With one-fourth of the world's proven oil reserves, Saudi Arabia is likely to remain the world's largest oil producer for the foreseeable future. During 1999, Saudi Arabia supplied the United States with 1.4 million barrels per day of crude oil, or nearly 16%, of U.S. crude oil imports during that period.

Information contained in this report is the best available as of January 2000 and is subject to change.

GENERAL BACKGROUND
With oil revenues making up around 80-85% of total Saudi export earnings (and around 35-40% of the country's gross domestic product, or GDP), Saudi Arabia's economy remains, despite attempts at diversification, heavily dependent on oil (although investments in petrochemicals have increased the relative importance of the downstream petroleum sector in recent years). Although the collapse in oil prices of 1998 and early 1999 now has ended, and the country's economic outlook has improved greatly, Saudi Arabia continues to face pressures to reform its economy and to open up to increased private investment. For 1999, real GDP grew only about 0.4%, but the outlook for 2000, assuming higher oil prices continue, is for more rapid growth of 5.1%. Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah has stated that a period of austerity lays ahead, and that the "boom period" for Saudi Arabia and other Gulf oil producing countries is over. For Saudi Arabia, another particular challenge is the country's rapid population growth, young population, and the challenge of finding good jobs for these people (outside of the public sector, which is overstaffed and a drain on the country's budget). Over the past decade or so, Saudi economic growth has failed to keep pace with population growth, resulting in decreased per capita incomes.

Saudi Arabia's government officially (in its 1995-2000 development plan) has accepted the need to reduce state involvement and increase private sector -- including foreign -- participation and investment in the economy, but has moved very slowly in this direction (largely due to fears of job losses for Saudi citizens, as well as resistance by the private sector and some members of the Saudi royal family). Saudi Arabia also has moved slowly towards cuts in government subsidies (although it increased the price of gasoline by 50% -- to about $0.90 per gallon -- in May 1999), increases in taxes, or financial sector reform. Currently, there are signs that this pace may be picking up, with privatization now seen by Saudi leadership (Crown Prince Abdullah, in particular) as a "strategic choice," and with creation of a new "Supreme Economic Council" (charged with boosting investment, creating jobs for Saudi nationals, and promoting the private sector) in September 1999. Changes to rules governing foreign investment in Saudi Arabia are being considered, as are changes to the country's tax code (taxes on foreign business profits currently range as high as 45%) and foreign ownership rules (currently, foreigners are allowed to own up to 49% of any joint venture, need a Saudi sponsor, and are not allowed to own property). In one relatively small move in the direction or reform, in late October 1999, international investors were permitted to invest in local shares through established open-ended mutual funds.

Also pushing liberalization of the Saudi economy is Saudi Arabia's desire to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). Saudi Arabia hopes to be admitted to the WTO by the end of 2000, but this could be delayed by a variety of issues, including the degree to which Saudi Arabia is willing to increase market access to its banking, finance, and upstream oil sectors. Ultimately, WTO membership likely would result in significant changes to the Saudi economy, which currently is characterized by relatively high tariff rates, subsidies, and a variety of restrictions on the free market. The goal of WTO membership is in part due to Saudi Arabia's desire to attract foreign investment, and in part to its push for new markets for the country's petrochemical industry. In November 1999, King Fahd stated that "the world is heading for...globalisation" and that "it is no longer possible for [Saudi Arabia] to make slow progress." In the context of successfully becoming integrated into the global economy, Fahd also emphasized the importance of regional unity among Gulf states -- economically, politically, and militarily. A customs union, for instance, among Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, has been proposed. Currently, goods from GCC countries are exempt from all Saudi import duties, as long as 40% of their value has been added within the GCC and the producing company is owned at least 51% by GCC citizens.

Saudi Arabia also has a policy known as "Saudiisation," the goal of which is to increase employment of its own citizens by replacing 60% of the estimated 5-6 million foreign workers in the country. In order to do so, Saudi Arabia has stopped issuing work visas for certain jobs, has moved to increase training for Saudi nationals, and has set minimum requirements for the hiring of Saudi nationals by private companies. State subsidies and losses by unprofitable state-owned enterprises are large contributors to Saudi Arabia's budget deficit. The country's finance ministry has called for an increased private sector role. At present, the private sector accounts for around 40% of Saudi Arabia's GDP (and 89% of employment) , but only 5%-10% of those employed in the private sector are Saudi nationals.

