A PROPOSAL FOR AN EQUITABLE
RESOLUTION TO THE CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND THE PALESTINIANS OVER THE
SHARED WATER RESOURCES OF THE MOUNTAIN AQUIFER
By Hillel I. Shuval
Source: Arab Studies
Quarterly, Spring2000, Vol. 22 Issue 2, p33, 29p
INTRODUCTION
IN THE PRESENT POSITIVE ENVIRONMENT and
advanced stages in the search for a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict after the signing of the Oslo agreement of 1993 and the Sharm
al-Sheikh agreement of 1999, some have claimed that the disputes over shared
water resources can become a major roadblock in the final stages of the path of
peace. In fact, some of the major opponents in Israel to reaching an
accommodation with the Palestinians, based on the principal of territorial
compromise and the establishment of an independent Palestinian entity or state,
use the fear of threats to Israel's water resources and Israel's "water
security" as one of their main emotion laden arguments against reaching an
accommodation.
On the other hand, a just and equitable
solution to the severe water problems faced by both sides, which will bring
social and economic benefits to all, can provide a major impetus to the peace
process (Shuval, 1992). It is the goal of this paper to analyze the
developments in recent years towards possible approaches to a just resolution
of this problem, which can meet the legitimate needs of both Israelis and the
Palestinians.
One of the main issues under dispute is the
shared use of the mountain aquifer, the major portion of the recharge area of
which lies under the occupied territories in the West Bank but which flow
naturally into Israeli territory both to the northeast and to the west.
Historically, major portions of the ground water o, the mountain aquifer have
been utilized by early Jewish farmers who settled in Palestine during the
period of Turkish rule before 1918 and then under the British Mandate going
back some 60-80 years (Blass, 1960). This intensive development of the aquifer
continued after the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, which was
based on the decision of the United Nations in 1947.
In essence, Israel was utilizing a major
portion of the safe yield of the western and northeastern sectors of the
mountain aquifer, through the full development of the springs, rivers and wells
long before the occupation of the West Bank by Israel in 1967. Thus, Israel
bases its claims for the continued utilization of these waters on one of the
cardinal principles of international water law--prior historic use and the prevention
of significant damage that would result from the loss of their current water
resources which are fully used to meet vital Israeli economic and human needs
(Caponera, 1992).
The Palestinians, on the other hand, base
their claims on these very same waters, which arise mainly as rainfall over the
areas populated mainly by the Palestinians and now partially under the control
and rule of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank with equal
determination, on the principles of international law which call for equitable
sharing of international trans-boundary water resources as well as on
hydrological and geographic considerations and demands for the recognition of
their historic national water rights which they feel belongs to the land in
which they live, no less than their current urgent human and social needs.
There are also serious questions as to the water resources needs of Gaza, which
requires an urgent solution, but they will only be dealt with peripherally in
this paper.
On the assumption that as an out-come of the
Oslo peace process which has been accepted both by the current Government of
Israel and the Palestinian Authority some form of Palestinian State or
autonomous entity will evolve in stages in all or part of the occupied
territories, it is apparent that the mountain aquifer will be considered under
international law as a shared body of trans-boundary groundwater (Caponera,
1992) with claims and counter claims by both sides as to its future utilization
and control, which must be resolved if a peace agreement is to be achieved.
Even many of those in Israel who oppose the establishment of a Palestinian
State or autonomy based on a territorial compromise, recognize that the water
needs of the Palestinian population of the occupied territories, as it grows
and develops will essentially be the same regardless of the nature of the
political solution and will have to be met from the same shared pool of water
resources.
THE MOUNTAIN AQUIFER
The mountain aquifer covers the central area
of the occupied territories on both sides of what are called in Israel the
Judaean and Samarian Mountain range and extends generally from the Jezreal
Valley (near Afula) in the North to the Beersheba Valley in the South and from
the foot hills of the Judean Mountains near the Mediterranean in the West to
the Jordan River in the East (See Figure 1). The mountain aquifer is mainly of
karstic limestone/dolamite formations with permeable recharge areas mostly
along the upper mountain slopes and ridges at levels above 500 meters above sea
level. Most of the exploitation of the aquifer is by natural springs and
artesian wells drilled in the confined areas of the aquifer on the lower slopes
of the Samarian and Judaean Mountain range below the elevation of 500 m largely
within the borders of Israel (Gvirtzman, 1994). The mountain aquifer can be
divided schematically into three general zones. The Western (Yarkon-Taninim),
the northeastern (Schem/Nablus-Gilboa) and the eastern aquifers as show in
Figure 1. The Western aquifer which flows towards the Mediterranean Sea to its
historic natural outlets at the Rosh Ha'Ayin (Ras el Ein) Springs which fed the
Yarkon River (El Uja) near Tel Aviv/Jaffa in the south and the Tanninim Springs
and river near Hadera in the north, is called the Yarkon-Taninim aquifer in
Israel. This aquifer has an estimated mean average safe yield of about 350-360
million cubic meters/year (MCM/Yr) including some 40 MCM/Yr of brackish water,
having more than 1000 mg/l of total dissolved solids (Goldberger, 1992). A
detailed and accurate inventory of the historic use of the aquifer is beyond
the scope of this paper, however some qualitative descriptions of past use are
presented. The early use of the aquifer by the Palestinian Arab population was
limited to a part of the flow of springs such as those at Rosh Ha-Ayin and the
Tanninim, as well as some deep traditional dug wells in the Qualqiliya and
Tulkarim areas estimated at some 25-35 million cubic meter/year (MCM/Yr)
utilizing less than 10 percent of the potential yield of the aquifer.
The Palestinian Arab farmers, villages and
towns were mainly poor and did not have any organized framework or the
financial resources to develop the natural water resources of the region; as a
result most of the water potential was left untouched. Before 1948 few
Palestinian villages had developed central water supply systems supplying piped
water to the homes. Little was done in that direction during the years 1948 to
1967 under the Jordanian administration of the area. The fact that the areas
surrounding the natural spring outlet of the Western Aquifer and North Eastern
Aquifer were well known for their malarious swamps provides historic evidence
that at the beginning of this century most of the water went unutilized.
The British Mandatory Government granted
Pinchas Rutenberg, a Jewish engineer, an exclusive concession for the use of
the waters of the Yarkon River in 1920. The intensive exploitation of this
aquifer initiated by the early Jewish farmers some 80 years ago, starting in the
1920s, included pumping from the Yarkon River to irrigate extensive orange
groves in the area between Tel Aviv and Petach Tikva and by numerous drilled
wells in the Hadera area (Blass, 1960).
The British. Mandatory Government also
tapped the Rosh Ha'Ayin Springs as the source of the water supply for
Jerusalem, the majority of the population of which was Jewish. Prior to the
establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, Jewish farmers were already
utilizing a significant portion of the safe yield from the springs, rivers and
deep wells, while the remainder of the aquifer's potential was developed
rapidly, mainly by Israel, within the boundaries of State of Israel in the
period of 1948-1965. The main Israeli water project utilizing the aquifer was
the Yarkon-Negev Pipeline completed in 1954 which pumped some 200 MCM/yr, which
is essentially the total flow of the Rosh Ha'Ayin Springs. Today the aquifer is
tapped by about 300 hundred wells located to the west of the "green
line," that is, within the boundaries of Israel. Since the occupation of
the West Bank, Israel has dug some wells in the Western Aquifer for new Israel
settlements over the green line in West Bank, areas formerly administered by
Jordan. It is questionable if Israel can claim prior historic use in the case
of such wells. The exact amount of water pumped by these wells is not published
by the Israeli authorities.
From the engineering and hydrological point
of view the most appropriate place to tap the aquifer is over the deeper
confined artesian areas on the foot hills and lower slopes of the mountains
towards the Mediterranean Sea, the major portion of which is within Israel.
