee.
The members refused and another organization was never formed.18

Following the closure of the Karak Cultural Forum, Ahmad al-Qudah, then
Minister of Culture, issued a directive which banned any cultural meetings
from taking place anywhere in the Kingdom without prior approval from the
administrator charged with overseeing cultural organizations in the respective
governate. This was generally viewed as a direct reaction to the speech
by Shubaylat and engendered virulent opposition from cultural societies
throughout Jordan. Members of the Jordanian Writers' Association believed
the directive was aimed at their society after it hosted a cultural week
entitled "debate of choices" which focused on the political, economic,
cultural, and creative issues facing the country. 19 Though the directive
was eventually rescinded, other lectures about issues such as the temporary
press law, economics, and the peace treaty were canceled; and there is
continuous interference with the freedom of assembly to prevent voluntary
organizations from discussing political issues.20

In the following September, the subsequent Minister of Culture, Qasem Abu
Ein, sent a directive to cultural societies warning them to refrain from
political activities.21 There was an ensuing confrontation between the
Minister of Culture and the Jordanian Writers' Association over the "political
nature" of some of the association's work. The association president, Fakhri
Kawar, responded that "any cultural activity will one way or another include
politics in it," and asserted the association's right to "conduct political
activities because they are part of culture." The Minister warned the Jordanian
Writers' Association that he would close the organization if it persisted
in any "political, tribal or sectarian activity."22

State officials view the distinction between civil society and politics
as a consequence of democracy. They argue that because democracy has provided
opportunities for participation through formal political institutions,
such as political parties, individuals and groups in society should confine
their political activities to these political institutions. As the Director
of Charitable Organizations at the Ministry of Social Development argued,
"they are separate now, politics and culture."23 The regime initiated democratization
to maintain stability and refuses to expand political participation beyond
state-delineated institutions and political space.24

DEMONSTRATIONS AND PROTEST

In most democracies, the right to protest is well established. While the
policing of protest in liberal democracies was once characterized by a
strategy of escalated force intended to dissuade and contain demonstrators,
police now utilize negotiations with protesters to ensure order and to
protect the rights of the demonstrators themselves.25 In fact, protest
has become so commonplace and accepted that some scholars argue that social
movements and demonstrations have become part of routine, institutionalized
politics.26

In Jordan, despite movement toward democracy, demonstrations and overt
protest remain limited, even when organized by political parties, since
they operate outside the boundaries of formal politics. Although there
is a demonstration permit system in place, the regime rarely issues permits.
The regime's response to "illegal" demonstrations (those that take place
without a permit) indicate how seriously it views the boundaries of politics.
By harshly repressing "illegal" demonstrations, the regime attempts to
discourage potentially volatile and destabilizing forms of political participation.


The first barrier to demonstrations is that protest organizers must receive
permission from the district governor to protest, permission which is rarely
forthcoming. Even high profile, moderate opposition figures, such as members
of the Islamic Action Front Party (IAF), encounter difficulties. State
opposition arises even when the proposed demonstration targets an external
agent, such as the United States or Israel, rather than the regime itself.
According to former Speaker `Abd-al-Latif `Arabiyyat, IAF members are routinely
told that they cannot demonstrate because "the situation is too dangerous"
for protest activities.27 Security forces use this ambiguous explanation,
in conjunction with national security interests and the need for national
unity, to deny permission consistently. For example, following the bread
riots in 1996 which were sparked by subsidy reductions, the government
refused to grant the IAF permission to hold a "hungry million march" to
protest the subsidy policies because of concern for stability.28