In December 1999, Saudi Arabia issued a cautious budget for 2000, with only a small (2%) increase in government spending and conservative assumptions about oil revenues. In other news, in early January 2000 Saudi Arabia announced that it was establishing an 11-member supreme "Council for Petroleum and Minerals Affairs." The function of this council is uncertain at present (January 2000), but appears related to Saudi Arabia's overall goal of restructuring its economy and possibly accelerating private sector involvement in the country's energy sector.

OIL
Saudi Arabia (not including the Saudi-Kuwaiti "Neutral Zone") contains 261 billion barrels of proven oil reserves (more than one-fourth of the world total) and up to 1 trillion barrels of ultimately recoverable oil. Saudi Arabia is the world's leading oil producer, exporter, and holder of spare oil production capacity. Saudi Arabia's location in the politically volatile Arabian Gulf region adds an element of concern for its major customers, including the United States. Saudi Arabia agreed at the March 1999 OPEC ministerial meeting to cut its crude oil output to 7.438 MMBD. As of October 1999, Saudi Arabia reportedly was producing around 7.5 MMBD, excluding the Neutral Zone.

Although Saudi Arabia has about 77 oil and gas fields, over half of its oil reserves are contained in only eight fields, including Ghawar (the world's largest onshore oil field, with estimated remaining reserves of 70 billion barrels) and Safaniya (the world's largest offshore field, with estimated reserves of 19 billion barrels). Ghawar's main producing structures are, from north to south: Ain Dar, Shedgum, Uthmaniyah, Farzan, Ghawar, Al Udayliyah, Hawiyah, and Haradh. Overall, Ghawar alone accounts for about half of Saudi Arabia's total oil production capacity. Saudi Arabia has fewer than 1,430 wells, which is extremely low relative to the volume of oil the country produces.

Saudi Arabia produces a range of crude oils, from heavy to super light. The lightest grades are produced onshore, while the medium and heavy grades come mainly from offshore. The Ghawar field is the main producer of 34^o API Arabian Light crude, while Abqaiq (a super-giant field with 17 billion barrels of proven reserves) produces 37^o API Arab Extra Light crude. Since 1994, the Hawtah Trend (also called the Najd fields), which includes the Hawtah field and smaller satellites (Nuayyim, Hazmiyah) south of Riyadh, has been producing around 200,000 bbl/d of 45^o-50^o API, 0.06% sulphur, Arab Super Light. Overall, the Najd fields are estimated to contain 30 billion barrels of liquids and major reserves of natural gas. Offshore production includes Arab Medium crude from the Zuluf (over 500,000 bbl/d capacity) and Marjan (270,000 bbl/d capacity) fields and Arab Heavy crude from the Safaniya field.

The Neutral Zone contains about 5 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. Within the Neutral Zone, Japan's Arabian Oil Co. (AOC) operates two offshore fields (Khafji and Hout). This represents Japan's most significant upstream oil interest, with 80% of revenues going to AOC and 10% each to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Texaco, meanwhile, operates three onshore fields (Wafra, South Fawaris, and South Umm Gudair). AOC's concession on the Saudi side expires on February 27, 2000 (an extension has been requested), and on the Kuwait side in January 2003. Saudi Arabia has stated that it would like AOC, and Japan in general, to increase its investments in Saudi Arabia (including more than $1 billion in a railway linking remote mining areas to export terminals), as well as its purchases of Saudi oil, before it renews AOC's drilling rights in the Neutral Zone. Japan has offered around $4 billion in commercial loans to Saudi Arabia for possible investment projects in desalination, power generation, and petrochemical development.