While it is technically possible to drill deep wells to tap the thinner
non-confined zones of the aquifer from the mountain top areas within the West
Bank, the wells required must be deeper and their yields are lower, thus the
potential withdrawal of water from the Western Aquifer from within the West
Bank is more limited and more expensive than pumping from wells in Israel near
the coastal plain.
The North Eastern Aquifer, called in Israel,
the Schem-Gilboa Aquifer, starting near Schem (Nablus) flows towards the Gilboa
Mountains and Jezreal and Bet Shean Valleys to the north-east. The historic
natural drainage outlets, of what is described by Israeli hydrologists as the
Bet-Shean-Harod multiple aquifer system, are the Ein Harod and Bet Shean
springs. Some springs and wells have been utilized historically by the local
Palestinian villagers, while a portion of its flow was utilized by the early
Jewish farmers and water companies in the 1920's long before the establishment
of Israel in 1948. One of the early large-scale water utilization projects by
Jewish settlers, was that at the Ma'ayan Harod Springs in the Jezreal Valley (going
back to the 1930's) (Blass, 1960). These springs or the wells that replaced
them for better flow regulation still serve as the natural flow outlet of the
aquifer and are located within Israel. After 1948 the aquifer was fully
utilized within, Israel.
The potential safe yield of the northeastern
Basin (Schem/Nablus-Gilboa) is estimated by the Israel Hydrological Service
(Goldberger, 1992) at about 130 MCM/Yr, part of which is brackish. Of this
amount it is estimated that Israel utilizes some 100 MCM/Yr from historic
natural sources within Israeli borders and supplies some 5MCM/Yr from new wells
within the West Bank to new Israeli settlements in the Jordan Valley, while
about 30 MCM/Yr or 23 percent is used by the Palestinians.
The Eastern Aquifer has two main strata. The
Upper Cenomanian and the Lower Cenomanian which are separated by an impermeable
strata several hundred meters thick. The Upper Cenomanian Aquifer is a
relatively thin strata which drains naturally to the east to series of springs
including Uja, Samiya and Kilt which have historically been used by the
Palestinians. This aquifer has only a very limited storage capacity and thus
the flow from the springs is subject to major inter-seasonal fluctuations and
is dependent on the rainfall of the. immediate previous season.
The natural flow of these springs and others
like them was drastically reduced as a result of the severe drought conditions
of the area during the years 1988-1991. Some springs and wells almost
completely dried up. While some Palestinian hydrologists blamed Israel's new
wells in the area as the cause of the dry springs, after the heavy rains of the
1991-1992 season the flow from most of the springs was revived. A similar and
more drastic drying up of natural springs and wells has resulted from the
severe drought of 1998/99.
The Lower Cenomanian Aquifer is a deep
initially fresh water aquifer that flows naturally to the east from the high
mountain infiltration area down to the Jordan Valley where it apparently mixes
with strata of saline ground water. This brackish water flow has historically
either seeped to the surface of the Jordan Valley or evaporated or partially
seeped into the Jordan River.
The Eastern Aquifer flows from the mountain
ridges towards the Jordan River and estimates of its safe yield vary between
some 150-200 MCM/Yr, part of which is brackish. It has been estimated that
Palestinians currently utilize some 60MCM/Yr including brackish water. Much of
the flow from mountain springs, such as the Wadi Kelt, and Wadi Uja Springs and
some wells were historically utilized by Palestinian villagers and farmers. An
ancient aqueduct from the Wadi Kelt Springs transported the water for
irrigation by Palestinian farmers in the Jordan Valley.
Since the occupation of the area in 1967,
Israel has dug numerous new wells in the mountain aquifer within the area of
the West Bank mainly drawing upon previously un-exploited sources to supply
water to new Israeli settlements. The Israeli wells have diverted the flow
before it become saline in the lower reaches of the Jordan valley. Official
information on the exact amount of water withdrawn by Israel from within the
West Bank Aquifer in not available, but reliable estimates indicated that it
may be about 35-45 MCM/Yr from the Eastern Aquifer and another 10-15 MCM from
the Western and North-Eastern Aquifers for an estimated combined withdrawal of
some 45 to 60 MCM/Yr The yet un-exploited potential safe yield available to the
Palestinians in the Eastern Aquifer has not been determined accurately but may
be somewhere between 50 and 100 MCM/Yr. In the Oslo B Accord it is stated that
78 MGM/Yr of unexploited water in the Eastern Aquifer is available for
unrestricted Palestinian development and use, Thus, at this time, it can be
estimated that the Palestinians use some 60MCM/Yr, the Israelis use some
45MCM/Yr and that some 50-100 MCM flows to the Jordan River and the Dead Sea as
saline or brackish water. However, it is anticipated that much of that saline
or brackish water can be tapped for Palestinian use by wells on the higher
mountain slopes prior to its becoming saline/brackish. Exactly how much is an
open question. For the purposes of this analysis we have assumed that an
additional 50 MCM/Yr of fresh water potential will most likely be available to
the Palestinians from further exploitation of the Eastern Aquifer and that
possibly another 30 MCM/Yr may eventually be extracted from that source.
As mentioned above, since the Israeli
occupation of the West Bank territories in 1967, the Israeli authorities have
tapped the sweet water sources of this aquifer with a number of new very deep
wells along the upper slopes prior to its becoming more saline, mainly for the
use of new Israel settlements in the area. In some cases the Palestinians claim
that this has reduced the flow from their traditional springs and wells. As
mentioned above some of the reported cases of flow reduction coincided with the
severe draught period of 1988-1991. While Israeli hydrological studies suggest
that there is no physical connection between the new deep wells in the Lower
Cenomanion Aquifer and the traditional shallower wells whose source is the
Upper Cenomnian Aquifer, Palestinians claim that there may be a connection
since the Israeli wells pass through both aquifers or they may be connected by
fissures or faults in the rock formations. This remains an open issue, which
must be resolved.
The Palestinians claim and some Israeli
international law experts agree that any water extraction within the West Bank
after 1967 for Israeli civilian settlements is illegal and in violation of the
Geneva Convention concerning the rights and obligations of what is defined as
"belligerent occupier" (El-Hindi, 1990; Benvenisti, 1994). Their
position is that while a" belligerent occupier" may use those natural
resources of the occupied area required to support the military forces of
occupation, they cannot be used to support civilian activities by the occupying
power.
To summarize our tentative estimate of the
total mean renewable fresh and brackish water potential of the mountain aquifer
and its current utilization by Israel and the Palestinians: It would appear
that today of the estimated 630MCM/Yr of known mean potential safe yield of the
mountain aquifer, 410 MCM is now and has been utilized within Israel's borders
prior to 1967, with much of its use going back some 60-80 years. Some 110
MCM/Yr is currently used by the Palestinians, while another 45-60 MCM/Yr is
pumped by Israel from new wells drilled since 1967 within the West Bank for use
mainly by the new Israeli civilian settlements there. It is estimated that
there may be about another 50-100 MCM/Yr of un-utilized water in the Eastern
Aquifer, which might be tapped for Palestinian use as sweet water through deep
wells.
The Palestinians pump another 100 MCM/Yr
from the coastal aquifer in Gaza, although most authorities agree that the
annual recharge of that aquifer would allow for a mean safe yield of only about
60-80 MCM/Yr, thus the total estimated Palestinian water supply in the year
2000 is about 210 MCM/Yr with a possible untapped potential reserve in the East
Aquifer of 50 MCM/Yr for a total current water potential of 260 MCM/Yr. Thus
without reducing Israel's pre-1967 water withdrawal rates from the mountain
aquifer, the potential water increases that might be available to the
Palestinians would be some 50 MCM/Yr from new wells in the Eastern Aquifer and
possibly some 50 MCM from existing Israeli wells of disputed legality drilled
by Israel in the West Bank after the 1967 occupation, to supply water to
Israeli civilian settlements in the West Bank.
