DEFINING THE POLITICAL/ECOLOGICAL THRESHOLD FOR THE EUPHRATES AND TIGRIS RIVERS

By John Kolars

Source: Arab Studies Quarterly, Spring2000, Vol. 22 Issue 2, p101, 12p.

PROFESSOR TOMANBAY'S ARTICLE presenting Turkey's approach to the utilization of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers demonstrates the keen nationally focused attention brought to the problem by each of the three riparians sharing the two rivers. Essays on the same subject by either Syrian or Iraqi authors would present equally persuasive yet nationally focused accounts of the situation.

While Tomanbay's essay emphasizes the "Right of Sovereignty" to water originating on Turkish territory, other strong legal claims to the water of rivers shared by several riparians are based upon the concepts of the "Right of Prior Usage" and the "Right of Equity." All three types of claims are recognized by the international community. When concerned riparian litigants cite two or all three, as in the present situation, deciding among them compounds the problem. Taken in combination, the water demanded by the three riparians would exceed the actual flow of the Euphrates in the year 2040 by at least 2.0 bcm/yr (Ozal and Altinbilek, Table 8; Kolars and Mitchell, Figure 11.1 for a similar predication).

Continued disagreement over the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers, as exemplified by Professor Tomanbay's article, is the result of changes in "the location of water management activity and the type of water controls (which have been) introduced" (Beaumont, 171). Such changes, after centuries of stasis, have been abrupt. Before the introduction of gasoline pumps for cotton production in the 1950s there was little Syrian utilization of Euphrates' waters (Kolars, 1994, 135). "Irrigated hectarage on the Euphrates, Orantes (Asi), and Khabur leaped from 284,000 ha in 1956 to 583,000 ha in 1957" (Sanlaville and Metral, 231). By 1970 160,000 ha in the Syrian Euphrates valley, largely in the bands of private entrepreneurs, were under irrigation (Treakle, 19). As a result, Syria, the middle riparian on the Euphrates, bases its strongest claims on the principle of equity, for not only does it need water from the river for a major portion of its irrigated agriculture, but also faces severe domestic water shortages. Aleppo already depends upon Euphrates' water piped from Lake Assad, while similar shortages in Damascus and Horns must in the future be met by inputs from the same river.

Farthest downstream, Iraq posits prior usage as its claim on the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers. Inhabitants of Mesopotamia, essentially modern Iraq, have used the rivers for a period of 7,500 years. Though over the millennia irrigated agriculture has been intermittent and varying in intensity, from the nineteenth century on increasing irrigated hectare has depended upon the twin rivers. By 1984, Iraq, according to government sources, annually was using 48.3 billion cubic meters of river water (Shapland, 107-109).

The abrupt changes in the use and amount of water needed by Turkey, Syria, and Iraq have given little time for a solution to be found which is acceptable to all three riparians, nor do continuing developments promise quick answers. The following discussion suggests that a broader approach to the river and their basins(s) (see below) might be able to cut this new, seemingly unsolvable Gordian Knot.

While the political impact of such changes has been dramatic (Biswas, et al, 1997, Chap. 2, and Naff, 1994), the ecological consequences of these developments have been for the most part overlooked (Richardson, pp. 36-47). The following discussion also posits that the sustainable ecology of the rivers must take precedence over the demands of any of the riparians. If not, all three will suffer.

Three elements must be recognized in order to find an ecologically sustainable way out of this seeming impasse of claims and counter claims. These are: facts (verifiable descriptions of events upon which all parties agree), interpretations of such facts, (i.e., nationally influenced perceptions), and acts (developmental activities based on such interpretations). It should also be noted that acts themselves and their consequences could in turn be interpreted as good or bad depending upon the viewpoint of the interpreter. Interpretation inevitably reflects the political and cultural biases of the interpreters. Thus, political and cultural interpreters and the acts based upon them need to be brought into accord with the ecological viability of the river and its basin. That is, some threshold must be recognized beyond which politics is not allowed to deteriorate into killing the goose, which lays the golden egg.