Saudi Arabia is a key oil supplier for the United States, Europe, and Japan; however, in recent years, Western Hemisphere producers (Venezuela, Canada, and Mexico) have challenged Saudi Arabia's dominance in the U.S. market. Asia now takes about 60% of Saudi Arabia's crude oil exports, as well as the majority of its refined petroleum product exports. Europe is Saudi Arabia's second largest oil export market, followed by the United States. Through the first 10 months of 1999, Saudi Arabia exported 1.47 MMBD of oil (1.37 MMBD of crude) to the United States. For this time period, Saudi Arabia ranked third (after Venezuela and Canada) as a source of total (crude plus refined products) U.S. oil imports, and first for crude only. Saudi Arabia is eager to maintain and even expand its market share in the United States for a variety of economic and strategic reasons. For the first 10 months of 1999, Saudi Arabia's share of U.S. crude oil imports was 15.8%, down slightly from 16.3% for the same period in 1998.

Faced with a sharp oil price decline, domestic financial difficulties, a declining Saudi share of world oil markets (down to 12% from 17% in 1980), a desire to solidify relations with the United States, and increased competition from a variety of new, relatively expensive oil areas (the Caspian, offshore West Africa, deepwater Gulf of Mexico, etc.), Saudi Oil Minister Ali Naimi and Crown Prince Abdullah met with several U.S. oil companies (former Aramco partners Chevron, Exxon, Mobil, and Texaco; plus Arco, Conoco, and Phillips Petroleum) in September 1998 regarding possible upstream investment in Saudi Arabia's oil and, possibly even more so, natural gas industries, plus increased investment in petrochemicals. The Saudis asked the companies to submit proposals for possible projects in these sectors -- the first such invitation since these industries were nationalized in the mid-1970s, and potentially a major policy shift. In recent months, however, top Saudi officials have stated that additional foreign involvement in the country's upstream oil sector was not necessary at the present time, as opposed to the downstream oil and natural gas sectors, where Saudi Arabia is "fully open to investors," according to Oil Minister Naimi. In October 1999, Naimi stated that Saudi oil policy was based on four facts: 1) the largest oil reserves and among the lowest production costs -- around $1.50 per barrel -- in the world; 2) maintenance of significant spare oil production capacity; 3) a national economy closely linked to the oil industry; and 4) a stable political and economic system. Naimi also stressed the importance of "a stable international oil market" where "wide and rapid swings in prices are undesirable."

Saudi Arabia's oil production totaled about 8.5 MMBD in 1999 (7.8 MMBD crude oil), including 666,000 bbl/d of natural gas liquids, and also including about 270,000 bbl/d of crude oil produced from its half-share of the Saudi-Kuwaiti Neutral Zone. This compares with an OPEC crude oil production quota of 7.438 MMBD (as of April 1, 1999). Saudi Arabia has been producing close to its OPEC quota (production of natural gas liquids is not counted against the OPEC quota), but about 3 MMBD below its sustainable oil production capacity. Of Saudi Arabia's total oil production capacity, about 65%-70% is considered light gravity, with the rest either medium or heavy.

Despite its roughly 3 MMBD of spare production capacity (the largest in the world), Saudi Arabia is continuing to invest -- albeit slowly -- in the development of lighter crude reserves. Priority has been given to developing the Shaybah field in the remote Empty Quarter area bordering the United Arab Emirates. Shaybah contains an estimated 7 billion barrels of premium grade 40-42^o API sweet crude oil, and ultimately is slated to produce 500,000 bbl/d of crude oil and 870 million cubic feet/day of natural gas. Shaybah began production in July 1998 at around 250,000 bbl/d. Overall, the Shaybah project will cost $2-$2.5 billion, and will include three gas/oil separation plants (GOSPs) and a 395-mile pipeline to connect the field to Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia's closest gathering center, for blending with Arabian Extra Light crude (Berri and Abqaiq streams). As Shaybah light crude production increases (to 500,000 bbl/d), Saudi Arabia likely will cut production of Arab Light from overworked parts (water content is rising) of the Ghawar reservoir, as well as Arab Heavy from offshore. Two U.S. companies are playing a major role in the Shaybah project: Parsons Corporation (project management) and Bechtel (construction).

Ports and Pipelines
Most of Saudi Arabia's crude oil is exported via the Arabian Gulf through the Abqaiq processing facility. Saudi Arabia's primary oil export terminals are located at Ras Tanura (5 million bbl/d capacity) and Juaymah (3 million bbl/d) on the Arabian Gulf, plus Yanbu (3 million bbl/d) on the Red Sea.