As can be seen in Figure 1 the major portion
of the recharge area of the Western Mountain Aquifer is in the Occupied
Territories. Almost all of the recharge area of the North Eastern and Eastern
Aquifers lie within the West Bank" area (Gvirtzman, 1994). Thus a rough
preliminary estimate of the ground water flow of the mountain aquifer which
originates as rainfall within the Occupied Territories indicates that it is
some 80-90 percent of the total flow. However, Gvirtzman estimates that much or
most of the storage and optimal pumping area of the Western and North Eastern
aquifers which serve as its natural historical outlet lies under Israeli
territory (Gvirtzman, 1994). As will be pointed out elsewhere the sources of
the flow of a trans-boundary body of water, including groundwater, is not the
sole criteria in determining water rights.
CLAIMS, COUNTER-CLAIMS, FEARS AND CONCERNS
In order better to understand the nature of
the conflict and its intensity, it is essential to spell out, in some detail
the stated claims and counter-claims as well as the real and perceived fears
and concerns of the sides in the dispute over the mountain aquifer which are
often expressed in emotional terms.
Palestinian Claims and Concerns
1. The Palestinians claim that the flow of
the western and north eastern sectors of the mountain aquifer that is derived
from rainfall over the West Bank, 90 percent of which is currently extracted
from deep wells mainly within Israel is Palestinian water which should be
allocated for their use. This demand is based on the claim that the nation
controlling the land, which serves as the source of the water, should be given first
priority in its utilization.
2. The Palestinians are concerned that owing
to the power of the Israeli agricultural lobby's demands for more and more
water and development requirements resulting from the mass immigration of Jews
from Russia, (the former Soviet Union) as well as other countries Israel will
use more and more of the water from the mountain aquifer depriving the
Palestinians of their fair share. They point out that Israel's much criticized,
long term over-pumping of the aquifer (State Controllor, 1990) is a serious
threat to the Palestinians' future essential water reserves.
3. The Palestinians claim that the Israel
Civil Administration has effectively frozen Palestinian utilization of water
sources in the occupied territories and has allocated insufficient amounts for
domestic, urban and industrial use and practically no water whatsoever for
increased agricultural development to meet the needs of the growing population.
They claim that during the period of the occupation, the Israel authorities
have developed many new water supplies in the occupied territories and have
allocated significant amounts of water for agricultural and urban use for new
Jewish settlement in the areas (United Nations, 1983). The Palestinians claim
that by doing this Israel has violated the Geneva Convention and misused its
authority as the "belligerent occupier" (El-Hindi, 1990).
Particularly aggravating to water-short Palestinian villagers is the perception
of wasteful Israeli water use and landscape practices which often include the
irrigation of extensive lawns and the construction of swimming pools.
4. The Palestinians claim that in the
process of drilling new Israeli deep wells within the occupied territories
there have been cases of lowering the aquifer and drying out traditional
springs and shallow wells used for domestic and agricultural purposes in
neighboring Palestinian communities. They claim that Israel's pumping of ground
water near the Gaza strip has caused the severe salination of the wells in
Gaza. Even when the Israeli authorities supply alternative water to the
communities that lost their original wells or springs, through the Israeli
Mekorot Water Company, the cost to the villagers is significantly increased,
while this is viewed as a method of Israeli control and domination over the
Palestinian residents (Global Viewpoints Forum, 1990).
5. The Palestinians point with concern to
the fact that in all new water projects developed by Israel in the territories,
serving Palestinian communities, key controlling elements such as regional
reservoirs, valves and control points are located within Jewish settlements and
are viewed as a method of domination.
6. The Palestinians fear that even if a
peace settlement is achieved with an appropriate Palestinian State being
established, that the agreed upon division of the very limited shared water
resources will leave them with insufficient amounts of water to allow for
normal population growth and the resettlement of the Palestinian Diaspora
within their own territory, with the required urban, industrial and
agricultural development to allow them to be economically viable.
7. In the event of major regional projects
to import water to the area for Jordan, Palestinian and Israeli use there is
concern and fear over the possibility that Israel will obtain practical as well
as political control over the waters to be supplied to the Palestinians and
Jordan through, for example, the use of the Sea of Galilee as a long term
inter-seasonal and inter-annual storage reservoir. There is likewise concern
that other nations of the region, who may supply the additional water or
through whose country water pipelines pass, will use the water supply lines for
purposes of political control, as Turkey did in the case of the Iraqi oil pipelines
during the Gulf War of 1990-1991.
8. In general the Palestinians claim the
priority rights to complete and total control of "Palestinian" water
(the mountain aquifer) which should be available to them directly within their
own territory without being under Israeli control. They suggest that
complicated schemes to supply them water from Israel, import water from other
nations or desalinate sea water be allocated to Israel which in return should
forgo claims to the local, easily accessible, "Palestinian" water
sources underneath the Palestinian controlled lands of the Palestinian
Authority/Palestinian State and in the West Bank in general (Global Viewpoints
Forum, 1990).
Israel's Claims and Concerns:
1. Israel claims that it has legitimate
historical riparian rights to most of the flow of the Mountain Aquifer, based
on the principle of International Law of prior use of the Mountain Aquifer,
major portions of which flow naturally into its territory and which has been
developed at great expense and fully utilized for essential human use economic
sustainability over a period of time going back some 60-80 years.
2. Israel is concerned that if the
Palestinians achieve autonomy or independence, in all or part of the currently
Israel occupied territories of the West Bank, they will, once they gain
physical control of the territory, insist on making good on their claim that
all of the water of the shared Yarkon-Tananim Aquifer (western sector of the
Mountain Aquifer) that is derived from rainfall within the West Bank (estimated
to be about 80 percent of the total flow of the aquifer) be allocated
exclusively for their own use. Many Israelis fear that the once given
independence, the Palestinians will drill many new wells in the aquifer and
increase the pumping rates in an unsupervised and uncontrolled manner, which
will result in seriously lowering the water table and depriving Israel of water
resources essential for its survival. This fear is compounded in Israel's eyes
by Palestinian stated goals of returning large segments of the Palestinian
Diaspora to any independent entity which is established.
3. Some Israelis fear that there will be a
major unregulated increase of pumping from the aquifer by the Palestinians in
the West Bank area once they gain independence, as they have done in Gaza after
achieving independence there. They fear that in the process this will lead to
the drying up of the wells on the Israeli side of the border, leading to a
serious shortage of water in Israel. It might mean a drastic reduction of
Israel's most important, high quality, source of drinking water. It might mean
a reduction of Israel's current utilization of that aquifer by some 300 MCM/Yr
cutting off of the drinking water supplies for some three million people. This
would result in a serious threat to Israel's viability, which would fred to be
completely unacceptable.
4. Even if an equitable agreement is
achieved on the division of the waters of the Mountain aquifer between Israel
and any future Palestinian entity or state, there is serious concern about the
possible degradation of the quality of the water of the shared Mountain Aquifer
as a result of inadequate monitoring and control of urban pollution, wastewater
and toxic agricultural and industrial wastes in the West Bank, that could cause
serious pollution in the highly susceptible karstic limestone aquifer in the
downstream areas of the aquifer that drain naturally into Israel, making the
water within Israel unfit for human consumption. In 1990, General (Reserves)
Raphael Etan, at that time the Minister of Agriculture of Israel, published a
full page ad in the Israel press (Jerusalem Post, 10 August 1990) expressing
many of the above concerns, declaring that because of the water issue alone,
Israel can never give up the physical control of any of the occupied
territories since they are absolutely essential for the preservation of the
country's vital water resources. He cited both the threat of the diversion
and/or over-pumping of water vital to Israel and the danger of environmental
pollution of the shared Mountain Aquifer. These same argument are being used at
this time to oppose handing any water sources or land to the Palestinians,
which in effect means maintaining Israeli authority and control over most of
the key areas of the West Bank.
5. There is also concern that unregulated
over-pumping of the mountain aquifer in the West Bank areas could lead to a
serious lowering of the water table with the resulting danger of sea-water
intrusion and irreversible damage to the shared aquifer which could be a real
threat to both partners.