THE IMPORTANCE OF FACTS

Facts are something that have been too often overlooked or slighted during water negotiations. By this is meant the actual data, e.g., the amounts and/or quality of water available in the rivers, lakes and aquifers being discussed. This also refers to the timing of events: are there spring floods and late summer droughts? Are we talking about a really good year or a really bad one? Or are the figures quoted multi-year averages, and if so, for how many years? Such questions could go on and on. In fact, five years ago this author made a presentation to the United States, Department of State, Middle East water negotiators to persuade them of just this point.

An example of the trouble that lack of attention to the correctness and completeness of the facts, i.e., the data which are the object of negotiation, occurred on our own Colorado River at the beginning of the twentieth century. The states of California and Arizona early on recognized the value of the Colorado River and began staking claims to its water. They did this with little regard to the water rights of upstream states such as Colorado and Utah. Political wrangling ensued until the Boulder Canyon Act was approved by the U.S. Congress in December 1928, ratified by California in February 1929, and signed into law by President Herbert Hoover on June 25 of the same year.

But that was not the end of the disagreement between the seven riparian states sharing the river. In fact, it continues to the present day. It is not the intention here to belabor the reader with Colorado River woes. Let it suffice to quote the following:

... the framers of the compact assumed the dependable yield of the river to exceed sixteen million acre-feet per year; the farmers apparently believed that average flow to be close to seventeen or eighteen million acre feet. It is now widely believed by students of the matter that the average annual yield is less, possibly considerably less, than the fifteen million acre-feet actually divided up by the compact. (Kneese and Bonem, 89)

An example of such confusion appears in the Special 1996 Double Issue of Middle East Insight. It concerns the competition for water in the Euphrates River between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. In an article entitled, "Ankara Pools Its Resources," the author writes that "according to most figures" the average annual volume of the Euphrates River is 36 billion cubic meters (bcm) (Volkan, 55). In the article which follows, entitled, "Water Rights and Wrongs--in the view of Damascus more ill will than water flows form the taps in Ankara," its author quotes "Nabil Samman, a Syrian expert in the water issue," that "the annual flow of the Euphrates reaches 27 billion cubic meters" (Hamidi, 60). Meanwhile, in his paper Professor Tomanbay posits 31.61 bcm annually (Table 3). William Mitchell and this author, after years of research examining all the data available to us, conclude in our book on the Euphrates River that the average annual flow of the river is 33.46 bcm (Kolars and Mitchell, 232-235). Naturally, we think we are correct and the others are wrong. A case in point!

And again, in the October 1996 issue of Middle East Policy a contributor evaluates the situation existing between Israel and Syria and suggests how United States' financial aid might improve it. He devotes a quarter of his article to "Guaranteeing the Flow of Water," by which he means making certain that Syria and Iraq receive fair shares of the Euphrates River. This would be a commendable undertaking. However, the author in his provisions for such action lists among other points, "Second, Washington would take steps to ensure that storage facilities inside Syria matched those under Turkish control" (Lawson, p. 108).

This is simply not possible. The Euphrates River in Turkey flows through mountainous terrain with a number of sites ideally suited for deep storage reservoirs. There are no mountain gorges on the Euphrates in Syria and the few places suitable for even the shallow impounding of water have already been utilized: the Tishreen Dam, the Thawrah Dam, and the Ba'ath Dam. Moreover, existing reservoirs are shallow, and compared with reservoirs upstream in Turkey, lose disproportionately large amounts of water through evaporation (Table 1). Valuable time and effort might be lost negotiating this moot suggestion regarding a circumstance due entirely to the asymmetry of natural conditions, and a misunderstanding of the data (facts).

Facts may vary with the methods of observation employed as well as the times and sites involved. For example, the wide seasonal and multi-annual variation in the flow of the Euphrates is a fact. Our perception of the magnitude of such variance depends upon the observations made (and our ability to agree upon their accuracy) (See Kolars and Mitchell, Chap. 5).

ACTS AND INTERPRETATIONS

Some other facts depend upon how they are worded. An example will illustrate this point. Most authorities state that 88 percent of the flow of the mainstream of the Euphrates River is generated or comes from Turkey. Such statements hinge on the definition of the words "generated" or "comes from." (This example and the one which follows are drawn from specific writings. It is not the intention of this author to badger his colleagues; therefore exact references are not given but are available upon request.)