Saudi Arabia operates two major oil pipelines. The 4.8 million bbl/d East-West Crude Oil Pipeline (Petroline) is used mainly to transport Arabian Light and Super Light to refineries in the Western Province and to Red Sea terminals for direct export to European markets. Running parallel to the Petroline is the 270,000 bbl/d Abqaiq-Yanbu natural gas liquids pipeline, which serves Yanbu's petrochemical facilities. The Trans-Arabian Pipeline (Tapline) is mothballed (having provided only limited service to a refiner in Jordan since the 1970s), and the 1.65 million bbl/d Iraqi-Saudi Pipeline (IPSA-2) was closed indefinitely following the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Currently, according to Saudi Oil Minister Naimi, "we have surplus oil export and pipelines capacity....[including the] East-West oil pipeline system [which] can carry and deliver 5 million bbl/d" but is being run at "only half capacity." Also, according to Naimi, "our oil export terminals on the Arabian Gulf can load 14 MMBD but are currently handling much less than half of that."

Refining
Prior to the the sharp downturn in oil prices and the resulting financial pressures on the Saudi budget during 1998 and early 1999, Saudi Arabia had been investing in refinery upgrades and expansions. These included a $1.2-billion upgrade of the 300,000-bbl/d Ras Tanura refinery (apparently still on schedule). Also slated for upgrading had been the Rabigh refinery located on the Red Sea coast. Previous plans called for boosting capacity at Rabigh, Saudi Arabia's largest domestic refinery, to as much as 400,000 bbl/d, as well as upgrading the refinery's product slate away from low-value heavy products towards gasoline and kerosene at an estimated cost of $2 billion. Due to Saudi Arabia's ongoing financial difficulties, however, the Rabigh project was scaled back by 60% or so, and as of October 1998 appears to have been canceled. Another project, the $200-million Haradh-2 gas-oil separation plant for the Ghawar field, was deferred as of June 1998.

Saudi Arabia has ambitious plans for expanding petrochemical production using natural gas as a feedstock. State-owned (70%) Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) accounts for 5% of world petrochemical production, and is pushing ahead with the third stage of an expansion plan which aims to increase petrochemical production to 30 million tons per year (t/y) by 2000 (from 23.7 million tons in 1997). In February 1997, Saudi Petrochemical Company (Sadaf), a joint venture between SABIC and Shell Oil Company of the United States, launched a $1 billion expansion program that includes a new 700,000 metric ton/year plant for methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE). The plant's opening boosts SABIC's total MTBE production capacity to 2.7 million metric t/y. A large ($415 million) MTBE plant also is to be built by a domestic/international joint venture called Tahseen. SABIC also is aiming to increase its sales to Iran.

NATURAL GAS
Saudi Arabia's proven gas reserves are estimated at 204.5 trillion cubic feet (Tcf), ranking fifth in the world (after Russia, Iran, Qatar, and the UAE). Most (around 2/3) of Saudi Arabia's currently proven gas reserves consist of associated gas, mainly from the onshore Ghawar field and the offshore Safaniya and Zuluf fields. The Ghawar oil field alone accounts for one-third of the country's total gas reserves. Most new associated gas reserves discovered in the 1990s have been in fields which contain light crude oil, especially in the Najd region south of Riyadh. Most of Saudi Arabia's non-associated gas reserves are located in the deep Khuff reservoir, which underlies the Ghawar oil field. Another gas field, called Dorra, is located near the Khafji oil field in the Saudi-Kuwaiti Neutral Zone and may be developed by Japan's AOC. Gas also is located in the countries extreme northwest, at Midyan.

With domestic gas demand expected to grow as much as 8% per year through 2007, increasing gas production is a priority for the Saudi government, with gas development slated to consume a large share of Aramco's budget (in late 1999, Aramco decided to invest $45 billion over 25 years on upstream gas development and processing facilities). Additional gas production is being encouraged as a feedstock for the country's growing petrochemical industry, as well as for electricity generation, desalination plants and other industrial establishments, and as a replacement for direct oil burning. Using gas instead of oil domestically will help free up additional crude oil for export. Saudi Arabia is interested in applying new technologies, specifically the Fischer-Tropsch gas-to-liquids process to convert gas into middle distillates like diesel, jet fuel, gas oil, kerosene, and naphtha. To date, Saudi Arabia has not expressed interest in liquefied natural gas due mainly to doubts regarding economic viability.