6. Israeli officials hold that the
Palestinians have not been deprived of the use of needed water. They cite the
construction of many dozens of new village piped water supplies, introduced by
Israel since the end of Jordanian rule in 1967; the granting of permits to the
Palestinians to drill some 40 new deep wells and the importation of water from
the Israeli National Water Carrier to increase the water supplies to
Palestinian cities and villages in the occupied territories. According to the
claims of some Israelis, the total water supply and per capita use in the
occupied territories has increased significantly during the period of the
Israel administration. Israeli hydrologists say there is limited connection
between the ground water in Gaza and Israel and that the salination of wells in
Gaza is solely the result of years of overpumping by the Palestinians mainly
before 1967 and after independence. Israel also points out that many of the
claims of drying up of Palestinian wells and springs coincided with the
1988-1991 drought period and may have nothing to do with the Israel water
development projects.
In light of the above partial list of the
claims and counter claims of the parties, which seem irreconcilable, what can
be done to resolve this conflict? Let us examine the possible contribution of
international water law.
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW
Throughout history there have been conflicts
over the use of shared international bodies of water called international
river/drainage basins or trans-boundary waters. Both upstream and downstream
countries have claimed absolute sovereign rights to such waters and have, at
times, been in conflict over such questions. International water law has evolved
mainly over surface water issues but according to an early paper by Caponera
and Alheritiere (1978) the legal principles and practice which have evolved for
questions of surface water disputes apply by extrapolation to questions of
ground water. Since then the status of ground water law has become well
established in key documents of the International Law Association and the
International Law Commission of the United Nations (Bebreris, 1991; Haston and
Utton, 1989).
In the current era, where the concept of
peaceful cooperation between nations over the use of shared resources has
become the normative pattern in international relations, new views in
international water law have developed. More recent concepts are those of
"equitable apportionment" of shared international water resources
(Caponera, 1992). This more enlightened and peaceful approach was first summed
up in the "Helsinki Rules" of 1966 recommendations of the
International Law Association (Caponera, 1992) which propose that water disputes
be settled by negotiations. Article IV of the Helsinki rules state that
"Each basin state is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and
equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters on an international
drainage basin". These rules take into consideration prior historic use as
well as factors concerning the sources of the water such as the geography and
hydrology of the area. They further provide for taking into account, among
other means, possible alternative water sources that might be available to one
of the parties, the possibility of economic compensation and the economic and
social needs of each state.
The spirit if not the letter of the Helsinki
rules have recently received international status with the approval by the
United Nations of the proposal of the International Law Commission on
international water bodies. The International Law Commission report as amended
by the UN General Assembly includes the key phrase that no appreciable damage
should be caused to any of the riparians on an international drainage basin,
some legal experts interpret this to mean that downstream countries such as
Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Israel, with claims of prior historic use of a shared
water resource have the right to continue that use since depriving them of those
waters by an upstream country would cause them appreciable damage. On the other
hand, others claim that an upstream country deprived of vital waters which
arise in that country and which are urgently needed to meet current human and
social needs such as vital water supplies for drinking/domestic/urban use
causes them appreciable damage that must be redressed. The definitive legal
interpretation of that point has yet to be determined by the World Court.
However, despite the moral weight of the
principles of international water law and the fact that there is now a proposed
United Nations International Convention on the subject, there is in effect no
international body with the authority or power to enforce them on unwilling
nations. In fact many nations, including some of the world's leading nations,
have not yet fully accepted them. A study by Wolf (1999) has shown that over
one hundred agreements between nations who are riparian partners on
international river/drainage basins have been reached, through negotiations,
out of mutual interest and mutual benefits and gains rather than through the
application or enforcement of international water law. Most of the effective
international water treaties provide for the establishment of joint commissions
and for a greater or lesser degree of data sharing, inspection, monitoring,
control, and management of shared water resources so that all parties can be
assured that the terms of the agreement are in fact being adhered to.
While the Helsinki Rules had only a limited
reference to ground water, the Bellagio Draft Treaty on Ground Water of 1989
(Haston and Utton, 1989), the Seoul Rules, the Geneva proposals (Bebreris,
1991) as well as the recently approve UN convention on international water,
covers this area in a most specific manner so that today experts in
international water law generally accept that all of the above principles apply
equally to surface water and to ground water. This acceptance is less universal
among the nations of the world, however.
If we are to accept the point of view of the
experts in international water law we would come to the following conclusions:
the position of some, that only by the physical occupation of territories which
serve as a source of its water resources can a country assure its water rights
is not generally supported by the normal practice of peaceful nations or
international water law. If this were so Iraq and Syria would be justified in
conquering Turkey to assure the continued flow of the Tigris and Euphrates
Rivers, and Holland would have to occupy Germany to assure the flow of the
Rhine River.
Similarly there is little legal basis in
international water law for the claim of others that they have exclusive rights
over the use of water derived from sources within their territory. If this were
so, it would mean that Egypt, which receives the flow of the Nile River
entirely from upstream countries, would have no rights to the water that it has
used for thousands of years. On the other hand, the claim that prior historical
use assures immutable water rights is also not absolute in terms of
international water law. For example international water law would not support
the Syrian claims that Turkey cannot carry out major water and irrigation
projects for the welfare of its people with the waters of the Tigris and
Euphrates Rivers which arise from within its borders as long as Syrian
historical use of the water is not affected. There are many underdeveloped
upstream countries who have developed and used only limited amounts of their
own water resources in the past, such as Ethiopia, for example, with growing
populations and serious food shortages, who are now entering periods of more
rapid economic and social development. These nations will have urgent needs for
a greater share of the water resources that arise within their territory.
International water law does recognize the need to meet new human and social
requirements for water on an existing international watershed. The Palestinians
are to a great extent in just such a position.
Whether or not international law is actually
binding at this time, the community of nations will undoubtedly expect that
Israel and the Palestinians as well as Syria and Lebanon will negotiate a
settlement based on the assumption that they share common international water
resources and that an accommodation should be reached in the spirit of the
principles of international law assuring that "Each basin state is
entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the
beneficial uses of the waters on an international drainage basin."
Thus, based on modern principles of
international water law, both the historic riparian rights of Israel as the
downstream user and the rights of the Palestinians as the upstream party on a
shared international body of water must be considered on the basis of equity
and legitimate needs. Both parties to the conflict would be expected, in the
first instance, to negotiate directly between themselves to arrive at a
settlement based on the principles of "equitable apportionment"
rather than to enter some type of confrontational litigation, expecting some
supra-government authority to enforce a judgment based on what each side views
as their legitimate rights.
ESTIMATING THE LEGITIMATE WATER NEEDS OF THE
PARTIES "MINIMUM WATER REQUIREMENT"--MWR CONCEPT FOR BASIC WATER
SECURITY
An attempt shall be made to estimate the
minimum legitimate baseline water needs of the parties required to ensure a
reasonable minimum standard of living in a semi-arid area suffering from
serious water shortages. I have defined this as the Minimum Water
Requirement--MWR. I have held that the palmers to the dispute will each require
as a minimum degree of "water security"--so that they will have
access to adequate and equitable allocations of good drinking quality water for
domestic, municipal and industrial use. The basis I have proposed for
estimating these quantities would be an equal amount per capita for both sides
(Shuval, 1992).
Thus, I have suggested that a basic element
in resolving the water disputes in the frame work of the final stage peace
settlement with the Palestinians would be the recognition of principle of a
sufficient, fair and equitable allocation of the essential MWR for domestic,
urban, and industrial use. I proposed this concept at Israeli/Palestinians
meetings as early as 1991 with the suggestion that the ultimate MWR allocation
for domestic, urban, and industrial use for Israelis and Palestinian alike be
about 125 cubic meters/person/year (CM/P/Yr) (Shuval, 1992). Some Israelis
point out that the actual current Palestinian drinking water demand for
domestic/urban is only about 35 CM/P/Yr and claim that this indicates that the
Palestinians do not need as much water for domestic and urban use as the
Israelis do. I have not accepted this position and base my estimates on the
natural increase in domestic/urban water consumption among the Palestinians as
socio-economic conditions improve and water supplies become more available to
meet growing needs. It is correct and proper to assume that in time the
Palestinian domestic/urban water demands will be the same as the Israeli
present rates of use. Domestic/urban demand in Israeli cities that suffered
from serious water shortages, such as Jerusalem, some 50 years ago have more
than doubled over the years.