In another well-publicized incident in 1997, opposition groups led by Fu'ad
Dabuor, the Secretary General of the Progressive Bath Party, applied for
permission to hold a rally in Irbid to protest a United States military
build-up (in anticipation of a strike against Iraq), but were blocked by
the regime. The governor of the district wanted to review the speeches
before granting permission. Included in the list of speakers were outspoken
opposition figures such as Layth Shubaylat, Tujan Faysal, and Khalil Haddadin.29
Given such controversial personalities, the governor was concerned about
the content of the speeches. The security forces went so far as to prevent
Layth Shubaylat from entering Irbid and he was forced to return to Amman.3"'
Eventually, a rally was permitted in Amman, scaled down from the original
proposal which would have included a much broader demonstration. It was
confined to the Professional Associations Building, where it was carefully
monitored and controlled by security forces and the police.,' The regime
occasionally permits such rallies if they are held indoors, but in most
instances there are no facilities available to accommodate large numbers
of people, in effect preventing protest.12 In addition, demonstrations
which are held indoors lose their effectiveness in impacting bystanders,
especially prospective supporters, because they are less visible. The potential
"contagion of conflict" is thus limited.31

In the weeks building up to a possible United States strike against Iraq
in February 1998, the regime went even further by prohibiting demonstrations
altogether. Nazir Rashid, the Minister of the Interior, issued a statement
that the government "will not allow any marches under any slogan and for
any reason anywhere in the Kingdom at these critical circumstances and
this crucial stage which the country is passing through."34 The statement
was issued in response to a request from opposition groups to hold a rally
in downtown Amman in support of Iraq. The Minister argued that the measures
were designed to prevent "any attempt by those harboring ill-intentions
against this country from infiltrating our ranks."35 This concern most
likely derives from the government's belief that external Ba`thi infiltrators
were responsible for the 1996 riots, an assessment that remains unsubstantiated
and ridiculed by opposition leaders.

Defying the order issued by the Ministry of the Interior, supporters of
the IAF and other opposition groups attempted to launch a demonstration
from King Husayn mosque in downtown Amman following the Friday prayers.
Thousands of people gathered to protest the United States military build-up,
but were met by hundreds of anti-riot police armed with guns, batons, tear
gas, a police helicopter, and dogs. Police beat back the protesters and
eventually entered the mosque to arrest 60 people, including leaders of
the Muslim Brotherhood, a move which engendered harsh criticism from opposition
leaders. The IAF, the political party arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, issued
a statement condemning the forcible invasion of the mosque's sanctity as
"unprecedented," stating that. "Throughout our history, no government dared
to attack the prayers in the mosque and to beat them in the pulpit of the
mosque."36 The government claimed that it feared infiltrators who might
destabilize the country and charged that protesters were ready to throw
bombs at police.31

Shortly after this clash, the state again asserted its right to use force
to control and contain demonstrations. According to the government, Layth
Shubaylat urged inhabitants of Ma'an to demonstrate in support of Iraq
after the Friday prayers on 20 February 1998.38 Several hundred protesters
began demonstrating but were stopped by police. In the ensuing confrontation,
violence erupted and the police fired tear gas from the rooftops of government
buildings. As the chaos increased, a shot was fired, killing an innocent
bystander.39 News of the incident spread throughout the city and rioting
erupted. The following day, 2,000 mourners carried, through the streets,
the shrouded body of the bystander killed in the clashes. Police fired
tear gas and the procession devolved into a riot as protesters burned a
Housing Bank office, an Education Ministry building, and electrical utilities.
Weapons were visible and fighting broke out while the crowd chanted pro-Iraq
slogans. The army was called in to restore order and a curfew was imposed.
The army conducted a house-to-house search for weapons including ordinance.
King Husayn told a group of soldiers that "Everyone who tries to stir trouble
and riots in this country is contributing to the implementation of conspiracies."40
The curfew was held for a week and security forces detained 47 people for
questioning. In total, more than 20 people were injured in the protests
and confrontation.41 The regime had again stood its ground and demonstrated
its willingness to use force to prevent alternative forms of political
participation.