Domestic demand is driving investment in Saudi Arabia's Master Gas System (MGS), which started up in 1982. Previously, all of the country's natural gas was flared. In November 1996, a project management contract was signed with U.S.-based Parsons Corp. for construction of a $1.9 billion, 2.4-billion-cubic-feet (Bcf)-per-day gas processing plant at Hawiyah. Others involved at Hawiyah, located south of Dhahran and east of Riyadh, include Japan's JGC and Argentina's Techint. At an estimated cost of $2 billion, this is the largest Saudi gas project in more than 10 years, and is to be completed by 2001. The Hawiyah plant plus the debottlenecking of three other existing plants is to boost Saudi Arabia's gas processing capacity to 6.3 Bcf per day by 2002. Despite Saudi Arabia's ongoing financial difficulties, and severe cuts in capital spending by Aramco and others, Hawiyah, which will process nonassociated Khuff gas for power plants and industry near Riyadh, has not been postponed due to rising gas demand from industrial users and regional power generators.

ELECTRICITY
Saudi Arabia's relatively affluent and rapidly growing population is increasing demand on electric utilities. Overall, Saudi power demand is growing by around 5% annually. Industry and Electricity Minister Hashim bin Abdullah Yamani has stated that $117 billion will need to be invested in the country's power sector over the next 24 years, with most of this to be raised by the private sector, in order to expand capacity and build a national power grid. Yamani also has estimated that Saudi Arabia needs to install 2,000 megawatts (MW) of new capacity each year through 2020. Meanwhile, new industrial projects have been delayed and brownouts have occurred due to inadequate power supplies. Saudi Arabia's Consultative Council reportedly has begun pushing for a radical solution to the country's power supply challenges. Privatization of Saudi Arabia's electricity sector is under consideration, as is a division into three parts -- generation, transmission, and distribution. Electricity Minister Yamani said in November 1999 that the power sector would be privatized soon.

Several projects now underway employ financing mechanisms that are new to Saudi Arabia's electric power sector. For example, the 1,200-MW, PP9 power station north of Riyadh has been funded with extra revenues generated by a special tariff imposed on heavy users since January 1995. Expansion of the 2,400-MW, $1.5-billion Ghazlan II power plant is being financed by an internationally syndicated, $500-million, commercial loan (the first such loan in Saudi history). Ghazlan II consists of four units, which are expected to come online, approximately one unit per year, through 2002. Meanwhile, plans for a 1,100-MW, gas-fired power plant at Shuaiba on the Red Sea coast apparently have been dropped by Saudi Consolidated Electricity Company (SCECO) West. ABB Asea Brown Boveri had been awarded the contract on a turnkey basis.

Saudi Arabia's electricity sector is run mainly by four regional state-owned companies: SCECO East, West, Central, and South. Overall, SCECO controls around 85% of the country's power supply. In December 1999, Saudi Arabia's cabinet announced the creation of a single shareholding electric company (Saudi Electric Co.) from the country's 10 existing regional power companies (including the four SCECOs), which control 85% of the country's power supplies. The four SCECO companies have operated at a loss because they have been required to sell power below cost to Saudi consumers, as well as due to inefficiencies and difficulties with non-payment of bills. The government has subsidized the cost of electricity and has paid a guaranteed dividend to private shareholders. Restructuring of the SCECO system could be accompanied by a more general streamlining/privatization of the Saudi power sector, and possibly even an increase in power tariffs, at least to major customers. Creation of the Saudi Electric Company could open the door to independent power projects (IPPs) in Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia has downsized plans for a new utility company in its twin industrial cities of Yanbu and Jubail. The proposed company, known as the Utility Company (UCO), would be owned 40% by the Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu and 60% by major local companies including SABIC. Bechtel and Parsons were to be founding shareholders, although it now appears that state companies will own UCO, at least initially, while Bechtel and Parsons will continue in advisory roles.