The MWR figure of 125 CM/P/Yr I have
proposed is considered in Israel as an adequate minimum water allocation to
support a good hygienic standard at the household level as well as sufficient
water for a high level of urban/commercial/tourist and industrial development,
if coupled with sound measures of water conservation (Braverman, 1994). This is
in fact the amount of water used in the domestic/urban/industrial sector in
Israel in 1998 and it is anticipated that with good household and urban water
conservation this level can be maintained in the future. This allocation does
not include any use of the limited resources of good quality drinking water for
agriculture since almost all water of drinking water quality will be required
within the next thirty years for domestic/urban/commercial and industrial use.
Water allocations for further agricultural development can become available
from recycling and the reuse of purified municipal wastewater, which is estimated
at 65 percent of the urban water supply. Further water needs beyond locally
available sweet water sources will eventually have to be met by imported water
and/or desalination of brackish water or sea-water in the framework internal
Israeli and Palestinian water projects and/or a regional Water-for-Peace plan,
as it develops.
In 1993, my Palestinian colleagues Dr. Karen
Assaf and Ing. Nader Al-Khatib together with Dr. Elisha Kally, the veteran
Israeli water planner and I published this concept in a book with the goal of
promoting our Water for Peace plan (Assaf, et al, 1992). Our concept of the MWR
was not accepted at first and in fact generated considerable opposition both
among Israelis and Palestinians. Meanwhile many Palestinians, some Israelis and
key international authorities have adopted this concept and proposal as being a
realistic and fair basis for estimating the ultimate basic human needs of the
partners to the water disputes and as an equitable basis for sharing of the
limited water of the area.
The official negotiating position of Israel
remains that it has no intention of reducing its current rate of utilization of
the waters of the Mountain Aquifer, which is based on prior historic use.
However, it is important to note here, that the recently retired Israel Water
Commissioner, Meyer Ben-Meir, who served both under Prime Minister Netanyahu
and Prime Minister Barak has on more that one occasion, written in articles
(Ben-Meir, 1994) and stated publicly in TV, radio and newspaper interviews both
before and after the 1999 elections, that regardless of the final borders
reached and the political nature of the settlement with the Palestinians,
Israel must accept the fact that it shares the responsibility of supplying the
drinking water/domestic and urban needs of the total population, including the
Palestinians, between the Mediterranean and the Dead Sea on an equitable
basis-Palestinians the same as the Israelis. He often uses the figure of 100
CM/P/Yr as the basis for future total domestic/urban water supplies, By these
statements, the highest water official in Israel has accepted in principle the
fundamental concept that Israel bas the moral responsibility to help supply the
drinking water/domestic/urban needs of its Palestinian neighbors on an equitable
basis with Israelis, regardless of the political solution reached between the
Israelis and Palestinians.
WATER SCARCITY AMONG ALL THE PARTNERS
EXACERBATES THE DISPUTE
The intensity of the water conflicts are
particularly grave since the main partners to disputed waters -- Israel and the
Palestinians -- face serious long-term water problems, particularly when
considering the expected doubling of populations within the next thirty years
or so. Jordan is in no better position. The three years of drought in 1989-1991
and the even more severe drought in 1998-1999, which has threatened
agricultural and economic development, made Jordan acutely aware of the
critical nature of its limited water resources. The bountiful rains of the
winter of 1992 have not changed the long-term mean water potential.
Based on the author's estimates from various
sources (Naif and Matson, 1984; Salameh, 1990) but mainly from World Resources
(1998) the available renewable fresh potable water resources for Israel and
Jordan in the year 2000 (assuming a return to normal rainfall, expressed on a
annual per capita basis, in what is often called the water stress index), will
be about 270 and 200 cubic meters/person/year (CM/P/Yr) respectively, while
only a mean of about 93 CM/P/Yr will be available to the Palestinians including
those in Gaza. For purposes of comparison Figure 2 shows the annual fresh water
availability per capita in cubic meter/person/year--CM/P/Yr for Israel, Jordan,
Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinians as well as for Turkey (World Water
Resources, 1998).
The calculation of the above water stress
index for the Palestinians is based on estimates of current water allocations
provided by the Israel Civil Administration, the actual water use in Gaza and
the potential untapped water reserves of the Eastern Aquifer of some 50MCM/Yr
for a total of 260MCM/Yr and not on the Palestinian's own estimates of what
they consider to be their legitimate water rights which include most of the
water available from the mountain aquifer. Most of this disputed water is
currently utilized by Israel from within Israel's borders. It is these very
amounts of water which are the subject of the dispute.
Assuming an anticipated immigration
resulting from in-gathering of Diaspora populations for both Israel and the
Palestinian Authority, each within their own borders, and natural population
growth, it can estimated that there will be at least a doubling of the
population within a thirty year period. This will mean that the limitations on
water resources will become even more severe. It is possible to make a rough
estimate of the water stress index for the year 2030 by assuming a doubling of
the population in each of the countries which will result in a reduction to one
half of the current level of the water available per person.--that is unless
additional water resources are added to the area by then. The situation of the
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza would according to these estimates be
most difficult. If the per capita water resources potential of the Palestinians
today are 93CM/P/Yr, with a doubling of the population and no increase in water
they would drop to a unacceptable low of less about 47 CM/P/Yr in 2030.
POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO RESOLVE THE WATER
ISSUES
As shown previously, Israel has a strong
legal case of historical riparian rights concerning its use for some 60-80
years of most of the ground water in the Western Mountain Aquifer (the
Yarkon-Taninim) and the North-Eastern Aquifer (Schem-Gilboa) which flow
naturally into its territory. Israel considers this water vital for its own
survival and the Israeli official position is that it will not agree to any
unilateral reduction in its current use of those aquifers. This will mean that
in general the Palestinians in the West Bank will not be able to meet their own
needs for water from internal sources alone, unless they can reach an agreement
on importation or larger allocations from the shared aquifers.
Without questioning Israel's legal position
as to their claims to that portion of the mountain aquifer that it has used
historically, it will undoubtedly be asked to consider the possibility of
negotiating an agreement on the shared use of that aquifer with the
Palestinians including increasing their allocation of the shared waters in order
to reach an accommodation in the framework of the final peace agreement.
Exactly how much of an increase in the Palestinians share will be agreed upon
is beyond the scope of this paper but I have pointed out my estimate of the
Palestinian's minimum human needs for drinking water and essential fresh water
for domestic/urban/commercial and industrial use.
It must also be pointed out that it is
estimated that there will most likely be a reduction in the amount of drinking
quality water available to Israel by some 200-300 MCM/Yr over the next fifteen
to twenty years as a result of the ongoing ground water pollution processes
from anthroprogenic and natural sources affecting mainly the coastal aquifer
and to some extent the Mountain Aquifer from sources within Israel as well as
those in the West Bank. The concentration of ground water salinity and nitrates
has been increasing at the rate of 1-2 mg/l for many years now. Within 30 years
a significant number of the wells currently supply drinking water or water for
agriculture will no longer be of be able to supply water of an acceptable
quality standard. The salinity increase is partially from sea-water intrusion,
fallout/washout from marine aerosols, from underground saline springs and
partially from the percolation of irrigation return flows which are always
considerably higher in dissolved salt concentration than the initial irrigation
water. The plants take up the irrigation water through membranes, which reject
excess concentrations of salts, which then percolate into the ground water. The
nitrate increases are mainly the result of the use of chemical fertilizers in
agriculture, infiltration of animal wastes from barns and chicken coops,
infiltration of wastewater from septic tanks, wastewater irrigation and seepage
from solid waste dumps. In addition, Israel's fresh water reserves may be
further reduced in the framework of peace agreements with Jordan, Syria, and
Lebanon. If these estimates are correct, then the amount of drinking quality
water that will be available to Israel over the period of the next 30 years
will just about be enough to meet Israel's own needs for its minimum water
requirement (MWR) with only a small amount available to help meet the needs of
the Palestinians.