The aquifers feeding the Syrian tributaries of the Balikh and Khabur are charged by rainfall in Turkey (U.N., 1966). In view of this, 96 to 98 percent of the flow of the Euphrates can be seen as under Turkish control. Syria's dependence upon downstream flow from Turkey is further exacerbated when one learns that Turkish pumping of ground water in recharge areas of the two tributaries could significantly reduce the flow of the Syrian springs, which feed them. Conversely, once irrigation water from Lake Ataturk reaches those same recharge areas, increased return flow may result in excessive flooding downstream and/or problems of pollution if such flows are contaminated with herbicides, pesticides, or fertilizer.

In another example, an author stares that Turkey has guaranteed 500 cms downstream flow, but modifies his statement using the phrase that it has "only been willing to" do so although it is "only about 50 percent of the natural flow of the river." This kind of language could be interpreted as selfish, or it could be interpreted as being carefully realistic since there have been runs of dry years where less than 500 cms have been available.

The concept of "natural" or average annual flow is a statistical abstraction rarely matched in nature. This is shown in Table 2 where it is assumed that Turkey retains an average of 450 cms and allows all other flow downstream and nevertheless runs short in some years.

Upstream storage in Turkish reservoirs, as mentioned above, can be interpreted as evening out flow variance, which is beneficial for all, or as water hoarding. As pointed out, Turkish source areas have the best sites for deep storage reservoirs. Additional advantages of headwater storage relating to power generation and clean air could also be cited (Miller). At the lower end of the river system, in the case of Iraq's draining of downstream marshes, it is an ecological fact that the wet lands and their dwellers, human and other, will be impacted. But whether such impacts are interpreted as good or bad depends upon the politics of the interpreter.

A frequent suggestion is that depletions of the Euphrates might be met in Iraq by additions from the Tigris. The latter river is fed by left bank tributaries and should be able to supply local needs as well as those for its sister river (Kolars, 1997, 53). This possibility is clouded by conflicting interpretations of the facts. That two rivers are involved is a fact, but whether or not they share one basin joined at the Shatt al-Arab, the Turkish view (Government of Turkey), or are in two independent basins, the Iraqi view, depends upon the political interpretations involved. This difference in turn precipitates discussion of the appropriateness and/or legitimacy of inter-basin transfers of water, a topic even further removed from the natural streams and their ecologies.

RIVER ADVOCACY AND A RIVER ETHIC

It is this intersection of human interpretations with verifiable facts that needs to be identified. However, when people with different, nationally generated views and agendas meet, as illustrated by the consternation with which some readers may view Professor Tomanbay's contribution to this journal, confusion results. How can this dilemma be resolved?

As suggested above, this essay proposes that problems of development can best be resolved through the introduction of a River Ethic, a notion derived from Sandra Postel's call for a "Water Ethic" (Postel). In this case, during negotiations regarding the use of a river by several riparians or conflicting intramural interests, the river itself would be represented by impartial participants, River Advocates. These advocates would espouse a River Ethic; that is, they would practice Advocacy on behalf of the river. In the case under discussion the introduction of a dispassionate external party advocating the good of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers would put opposing political points of view in perspective, and in the long run benefit all the human users (Kolars, 1997, 51).

This suggestion may seem unrealistically optimistic. Whether or not such a group might have a voice in ongoing negotiations remains to be seen. However, without such an effort, the twin rivers and the Gulf into which their combined flow empties will suffer irreversible ecological damage (Kolars, 1994, 139-148). There will no human winners if that occurs.

How can this be accomplished? We must begin by think of the river as a total entity with an existence of its own. We must realize that the human relationship to the river is a truly symbiotic one. We must learn to think holistically, not in terms of nationally defined river .segments. We must see the river as a living entity and become its advocates.

THE CONCEPTS OF RIVERINE NEED AND "RIVER AS ENTITY" AS ASPECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY

There are several ways of considering environmental security, the new catch phrase covering the interface between the natural environment and human activities. These, in turn, depend upon the conditioning (i.e., perceptions) of the observer. Military and high-level government participants will usually consider as the focus of their concerns the security of the natural environment as it relates to the nation-state. Their salient question might be: can some element within the natural environment be manipulated to constitute a threat or cause harm to out country and its economy and/or people suggesting that Turkey, during the Gulf War, should cut oft the flow of the Euphrates in order to "punish" Iraq (which Turkey refused to consider), would fall into this category.