ENVIRONMENT
Saudi Arabia's vast oil reserves mean that environmental issues are seen mainly related to oil exploration and production. Despite technological advances in exploration and production, offshore oil development continues to have a significant impact on the marine environment, as do oil spills and illegal discharges.

Several air quality initiatives, including the planned introduction of unleaded gasoline into the country in 2001, should reduce Saudi Arabia's level of air pollution, but rising rates of energy consumption and carbon emissions portend possible future problems for the Kingdom. Oil production and development make the country very energy- and carbon-intensive as well.

Saudi Arabia's plentiful supply of domestic oil and gas reserves has stifled incentives for the country to develop a significant renewable energy sector. However, the Saudi government is intensifying its efforts to increase public awareness about the need to protect the environment, and in the 21st century Saudi Arabia will need to invest heavily in environmental initiatives in order to preserve its delicate desert environment.

COUNTRY OVERVIEW
Head of State: King Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz al-Sa'ud
Crown Prince: Abdullah ibn Abd al-Aziz al-Sa'ud
Independence: September 23, 1932 (unification)
Population (1999E): 20.5 million (growing around 3.5% per year)
Location/Size: Between the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea/865,000 square miles (about 1/4 the size of the U.S.)
Major Cities: Riyadh (royal capital), Jeddah (administrative capital), Mecca, Medina, Dammam, Jubayl, Buraydah
Language: Arabic
Ethnic Groups: Arab (90%), Afro-Asian (10%)
Religion: Muslim (100%) - predominantly Sunni
Defense (8/97): Army (70,000), Navy (13,500 marines), Air Force (18,000), Coast Guard (4,500), National Guard (57,000), Tribal Levies (20,000), Frontier Force (10,500)

ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
Currency: Riyal
Market Exchange Rate (1/7/00): US$1 = 3.751 riyals
Gross Domestic Product (GDP - market exchange rate) (1999E): $137.3 billion
Real GDP Growth Rate (1999E): 0.4% (2000E): 5.1%
Inflation Rate (consumer prices)(1999E): 0.2% (2000E): 2.7%
Unemployment Rate (unofficial estimate) (1999E): 27%-35% of males, 95% of females
Current Account Balance (1999E): -$10.2 billion (2000E): -$2.9 billion
Major Trading Partners (1999): Japan, United States, European Community
Merchandise Exports (1999E): $43.6 billion (mainly crude oil and petroleum products)
Merchandise Imports (1999E): $28.4 billion (mainly industrial goods, metals, food)
Merchandise Trade Balance (1999E): $15.3 billion
Oil Export Revenues (1999E): $35 billion (up 17% from 1998)
Oil Export Revenues/Total Export Revenues (1999E): around 80%
External Debt (1999E): $20.3 billion (up from $17.8 billion in 1997)
Reserves minus gold (4/99E): $7.6 billion

ENERGY OVERVIEW
Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources: Ali bin Ibrahim al-Naimi (since 8/95)
Minister of Industry and Electricity: Hashim bin Abdullah Yamani
Proven Oil Reserves (1/1/00): 263.5 billion barrels (includes half of Neutral Zone -- NZ)
Oil Production (1999E): 8.5 million barrels per day (bbl/d), of which 7.8 million bbl/d is crude oil (includes NZ)
OPEC Crude Oil Production Quota (as of 4/1/99): 7.438 million bbl/d
Oil Consumption (1999E): 1.25 million bbl/d
Net Oil Exports (1999E): 7.3 million bbl/d
Crude Oil Refining Capacity (1/1/00): 1.71 million bbl/d
Natural Gas Reserves (1/1/00): 204.5 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) (includes half of NZ)
Natural Gas Production/Consumption (1998E): 1.65 Tcf
Electric Generating Capacity (1/1/98): 21 gigawatts
Net Electricity Generation (1998E): 110 billion kilowatthours