In mentioning the possible need for
reallocations of water to other neighbors of Israel in the framework of peace
agreements with them, I am not implying that these countries should have
priority over the needs of the Palestinians who, without question, suffer from
the most severe water shortages of all the countries with whom Israel is
interested in reaching peace agreements. However, it is important to mention at
this stage that the Palestinians will not be the only nation requesting a
greater share of Israel's limited water resources and Israel must take all of
these potential demands into account.
It is also important to understand the deep
ideological commitment of Israel to preserve at least some of its agricultural
base as an essential part of its heritage and national goal of "the return
to the soil" in its ancient homeland. It is no more logical to expect
Israel completely to give up its deep national commitment and support for
agriculture than it is to propose such a move to the Swiss, French, Americans,
Egyptians or Palestinians which are nations with equally deep commitments to
their agricultural heritage. However, the Palestinians will also have to accept
the serious limitations on their agricultural potential based on the limited
availability of water resources and their high cost. Even if Israel agrees to
allow the Palestinians to pump a greater share of the Mountain Aquifer from
wells within the West Bank such water will most likely be too expensive for any
agricultural use. However, they cannot be expected to completely forgo the
agriculture base, which has been a deep-rooted part of the Arab economy and
tradition. Nevertheless with increasing populations Israel will undoubtedly
have to reduce severely its allocations of fresh water supplies for
agricultural purposes and will have to decrease it's subsidies for agricultural
water so as to assure its rational use, mainly to meet the needs of the
domestic, urban, commercial and industrial sectors. The Palestinians will, in
the long run, have little alternative but to do the same and reallocate good
quality drinking water from the agricultural sector to the domestic/urban
sector. It may be more difficult for them since most if not all of the water
used by the Palestinian farmers is privately owned, while in Israel all water is
owned by the state. Possibly some form of a water market mechanism could be
created where by water can be sold to the highest bidder, which undoubtedly
will be the Palestinian urban consumers.
It is expected that neither side will agree
to restrict immigration and the return of their respective Diaspora's within
their areas, as a water conservation measure. Both sides have deep commitments
on this matter and would view any restrictions on immigration as an
unacceptable constraint.
As shown in Figure 2, the water stress index
indicates that Lebanon and Syria are estimated to have, in the year 2000, about
1000 CM/P/Yr each, while Turkey has some 3000 CM/P/Yr. Thus, Syria and Lebanon
each have almost four times the amount of replenishable water resources per
person/year as Israel, some ten times that of the Palestinians and 5 times as
much per capita as Jordan. Thus, these two countries can be considered to be
relatively water rich countries in Middle Eastern terms, compared to their
down-stream neighbors on the Jordan River Basin, the Palestinians, Jordanians,
and Israelis.
Since Syria and Lebanon are true riparian
partners with the Palestinians, Jordanians, and the Israelis, on the shared
waters of the international Jordan River Basin, I suggest that it is not
unreasonable to expect that they too should be considered as potential
candidates in assisting their less fortunate downstream neighbors, particularly
the Palestinians, in the solution of their severe water shortages. The
fundamental principle of international water law of equitable sharing applies
no less to Syria and Lebanon than it does to the other three riparians. This
would be in the spirit of the Helsinki Rules and the UN decision, which
accepted the proposals of the International Law Commission.
Turkey is not a formal riparian on the
Jordan River Basin but is the most water rich country in the Middle East with
over 10 times as much as the Israelis and 30 times that of the Palestinians on
a per capita basis. Since Turkey is contiguous to Syria and Lebanon, two of the
Jordan River Basin riparians and shares with them other international waters
(the Orontes and Tigris Rivers) they might well be able to play an important
role in helping to alleviate the severe water shortages faced by the nations in
their immediate area.
HOW TO MEET THE MINIMUM WATER REQUIREMENT OF
THE PALESTINIANS FOR THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE
Since it is difficult if not impossible to
plan for all future developments and population growth, it is suggested that
the estimated MWR requirements for a 15 year period serve as the basis for
reaching an agreement on firm water allocations in the final stage agreement
between Israel and the Palestinians. There most likely will not be enough fresh
drinking quality water to meet the needs of the Israelis and Palestinians
together much beyond the next 15 years without major supplemental sources such
as import of water or desalination of seawater. Estimates of the water needs
for the second stage of 30 years is in any event diffiult if not impossible to
make at this time. Israel will almost certainly need to find external sources
of additional drinking water within the next 15-30 years. It will most likely
resort to desalination of seawater to meet the increased domestic/urban water
demands resulting from its own population growth. Thus, any long term estimates
of water needs and plans to meet those needs beyond the 15-year period should
be based on a framework agreement of regional cooperation to develop additional
water resources to meet the future needs of all the partners.
As an illustration, it can be assumed that
the estimated populations in about 15 years (the year 2015) and 30 years (2030)
will be as follows: Israel, 8 and 10 million and the Palestinians, 3.5 and 5
million. The true populations may be greater or smaller than these estimated
figures depending on many demographic and political factors which are difficult
to determine at this stage. These figures are presented as one possible
scenario. Based on these assumed populations the suggested requirements of
domestic/urban water-the MWR at 125 CM/P/Yr to assure water security-- are as
shown in Table IA and IB.
From this it can be seen that over the next
15 years the Palestinians will be short some 180 MCM/Yr to meet their essential
minimum water requirements- (MWR). Without going into detail it is not
unreasonable to estimate that a small part of the above missing quantities of
essential water supply required up to the year 2015, which will be needed to
meet the Palestinians MWR, can be developed by the Palestinians themselves from
sources in the Eastern Aquifer which are available to them according to the
Oslo B agreement.
The true untapped mean safe yield of the
Eastern Aquifer has not been determined and estimates vary between 50-100 MCM/Yr.
However, we have already assumed that at least a minimum of some 50 MCM/Yr of
water can be extracted by the Palestinians from that source and have included
that in the estimate of the current Palestinian potential. How much additional
water might be extractable from that source is still unknown, but for the
purpose of this estimate we have assumed an additional 30 MCM/Yr will be
available. This still leaves the Palestinians short of about 150 MCM/Yr up to
the year 2015.
In my personal opinion, it is not
unreasonable to expect that part of the increased allocation of water to the
Palestinians will include the disputed 50 MCM/Yr of water that Israel currently
pumps from wells it dug in West Bank areas, mainly in the Eastern Aquifer,
after the occupation in 1967. Israel would be hard pressed to claim prior
historic use as a basis for continuing the use of this water, as it does in
connection with the waters of the Western and North Eastern Aquifers which flow
into Israel and have been utilized by Jewish farmers and Israel for up to 80
years.
The remaining 100 MCM/Yr needed by the
Palestinians for drinking water over the next 15 years might be supplied by
Israel in incremental stages over that period as populations grow, through a
reallocation to the Palestinians of a portion of the water from the Western or
North Eastern Aquifers currently used by Israel. Part might be made available
by allowing the Palestinians access to the flow of the lower Jordan River for
use by Palestinians in the West Bank and the Jordan Valley. Such allocations
can help meet the urgent MWR requirements of the Palestinians for the next 15
years or possibly longer. This is only an example of one possible formulation
of an accommodation between Israel and Palestine but it could well serve as
basis for discussion for an equitable foundation for a final status peace
agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. Neither side will be happy with
such a reallocation of water. Some Israelis may see such reallocation as a
threat to Israel's agriculture and water security. The Palestinian may well
feel that it is not up to their expectations. However considering the
constraints of the limited water resources in the shared pool which are not
really enough to meet all the long term needs of either partner, such a
division may well be the most equitable division that is feasible. In the event
that such an agreement is included in the final phase agreement it will
certainly give the Palestinians a respite of at least 15 years, probably more,
with a significant increase in water resources to meet urgent growing needs. It
will also provide sufficient time to work on plans to develop additional water
resources, which will be eventually, be needed in any case.