Even when a demonstration receives permission, there is no guarantee that
it will be allowed to proceed. In 1994, Hamza Mansur, then an IAF Parliamentarian,
was granted permission to hold a demonstration in Irbid to protest the
Israeli-Jordanian peace accords. Despite receiving permission, paratroopers
intervened before the demonstration could proceed from the Grand Mosque
in the center of Irbid.42 The IAF sent a letter of protest to the government,
but never received a response.43

This does not mean that demonstrations are prohibited altogether, only
that demonstrations with an explicit political message are rare. In fact,
several apolitical marches have been sponsored by the royal family in recent
years. In October 1997, the Jordan Cancer Society and the Jordan Society
for Smoking Prevention held a march, under the patronage of Queen Nur,
to raise awareness of the dangers of smoking. 44 A few weeks later, the
Anti-Smoking and Anti-Cancer societies held a similar march, again sponsored
by the Queen.45 Such marches are relatively devoid of political import
and are supported by the regime and members of the royal family. Demonstrations
with a direct political message, however, are rare and are actively discouraged
and repressed.

Even general public meetings called to discuss politics are tightly regulated
and constrained. The Law of Public Meetings, Law 60 of 1953, is a regulatory
holdover from the martial law period, which stipulates that all public
meetings to discuss politics must receive permission. According to the
law, meeting organizers must receive permission from the governor of the
district;46 and the district manager or a delegated administrator must
attend the meeting to make certain that it does not address issues for
which permission was not obtained.47 In cases where the public meeting
broaches such issues, the governor can use force to cancel the meeting.41
This law has been used to prevent large scale public meetings from taking
place outside the boundaries of formal politics.49

THE PRESS 50

In any democracy, the press plays an important role in political discourse.
Not only does the press provide basic political information to the public,
but it also plays an active role in politics through investigative reporting,
which can unearth corruption and provide a check on governmental power.
Although the press in Jordan is relatively free, when compared to its Arab
counterparts, its ability to criticize the regime and engage the political
sphere has been curtailed.

Following the signing of the peace treaty with Israel in 1994, the press
became increasingly politicized. Numerous publications condemned the regime's
decision to "normalize" relations with Israel, and in many instances the
critiques were scathing. For the most part, the attack from the press was
initiated by the weekly newspapers which proliferated after restrictions
on the freedom of the press were lifted in 1992. The major news dailies
were far more reserved in their political critiques. This was most likely
due, in large part, to the fact that the state controls substantial shares
of the two largest daily newspapers in the kingdom-al-Ra'y and al-Dustur
(62 percent and 32 percent respectively).5,1 This gives the state considerable
power to limit editorial choices and prevent widespread political criticism.
In most cases, the restraint is a result of self-censorship, rather than
direct state interference.

The weeklies, on the other hand, have been far more articulate in their
political critiques, and the regime initiated a strong counterattack against
the weeklies in May 1997 through enactment of an amendment to the 1993
Press and Publications Law. Under the previous law, weekly newspapers were
required to deposit JD50,000 (US $35,000) at the Ministry of Trade and
Industry. The new amendment raised the capital requirement to JD300,000
(US $210,000) and the weeklies were given three months to comply.52 The
required capital was almost impossible for most weeklies to raise. In addition,
the law prohibited publishing information which criticized the security
services, attacked the royal family, sowed national discord, or incited
unrest. Fines for violations ranged from JD15,000-50,000 (US $10,500-$35,000)
and a single citation was costly enough to close many weeklies. Just the
prospect of such a fine caused the weekly political satire paper `Abd Rabbuh
to close in June of 1997. By September of that year, 13 weeklies were suspended
for noncompliance with the amendment.

There was wide suspicion that the new law was enacted to stifle criticism
of government policy outside the institutionalized election campaign during
the November 1997 Parliamentary elections. It was promulgated by the Council
of Ministers while Parliament was not in session only months before the
campaign season began. Many Jordanians suspected that it was a temporary
move to prevent the full participation of the press in the political process.
Human rights and international journalists' organizations such as Amnesty
International, Article 19, the Committee to Protect Journalists, and Human
Rights Watch, issued reports lamenting the deterioration of press freedoms
in the Kingdom.53 Political party newspapers were exempted from the new
law, although there were only three such papers-al-Nahda (National Constitutional
Party), al-Jamahir (Communist Party) al-Ahali (People's Democratic Party).
These papers were affiliated with formal political institutions that operated
within the boundaries of state-sanctioned political space.