ENVIRONMENTAL OVERVIEW
Director General of Meteorology and Environmental Protection Agency: Dr. Nezar Tawfeeq
Total Energy Consumption (1998E): 4.2 quadrillion Btu* (1.1% of world total energy consumption)
Energy-Related Carbon Emissions (1998E): 63.8 million metric tons of carbon (1.0% of world carbon emissions)
Per Capita Energy Consumption (1998E): 207.8 million Btu (vs. U.S. value of 350.7 million Btu)
Per Capita Carbon Emissions (1998E): 3.2 metric tons of carbon (vs. U.S. value of 5.5 metric tons of carbon)
Energy Intensity (1998E): 35,100 Btu/ $1990 (vs U.S. value of 13,400 Btu/ $1990)**
Carbon Intensity (1998E): 0.53 metric tons of carbon/thousand $1990 (vs U.S. value of 0.21 metric tons/thousand $1990)**
Sectoral Share of Energy Consumption (1997E): Industrial (41.3%), Transportation (40.3%), Residential (12.3%), Commercial (6.1%)
Sectoral Share of Carbon Emissions (1997E): Transportation (40.4%), Industrial (39.9%), Residential (13.2%), Commercial (6.5%)
Fuel Share of Energy Consumption (1998E): Oil (58.7%), Natural Gas (41.3%)
Fuel Share of Carbon Emissions (1998E): Oil (59.8%), Natural Gas (40.2%)
Renewable Energy Consumption (1997E): 0.17 trillion Btu* (11% decrease from 1996)
Number of People per Motor Vehicle (1997): 6.6 (vs. U.S. value of 1.3)
Status in Climate Change Negotiations: Non-Annex I country under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (ratified December 28th, 1994). Not a signatory to thae Kyoto Protocol.
Major Environmental Issues: Desertification; depletion of underground water resources; the lack of perennial rivers or permanent water bodies has prompted the development of extensive seawater desalination facilities; coastal pollution from oil spills
Major International Environmental Agreements: A party to Conventions on Climate Change, Desertification, Endangered Species, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea and Ozone Layer Protection.

* The total energy consumption statistic includes petroleum, dry natural gas, coal, net hydro, nuclear, geothermal, solar and wind electric power. The renewable energy consumption statistic is based on International Energy Agency (IEA) data and includes hydropower, solar, wind, tide, geothermal, solid biomass and animal products, biomass gas and liquids, industrial and municipal wastes. Sectoral shares of energy consumption and carbon emissions are also based on IEA data.
**GDP based on EIA International Energy Annual 1998

OIL AND GAS INDUSTRIES
Organization: The Supreme Petroleum Council governs the nationalized oil industry, including Saudi Arabian Oil Co. (Saudi Aramco) ­ crude production, refining and marketing; Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (SABIC) ­ petrochemicals.
Major Foreign Oil Company Involvement: AOC, Mobil, Shell, Texaco
Major Ports: Jeddah, Jubail, Ras al-Khafji, Ras Tanura, Juaymah, Rabigh, Yanbu, Zuluf
Major Oil Fields: Ghawar, Safaniya, Najd, Abqaiq, Berri, Manifa, Zuluf, Shaybah, Abu Saafa, Khurusaniya
Major Pipelines (capacity - million bbl/d): Petroline (4.8), IPSA 1 (0.5), IPSA 2 (1.7), Abqaiq-Yanbu NGL line (0.4), (note: IPSA I shut since 1990)
Major Refineries (capacity, 1/1/00): Aramco - Ras Tanura 325,000 bbl/d, Rabigh 325,000 bbl/d, Yanbu 190,000 bbl/d, Riyadh 140,000 bbl/d, Jeddah 42,000 bbl/d; Aramco/Mobil - Yanbu 366,000 bbl/d; Petromin/Shell - al-Jubail 292,000 bbl/d; Arabian Oil Company - Ras al-Khafji 30,000 bbl/d

Sources for this report include: Agence France Presse; Alexander's Gas and Oil Connections; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts; Cambridge Energy Research Associates; CIA World Factbook 1999; Deutsche Presse-Agentur; Dow Jones News Wire service; Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire; Hart's Middle East Oil and Gas; Middle East Economic Digest; Middle East Newsfile; Oil Daily; Oil and Gas Journal; Petroleum Economist; Petroleum Finance Company; Petroleum Intelligence Weekly; International Market Insight Reports; U.S. Energy Information Administration; WEFA Middle East Economic Outlook; World Gas Intelligence.