After the year 2015 other water sources must
be found elsewhere since Israel itself will be facing a situation where within
some 15-20 years it will not be able to meet its own minimum water requirements
without resorting to desalination. Here I propose that the countries with
richer water sources further to the north come into the picture. I am assuming
that in the not too distant future Israel will reach a peace agreement with
Syria and Lebanon which may well include some reallocation of Jordan
River/Golan Heights water currently used by Israel to them. If this amount of
water is based on the so-called Johnston Plan of 1956, then Israel may have to
reallocate some 80 MCM/Yr of water to Syria and Lebanon.
I would propose that in the negotiations
between Israel, Syria, and Lebanon, Israel or preferably a third party
mediator/facilitator, such as the United States propose that Syria and Lebanon
contribute a fair and equitable share of the flow of the Jordan/Yarmuk Rivers
and/or possibly the Litani and Awali Rivers to the most severely water short
riparian partner on the Jordan River basin-the Palestinians. I suggest that an
allocation of some 150-200 MCM/Yr from Syria and Lebanon be transferred to the
Palestinians on the West Bank of the Jordan Valley by the revival of the
original Western Ghor Canal project which was in the advanced planning stage by
Jordan just prior to the 1967 war. Is it unreasonable to expect that Jordan
should cooperate in meeting part of the Palestinians basic needs in the West
Bank by agreeing to construct, within Jordan, the Western Ghor Canal from the
Yarmuk, siphoned under the Jordan River to West side the Jordan Valley for use
by the Palestinians in the West Bank? This project was called for in their own
water plan and in the Johnston plan of 1956. The source of water could be from
the planned Syrian/Jordanian Unity Dam on the Yarmuk or other external sources
such as the Litani and Awali Rivers in Lebanon.
Thus with the participation of Israel,
Syria, Lebanon and Jordan in fulfilling the Helsinki/UN International Law
Commission principles of equitable sharing to meet human and social needs, it
will hopefully be possible to meet most if not all of the Palestinian's most
urgent human needs for drinking/domestic/urban water supplies for the
foreseeable future- that is the next 30 years.
This would mean that additional water for
all other uses, including agriculture for local markets or for export from
local sources of fresh water, would have to be severely restricted by both
partners. This also means that both Israel and the Palestinians would
themselves have to give priority in reallocation of existing fresh water
resources, available to them, to meeting the growing demands for drinking water
and domestic/urban requirements as populations double over the next thirty years.
The declaration of some Palestinian leaders that it is their intended policy to
increase water allocations to agriculture is unrealistic under the present
conditions of extreme water scarcity where both for the Israelis and the
Palestinians there will barely be enough water to meet the growing domestic and
urban demands. Another, no less important, reason why such a vision of
increased Palestinian agriculture is unrealistic will be the high cost of
water, which makes it unfeasible for any agricultural use.
REGIONAL COOPERATION IN DEVELOPING WATER
RESOURCES.
In addition to meeting these minimum human
needs there may be some place to develop additional regional water projects
which can be economically justified and, which can be of benefit to all five riparians
on the Jordan River Basin: the Syrians, Lebanese, Jordanians, Palestinians, and
Israelis. Such projects might include, the sale of water from the Awali and
Litani Rivers in Lebanon to all or some of the downstream riparian for a
limited period of time--say thirty years, which would be the normal life of
such an engineering project. Studies have shown that such a project is
relatively low in cost and highly feasible from an engineering point of view
(Kally, 1993). Of course it could only be carried out in an era of peaceful
cooperation between all of the riparians on the Jordan River Basin.
Another project worth evaluating would be
the Turkish proposal to build the "Peace Pipeline" or in this case
called the "Mini-Peace Pipeline" from Turkey to supply water to all
five Jordan River Riparians or part of them. This project which might transport
as much as 1,000 MCM/Yr or more to the south is most complex from an
engineering and geopolitical point of view, since it would involving building a
very big pipeline several hundred km in length that would have to cross the
borders of several countries. It may well be as expensive as sea water
desalination, if not more so (Kally, 1993).
An innovative alternative concept, which is
less complex from a geopolitical and engineering point of view, was proposed by
our joint Israeli/Palestinian team in 1993 (Assaf, et al., 1993). This concept
calls for an agreement between Turkey, Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinians,
mainly with the goal of assisting the Palestinians. It would include an
increased allocation of water from Turkey to Syria through the normal streambed
of the Tigris River, which will not involve any new pipelines. In return, as
part of the agreement, Syria would then increase its allocation of flow to Jordan
through the Yarmuk River, which would be diverted to the Abdullah Canal in
Jordan on the eastern side of the Jordan Valley. Jordan would then allow the
construction of the Western Ghor Canal, with the help of international funding,
which would siphon water from the Abdullah Canal under the Jordan River for the
use of the Palestinians on the West Bank. Along the route Syria and Jordan
would also benefit from increased water allocations. This innovative concept
involves a minimum of engineering works and new pipelines and requires no new
transboundary pipelines other than the Western Ghor Canal. The total cost would
be minimal. However, this project too, is only conceivable in the framework of
a peace agreement between all the riparians on the Jordan River Basin including
Israel. It would also require Turkey and Syria to reach an accommodation on
their long-standing differences on the utilization of the Tigris River. Turkey,
of course, would be paid by all the beneficiaries for the additional water it
releases to the Tigris.
Another attractive alternative is building
an under-sea pipeline in the Mediterranean sea from Turkey, in international
waters near the coastline, which could deliver water to Syria, Lebanon, Israel,
Jordan and to the Palestinians, as well as to northern Cyprus, is actually
currently under active consideration. The alternative of transporting water
from Turkey by sea in large floating plastic bags called "Medusas" or
in large relined former oil tankers is also being considered. The economic and
engineering feasibility of these projects is yet to be determined.
At some stage major local and/or regional
desalination plants will also come under active consideration. However, even if
the price of desalination is reduced to as little as 60 or 70 US cents/m[sup 3]
its use will still only be economically feasible for
domestic/urban/commercial/tourism and industrial use. No agriculture crops
could afford to pay such a high price for water. Beaumont (1999) has estimated
that the economic return, in the Middle East, from use of one cubic meter of
water in agriculture is at most about US $0.50-1.00/m[sup 3] while the return
on the use of water in the urban sector for commerce, tourism and industry is
any where between $100 to $1000/m[sup 3]. Thus only desalination to serve the
needs of the urban/commercial/industrial sector would ever be justified.
An additional possible format for future
regional cooperation could be an "inter-country water market" through
which water could be bought and sold between countries like any other commodity
or natural resources such as oil, coal or gas. Such a water market might become
feasible eventually in an era of stable peace and mutual trust among all five
riparians of the Jordan River Basin. However, it would be particularly
attractive and beneficial, even essential, for Israel and the Palestinians. The
Harvard Middle East Water Project, in which I participated in it's early
developmental stages, has reached the preliminary conclusion that intra and
inter-country water markets between Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians would
be economically beneficial to all partners (Fisher, 1996; Shuval, 1995).