The weeklies took the government to court, arguing that the amendment was
enacted illegally and violated the freedom of the press as outlined in
the Constitution. The Higher Court of Justice supported the government
in the initial hearing and issued a statement which emphasized the regime's
right to control the press as it saw fit:

The state has the right to organize the press if it is necessary for the
national interest .The legislator [government], in its attempt to organize
the media has the right to specify certain conditions.. in accordance with
the public interest, to preserve public order and to make new rules applicable
to all legal circumstances without the right of anyone to protest [that]
such measures infringe on acquired rights.54

The press pushed its case and eventually the High Court of Justice declared
the amendment unconstitutional in January 1998. By that point in time,
however, the amendment had already served its purpose-the press was depoliticized
during the election period.

The press victory was short-lived. Because the opposition parties boycotted
the elections, the resulting Parliament was comprised predominantly of
centrists and regime supporters. The government subsequently drafted a
new Press and Publications Law which was passed through Parliament and
came into force in September 1998.5 Although the capital deposits were
slightly reduced (dailies are now required to deposit JD500,000 [US $350,000]
and weeklies are required to deposit JD100,000 [US $70,0001), many of the
same restrictions remain. Specifically, Article 37 prohibits publication
on a number of political issues of interest in Jordan. A few stand out
in particular. First, the new law prohibits publications that "disparage
the King and royal family members." Any criticism of the royal family or
the King falls within this prohibition. Second, the law prohibits publication
of "any news item, cartoon, or comments that might harm the Jordan Armed
Forces or the security forces." In Jordan, the security apparatus, which
has engaged in torture and human rights violations, has always been off
limits to the press and the new law reemphasizes this fact. In the past,
reporters and editors were routinely arrested for publishing information
or criticism about the security services. For example, Hilmi Asmar, former
editor of the Islamist weekly al-Sabil, was detained for two weeks after
publishing a piece which claimed that security services had tortured a
detainee. They placed Asmar in the same cell as the alleged torture victim
without ever charging him.56

Third, the law prohibits publication of "any information that harms national
unity, encourages crime or sows seeds of envy, hatred or divisions among
members of society." In Jordan, there are deeply rooted divisions between
indigenous Jordanians and Palestinians who have immigrated to Jordan throughout
the years. Any publications which threaten this fragile coexistence or
challenge "national unity" are illegal. This has affected a number of nationalist
papers which espouse an East Banker (indigenous Jordanian) first perspective.
Again, this prohibition is consistent with the earlier law.

Fourth, newspapers cannot publish "any article or information that slanders
heads of state of Arab, Islamic, or friendly nations, heads of diplomatic
missions and their accredited staff on a reciprocal basis. for] anything
that might instigate strikes, sit-ins or other illegal public gatherings."
This part of the article is used to prevent opposition to the peace process
and criticism of Yasir `Arafat (President of the Palestinian National Authority).
The weeklies, in particular, vociferously oppose the peace process and
a number of articles have been published in recent years condemning the
process and `Arafat's role in it. Criticism of `Arafat and other leaders
involved in the peace process is subject to prosecution.17

There is still some opposition in Parliament to the 1998 Press and Publications
Law, but the articles and stipulations which were enacted are consistent
with the regime's attempt to depoliticize the press as much as possible.
A total depoliticization is almost impossible, given that freedom of the
press and expression are specifically outlined in the Constitution. However,
the capital deposit requirements and the limitations imposed by the new
law remove the press from certain highly contentious political issues,
further narrowing the scope of political participation and activism.

THE MANIPULATION OF POLITICAL SPACE

Once political participation is channeled away from institutions and practices
outside state-delineated political space, it is subject to further manipulation
as the regime manages politics to protect its power. In controlled liberalization
from above, the Jordanian regime carefully crafts the legal codes that
structure politics to serve its own interests and encourages politics through
political parties, which to date remain weak. In doing so, it claims the
mantle of democracy without fully implementing democratic norms and principles.
Formal democratic political space is limited in a number of ways.

First, although 20 political parties have formed to participate in the
political arena, their potency and utility in the new democracy are questionable.
Political parties hold little relevance for the general population. In
a 1995 survey by the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of
Jordan, only 50 percent of those surveyed had ever heard of the Islamic
Action Front Party, at the time the single largest political party bloc
in Parliament.58 Awareness of other parties was far less. In addition,
because only 50 initial members are needed to register a political party,
many parties have formed around individual personalities rather than ideological
or political platforms. They are "personal parties," representing the interests
and ambitions of particular leaders rather than broad groups in society.
A lack of financial resources further exacerbates the weakness of parties.


Because of the relative weakness of the party in the electorate, candidates
for Parliament rarely rely upon parties during campaigning and are not
beholden to them once in office. In the 1989 elections, political parties
were still banned. In 1993, parties ran a relatively unsuccessful campaign,
and the majority of those elected to the Chamber of Deputies ran as members
of a particular clan or tribe.-19 Even strong party candidates, such as
IAF leaders, still relied heavily upon tribal support. In 1997, the major
opposition parties boycotted the elections to protest government corruption,
peace with Israel, and the electoral law. The remaining parties did not
fare well (only five fielded candidates), and once again tribal candidates
dominated the electoral process. In a survey of 176 randomly selected candidates
published by al- `Arab al-Yawn, only 15 percent of the candidates indicated
a political party affiliation.60 As a result, 43 of the 80 members of the
1997-2001 Parliament are tribal representatives. 61

This is not to argue that political parties will remain weak indefinitely.
They have only been legal since 1992 and there is room for maturation.
But to date, they remain financially strapped and do not dominate the political
arena. Despite this weakness, however, the regime channels all political
participation in this direction by limiting activism in grassroots voluntary
organizations and other venues outside state-delineated political space.


Second, the distribution of electoral seats in the Chamber of Deputies
according to district favors pro-regime constituencies. Areas of regime
supporters, including rural areas, southern districts, select cities and
towns, and bedouin tribes, receive a disproportionate number of seats.
For example, Irbid, with a population of 390,685, is allotted nine seats,
while Amman's second district with its high Palestinian activism and a
population of 391,849 only receives three.62 The allocation of seats is
according to regime interests, not population size.

Third, the regime enacted an amendment to the electoral law in 1993 to
weaken opposition groups.63 King Husayn changed the electoral system from
block-voting to a one-person, one-vote system. In the previous system,
each voter was allotted a number of votes equal to the number of seats
in the district. For example, in Irbid voters had nine votes. Under the
block-voting system, these votes could be used for certain political groups,
thus amplifying the influence of political forces capable of mobilizing
disciplined voters. The system gave an advantage to the Islamic movement,
in particular, whose army of loyal cadres was able to utilize effectively
the block system to benefit their own candidates in 1989. Prior to the
1993 elections. however, the King enacted the electoral changes by royal
decree. Under the new system, individuals are only given one vote, regardless
of the number of seats in the district. This was generally seen as an attempt
by the regime to weaken the political prospects of the Islamists, and,
to some extent, it succeeded. In 1993, the number of Islamists in the Chamber
of Deputies dropped from 32 to 22. Members of the IAF claim that the number
of seats would have been much higher if the amendment had not been enacted
because they received a greater proportion of the popular vote.64

Fourth, political participation was further limited at the local level
by a 1995 amendment to the 1955 law governing municipal elections. The
new law stipulates that the mayor of Amman and half of the Amman Municipal
Council be appointed by the Council of Ministers.61 Since Amman is the
most politically significant municipality (with nearly one third of the
Kingdom's population), the amendment seriously undermines democratic practices.


Finally, democracy is constrained by the realities of monarchical power.
Although the Chamber of Deputies is a representative institution, the Senate,
the Prime Minister, and the Council of Ministers are all appointed by the
King, who chooses individuals loyal to the royal agenda. In addition, the
Constitution grants the King the power to dissolve Parliament, call new
elections, and declare martial law, powers which have been employed to
serve regime interests. While there has been movement toward democracy
in Jordan, it remains a Kingdom ultimately governed by a King.66

CONCLUSION

Jordan now enjoys far greater freedom than its Arab counterparts, but it
suffers from many of the limits of democracy common in the region. Despite
elections and multi-party politics, the regime has not relinquished its
prerogative to manage and control politics. Driven by a concern for stability,
the contours of democratization are shaped by regime survival interests,
not by democratic principles. As a result, democratic practices are accompanied
by repression and continued authoritarian tendencies.