Another tentative conclusion of great
interest, which has come out of the economic/ market analysis of the water
dispute between Israel and the Palestinians, is that the monetary value of the
water in dispute between Israel and the Palestinians, based on the estimated
current value of water to Israel of about $0.20/m[sup 3] is about 20-40 million
dollars per year. This means that if Israel reallocated some 100-200 MCM/Yr of
the water it currently uses to meet the Palestine MWR it would cost the Israeli
economy that sum of money. According to Fisher when you examine the water
dispute in such monetary terms it appears to be small and that "a dispute
over such a sum can be settled by negotiations rather than war." An annual
expenditure even of a sum as large as 40 million dollars would only be about
0.05 percent of the Israel GDP of 80 billion dollars in 1999 and could not be
considered an impossible economic burden on the economy. It would only be a
small part of the total price of a final stage peace agreement with the
Palestinians which will probably involve heavy multi-billion dollar
expenditures in moving military installations, roads, fences, border crossings,
and most probably the compensation, with additional billions of dollars,
required for the resettlement of tens of thousands of settlers. The economic
cost of a generous accommodation in the water field may appear to be somewhat
smaller and less of an obstacle to peace when it is compared to these other
elements of the price of peace. In any event, water must now be looked at as a
totally replaceable commodity available in unlimited quantities at the price of
desalination of sea-water which apparently will reach a price as low as
$0.50-0.60/m[sup 3] or less in the coming years.
There is a need to develop a bold regional
Water-for-Peace plan This plan should be based on economic feasibility as well
as the principle of sufficient and equitable allocations for all, which can
bring in quantities of additional water to all the countries of the region from
the large water resources reserves available for many years to come in
countries such as Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and possibly Egypt and/or by the
construction of major sea-water desalination plants (Shuval, 1992) It will be
much more feasible for the Israelis Palestinians to reach an accommodation,
painful as it may be, based on feasible but equitable allocations if there is an
assurance by the major powers of the world that the size of the pie will
eventually be increased and that neither side will be left without sufficient
water to assure its future development within the framework of their own
national goals which include a limited but economically feasible agricultural
base.
AN AGREEMENT ON EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT AND
JOINT CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES--AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF A PEACE TREATY IN THE
MIDDLE EAST
In the peace negotiation process on the
question of the shared water resources in the Middle East, including the
Mountain Aquifer, the partners to the dispute will have to give serious
consideration to ways of applying the principles of the Helsinki Rules and the
UN International Law Commission including an agreed upon formula for equitable
apportionment and eventual joint monitoring, inspection, and control on both
sides of the border. It is essential to assure all partners that the water
allocations, from surface and ground water sources, agreed upon, are being
abided by.
Both the Israelis and the Palestinians will
have to accept and learn to live with joint inspection teams verifying that the
terms of the agreement are being fulfilled on both sides of the border. There
must be ways of assuring both sides that neither partner to the agreement is
pumping more water from the shared aquifer than agreed upon or that either side
is causing pollution of the ground or surface water that may effect the quality
of the common pool of water serving both peoples. There must also be arrangements
for the joint management and operation of any water import facilities agreed
upon and joint desalination plants if any are constructed. No less important is
to assure that there is proper control of potential and actual sources of
environmental pollution, which might threaten the quality of the shared water
resources. This will require a recognition of the reality that the use and
management of a shared resource for mutual benefit, such as water, means that
both sides must accept a certain degree of limitation on their territorial
sovereignty.
Accepting a degree of limitation on
territorial sovereignty may well be a bitter pill to swallow for the parties to
the dispute in the Middle East, but it is not hard to find examples where
powerful sovereign nations have accepted that principle in treaties, in order
to end conflicts and protect their mutual interests in shared water resources.
This is particularly so in Europe among the countries belonging to the EU. An
outstanding example of international cooperation is the joint management of the
Rhine River which started in 1815 and today has evolved into the ten nation
International Rhine Commission (IRC) which regulates and controls chemical,
microbial and thermal pollution, fishing, flood control, navigation and water
use. The IRC carries out joint monitoring, inspection, control and research on
all aspects of the river's management. These countries have agreed to a certain
degree of limitation of their territorial sovereignty in order to achieve shared
goals of orderly management and pollution control of shared international
bodies of water (Van de Kliej, 1993).
An essential element of the agreement is
that the legitimate water rights of the Palestinians and Israelis to a fair
portion of the shared Mountain Aquifer be recognized and regularized. Another
important section of the treaty should be an agreed upon procedure for
resolving differences that arise out of the agreement by such procedures as
direct negotiations, facilitation or mediation. In the case that those steps do
not achieve a resolution of the disagreement they might be followed by binding
arbitration by an agreed upon procedure or adjudication before the World Court.
CONCLUSION
While providing a solution to the water
conflicts in the Palestinian-Israel dispute, including that over the Mountain
Aquifer, is not a sufficient condition for peace it is undoubtedly a necessary
condition. A bold and generous internationally sponsored Water-For-Peace Plan
can provide the framework of encouragement and optimism that can motivate the
partners to reach an accommodation based on compromise, even a painful one, not
fully meeting the expectations or hopes of either side. This will be necessary
in light of the limited water resources available in the shared water pool for
any kind reallocation. However the assurance that there will also be outside
assistance to increase the size of the pie for the benefit of all will help the
sides reach an agreement. In this way it will not only be possible to remove an
important obstacle on the path to peace but provides a real motivation for
peace which will enable the partners to the dispute to solve urgent problems
for the social welfare and economic benefit of all.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to
suggest the outcome of the peace negotiations between Israel and the
Palestinians concerning the water issues, which are often laden with deep
emotions and misunderstandings on both sides. I certainly do not claim to
represent the official Israeli position on this question. However, I can state
my own considered opinion, which is, that it is in Israel's national and
security interest to see to it that the Palestinians are assured sufficient
water supplies to meet their basic human and social needs. This can be done by
a generous gesture by Israel which would reallocate certain amounts of vital
water needed desperately by Palestinians but will not be a significant burden
on the Israel economy or endanger Israel's own water security. It is in
Israel's interest that the Palestinians have enough water, not only so that
they can survive, but so that they can thrive economically and socially and
live in peace and economic prosperity with their Israeli neighbors, with a
sense that a fair and just peace agreement has been reached.
TABLE 1A: Estimates of the Total Water Needs
to Meet the Minimum Water Requirement (MWR) of 125CM/P/Yr for the Israelis and
for the Palestinians in the Year 2015 and 2030
Legend for Chart: A - YearB - Pop Israel x 10[sup 6]C - MWR Needs-Israel in MCM/YearD - Pop Palestine x 10[sup 6]E - MWR needs-Palestine in MCM/Year A B C D E 2000 6 750 2.8 350 2015 8 1000 3.5 440 2030 10 1250 5.0 625
TABLE 1B: Estimates of the Total Water
Available to the Israelis and Palestinians and the ability to meet the 15 and
30 year estimates of the Minimum Water Requirement- MWR-assuming no additional
water to either.
Legend for Chart: B - IsraelC - Palestine A B C Current Available FreshWater Potential MCM/Yr 1600 260 Current water/personin CM/person/year 270 93 2015 water/person in CM/P/Yr 163 74 Shortage/Excess MWR +300[*] -1802015 in MCM/Yr 2030 water/person in CM/P/Yr 130 52 Shortage/Excess MWR 2030 in MCM/Yr +50[*] -365 [*] It is estimated that Israel's good quality water resourceswill be reduced over the next 15 to 30 years by some 300 MCM/Yras a result on ongoing process of pollution of the aquifer andpeace agreements with Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. This does notinclude additional allocations to meet the requirements of thePalestinians for water for drinking/domestic and urban needswhich is the subject of this analysis.
MAP: FIGURE 1: THE MOUNTAIN AQUIFER - A
Schematic Presentation: The pre-1967 cease fire lines which serves as the
border between Israel and the occupied territories of the West Bank, mainly
inhabited by the Palestinians, is shown with the heavy dashed and triple dotted
line. The heavy dashed line shows the hydrological divide between the three
main subdivisions within the mountain aquifer. The arrows show the general
direction of the flow of the ground water.
GRAPH: FIGURE 2; POTENTIAL WATER RESOURCES
AVAILABLE IN CUBIC METERS/PERSON/YEAR IN THE YEAR 2000
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