This article has argued that the limits of democracy in Jordan can be viewed
as part of a strategy to channel all political participation into a narrow,
state-delineated political space comprised predominantly of political parties,
elections, and Parliament. All forms of political activism outside this
space, such as participation through voluntary organizations, public demonstrations,
and the press, are limited by legal codes and repression. While society
attempts to expand the scope of participation through alternative institutions,
the state continuously mobilizes to contain political activism within set
boundaries. Once channeled into this political space, participation is
subject to the manipulative practices of the regime.

The limits of democracy are not immutable. The clash between the cultural
organizations and the regime indicates that society has not unconditionally
accepted the limits imposed by the state and is actively challenging the
boundaries of the political. However, this dialectical interaction has
thus far favored the regime which has succeeded in imposing its own vision
of democracy. The future of democracy in Jordan is difficult to predict,
especially given King Abdullah's recent (February 1999) arrival on the
political scene, but as long as the regime insists on channeling political
participation, it will remain limited.

1. In this article, I use the term democracy to denote a political system
where popular political participation, civil liberties, and civil rights
are protected by law and the enforcement of that law.

2. Samih K. Farsoun and Lucia P. Fort, "The Problematics of Civil Society:
Intellectual Discourse and Arab Intellectuals", unpublished paper, 1992.


3. S.E. Finer, Comparative Government (London: Pelican, 1970): Mahfoud
Bennoune, "Algeria's Facade Democracy,"Middle East Report (March-April
1990): Beverley Milton-Edwards, "Facade Democracy and Jordan," British
Journal of Middle East Studies 20, no.2 (1993), pp. 191-203.

4. Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen, and Paul Noble, eds., Political Liberalization
& Democratization in the Arab World, Volume 2, Comparative Experiences
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998). For this argument applied to
Jordan in particular, see Laurie Brand, "Economic and Political Liberalization
in a Render Economy: The Case of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan," in Iliya
Harik and Denis J. Sullivan. eds., Privatization and

Liberalization in the Middle East (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1992); Rex Brynen, "Economic Crisis and Post-Render Democratization in
the Arab World: The Case of Jordan," Canadian Journal of Political Science
25, no. 1 (March 1992), pp.69-97; and Katherine Rath, "The Process of Democratization
in Jordan," Middle Eastern Studies 30, no.3 (July 1994), pp.530-57.

5. Hazem Bablawi and Giacomo Luciani, eds., The Render State (London: Croom
Helm, 1987).

6. Giacomo Luciani, "Economic Foundations of Democracy and Authoritarianism:
The Arab World in Comparative Perspective," Arab Studies Quarterly 10,
no.4 (Fall 1988), p.463.

7. Diane Singerman, Avenues of Political Participation: Family, Politics
and Networks in Urban Quarters in Cairo (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1995), p. 245.

8. Brand, "Economic and Political Liberalization"; Brynen, "Economic Crisis
and Post-Rentier Democratization"; Rath, "The Process of Democratization
in Jordan."

9. Malik Mufti, "Elite Bargains and the Onset of Political Liberalization
in Jordan," Comparative Political Studies 32, no.1 (February 1999), pp.100-129;
Robert Satloff, "Jordan's Great Gamble: Economic Crisis and Political Reform,"
in Henri Barkey, ed., The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).

10. Daniel Brumberg, "Survival Strategies vs. Democratic Bargains: The
Politics of Economic Reform in Contemporary Egypt," in Henri Barkey, ed.,
The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1992).

11. Daniel Bromberg, "Authoritarian Legacies and Reform Strategies in the
Arab World," in Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany, and Paul Noble, eds., Political
Liberalization & Democratization in the Arab World, Volume 1, Theoretical
Perspectives (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Press, 1995), p.230.

12. Glenn Robinson, "Defensive Democratization in Jordan." International
Journal of Middle East Studies 30 (1998), pp.387-410.

13. For a detailed explanation of the relationship between the state and
civil society organizations in Jordan, see Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Civil
Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordan," Comparative Politics
(forthcoming).

14. Law 33 of 1966, Article 2: "Qanun al-Jamiyyat wa al-Hay'ai al-Ijtima'iyya,"
("Law of Groups and Organizations") emphasis added. Published in the Official
Gazette no.1927, It June 1966.

15. Law 32 of 1992, Article 14: "Political Parties Law." Published in the
Official Gazette, No.3851, 1 September 1992, p.1670.

16. Interview by author with organization leader, Amman, 5 November 1996.


17. The author attended this particular meeting and met with members the
following day. This episode is not unique. Islamist organizations often
face charges of political activities because of their application of Islam
to all aspects of life. Islam is seen as a framework for politics, economics,
social behavior, culture, and other dimensions of social existence. As
a result, it is difficult for such organizations to render their activities
completely devoid of political import.

18. Interview, by author, with an activist who presented a lecture at the
society just prior to its dissolution, Amman, 20 March 1997. 19. The Star
(Amman), 23 January 1997.

20. Human Rights Watch, Jordan. Clamping Down on Crities: Human Rights
Violations in Advance of the Parlimentary Elections (New York: Human Rights
Watch, 1997).

21. Jordaan Clamping Down on Critics. pp.31-33.

22. Jordan Times (Amman), 20 September 1997.

23. Interview by author with Muhmud Kafawi, Amman. 28 March 1997

24. Although professional associations remain politically active there
is some evidence that the regime intends to depoliticize them thus furthering
the channeling process. Various statement by state officals express growing
ire over associatonal activities in politics. Proposed reforms include
voluntary association membership (membership is currently mandatory). an
act which would seriously undermine the associations political influence.


24. Although professional associations remain politically active, there
is some evidence that the regime intends to depoliticize them, thus furthering
the channeling process. Various statements by state officials express growing
ire over associational activities in politics. Proposed reforms include
voluntary association membership (membership is currently mandatory), an
act which would seriously undermine the associations' political influence.


25, Donatella delta Porta and Herbert Reiter, eds., Policing Protest: The
Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1998).

26. David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow. eds., The Social Movement Society:
Contentious Politics for a New Century (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers. Inc., 1998).

27. Interview by author with `Abd-al-Latif `Arabiyyat, Amman. 27 November
1996. `Arabiyyat is currently (1999) the President of the IAF and was the
Speaker of Parliament from 1989-1993. He has also served as a Senator and
Minister.

28. United States Department of State, Jordan Human Rights Report (1996),
p.9.

29. Tujan Faysal was the first woman elected to Parliament where she was
a staunch critic of the government and served from 1993-1997. She was defeated
in the 1997 elections and filed fraud charges to

contest the loss. Khalil Haddadin, a member of the Jordanian Bath Arab
Socialist Party, has been a member of Parliament since 1993.

30. Jordan Times, 20 November 1997. 31. Jordan Times. 22 November 1997.


32. Permission is also inconsistent. While some political rallies were
permitted at the Professional Associations Complex, when opposition parties
wanted to hold a protest rally at the Complex in support of the 13 weekly
newspapers which were suspended (see below). the regime withheld permission
on the grounds that it would violate the Political Parties Law, Article
14. which states that political parties cannot use the premises of associations
(Jordan Times, 2 October 1997).

33. E.E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart.
& Wintson, 1960). 34. Jordan Times II February 1998.

35. .Jordan Times, 12 February 1998.

36. Jordan Times, 14 February 1998. 37. The Star, 19 February 1998.

38. He was arrested for inciting the riot and lese majesty (attacks against
the royal family).

39. The coroner's report indicated that the bullet did not come from a
police-issued gun (The Star, 26 February 1998).

40. The Star, 26 February 1998.

41. The Star, 5 March 1998.

42. Jordan Tunes, 29 October 1994.

43. Interview by author with Ishaq Farhan, Amman, 10 October 1996. Farhan
was then President of the

44. Jordan Times, 17 September 1997.

45. For more dan Tintes. see Wn15 October 1997.

46. Law 60 of 1953, "Qanun al ijtma atal-amma ("The Law of Public meeting")
Article 4 Published in the Official Gazette no. 1139. 1 April 1953 . p.651


47. Law 60 of 1953. Articles 5 and 7. Published in the O,4u1cr2u1at Ga-eu1te
no.1139. Law 60 of 1953, Articles 1953. p.65 and 7.

48. Law 60 of 1953, Articles 7 and 8.

49. Law 60 of 1953, Ar more details. see Wiktorowicz Civil Society as Social
Control." w' 'v' oc' on

50. At the time this article went to press, the Lower House and Senate
had approved a new amendment to the Press and Publications Law, though
the King had not yet endorsed it. In particular. Article 37, which is discussed
in this section. was cancelled. This represents a hopeful sign that, at
least in the area of press freedoms. the channeling process may be reduced
in the near future. The analysis in this section. however, is based upon
the law that was in place at the time.

51. The state maintains partial ownership through the Social Security Corporation
and the Jordan Investment Corporation of the Jordan Press Foundation. which
owns al-Ra'y and the English daily Jordan Tintes.

52. The requirement for dailies was set at JD600,000 (US $420,000).

53. Information on the Article 19 report can be found in The Star, 30 October
1997; Amnesty International, AI Report 1998: Jordan (http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar98/mde16.htm);
Committee to Protect Journalists has a variety of reports on this issue
in Jordan at http:/www.cpj.org/countrystatus/1998/ mideast/Jordan.html;
Human Rights Watch, A Death Knell for Free Expression? (New York: Human
Rights Watch, 1997).

54. Jordan Times, 11 November 1997.

55. Information and quotes from the 1998 Press and Publications Law come
from an unofficial translation provided by the Jordan Times. 23 September
1998.

56. Author's interview with Hilmi Asmar, Amman, 29 October 1996.

57. In addition, Article 50 gives the Court of First Instance the power
to close newspapers under investigation for violating any provisions of
the law (Jordan Times, 3 April 1999).

58. There was less than a 10 percent recognition rate for 16 of the 20
political parties. See University of Jordan's Center for Strategic Studies,
"Denocracy in Jordan," (Al-Dimkrat@yya Fi al-Urdun) unpublished paper,
1995.

59. For more on the 1989 and 1993 elections. see Pascaline Eury, Jordanie:
Les Elections Legislatives du 8 Novembre 1989 (Jordan: The Legislative
Elections of 8 November 1989) (Amman: CERMOC, 1991); Louis-Jean Duclos,
"Les Elections Ugislatives en Jordanie," ("The Legislatives en Jordanie,"
("M27o2e Legislative Elections in Jordan") MaghrebMachrek 129 (July-September
1990), pp.47-75; Al Urdunn al-Jadid Research Center, Intikhaabat 1993:
Diraasa Tahliiliyya Raqmiyya (The 1993 Elections: An Analytical and Statistical
Study) (Amman: Al Urdunn al-Jadid, 1994); Alba M. Amawi, "The 1993 Elections
in Jordan," Arab Studies Quarterly 16, no.3 (Summer 1994), pp.15-22.

60. Jordan Times, 4 November 1997. 61. The Star, 6 November 1997.

62. Abla Amawi, "I"he Consequences of Choice: Political Liberalization
in Jordan," Civil Society 5, no.52 (Cairo: Ibn Khaldoun Center, 1996).


63. The electoral law reform can be found at http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/elect_law.htnl.


64. Author's interview with Ishaq Farhan, 10 October 1996.

65. Jordan Times, 18 March 1999.

66. Survey results in Jordan indicate that Jordanians recognize the limits
of democracy. See the results from a series of surveys conducted by the
Center for Strategic Studies on Democracy, summarized in Maher J. Massis,
"Jordan: A Study of Attitudes Toward Democratic Change," Arab Studies Quarterly,
20 no.3 (Summer 1998), pp.37-63.

Quintan Wiktorowicz is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Shippensburg
University.
.