At another level are questions relating to inadvertent environmental impacts which could harm a population or become a casus belli. Pollution resulting from uncontrolled sewage, industrial wastes, agricultural field run oft would be listed here. Recent confrontations between Turkey and Syria/Iraq regarding possible and potential pollution of the Euphrates by Turkey illustrate this.

A third aspect of environmental security has to do with the viability (i.e., health) of the river system itself. This view can be further divided into treating the river as a total system serving the multiples uses of humankind (White, and more generally Science, 25 July 1997, devoted to "human dominated ecosystems"), and a more fluviocentric view which is the one considered primary by this author.

The concept of need is a good place is a good place to begin examining the latter approach. Simply put, just as human beings need the river, the river needs human beings. The river needs their consideration, their help, their perception that the river is an entity which in order to survive must maintain a healthy corpus in a felicitous environment. If the river perishes, so will all the creatures, great and small, human, animal and plant, with which it shares a commensalistic relationship.

Consider the following: a river has three roles (Tenenbaum, 1994, 11154). It serves as a route way for the basin/region it serves, not only for human commerce, but for anadromous fish and as a flyway for birds. Improperly used, it can also be the means of introducing disease and parasites, cholera, coli, schistosomes, along its length.

A river also serves the area through which it flows. It is the artery that provides life itself, as do its tributaries and distributaries, whether irrigation systems or natural deltas. Not only does it collect and bring life giving water, but it also carries away poisons and waste, serving the body regional, as does a healthy circulatory system cleanse the human body.

The discussion which follows is drawn from: (Kolars, forthcoming 2000). A river is an entity unto itself. A river in its natural state assumes a comprehensive gradient from source to mouth. Disturbance or blockage of this gradient telegraphs itself from beginning to end and initiates a series of readjustments in slope and flow and carrying capacity throughout its system (Stolum). A river adjusts to variations in seasonal changes in volumetric flow by means of its thalweg (the thread of fastest flowing water) (Ingle and Stopp, 106), its flood plains, and its underground flow. In its natural state, a river neither floods disastrously, nor shrinks capriciously. Those crises are defined by human perceptions, and often caused by human intervention. For example, the increasingly destructive floods in the American Midwest are the result of inept manipulation of the region's river' patterns and topology, and increased populations rushing headlong to occupy untenable flood plains.

The river has its own regulatory adjustments and its own dependent biota. All of these can be disturbed, even destroyed through human intervention. When the river subsequently sickens, perhaps dies, the symbiotic benefits accruing to human users cease.

These ideas need to be recognized in order to facilitate give and take across the mediation table. The participants, with the help of river advocates, must recognize the necessity of preserving the river's rights as well as their own, that they share an undeniable mutual dependency with the river. Let the river be seen as a vulnerable whole, the concern of all who sit in mediation. A beginning could be the writing of a River Ethic to supplement existing documents such as The Helsinki rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, and the United Nations Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-navigational International uses of International Watercourses. If the problems faced by the river were to be thus highlighted, it might become possible to define, for the benefit of all, the political/ecological threshold critical to rational discussion. This approach could lead to the resolution of the problem of sharing the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers.

The above ratios indicate the average number of cubic meters of water beneath each square meter of reservoir area. The larger the number, the more efficient the storage vis-a-vis evaporation losses. Mountain (i.e., headwater) locations provide the best and deepest reservoir sites. In the case of the Euphrates reservoirs, it should be noted that the farther downstream the reservoir in question is located, the higher will be the average annual ambient air temperature, resulting in greater evaporation losses per square meter of surface. This constitutes a multiplier effect when considering the best (of worst) places to store water. These comments, however, do not take into account the political ramifications of the situation, for downstream ushers may have serious reservations as to the availability of water stored in upstream locations. (Kolars, 1994, Table 2, 137).

TABLE 1: Surface Areas and Vols. Of Some Middle Eastern Reservoirs

Legend for Chart:
 
A - Country
B - Dam/Reservoir
C - Vol. (1 x 10[sup 6] m[sup 3])
D - Area km[sup 2]
E - Ratio: V/A (1 x 10[sup 6] m[sup 2])
 
 A B C D  E
 
Turkey Keban 30,600 67 44.4
 Karakaya 9,580 298 32.1
 Ataturk 48,700 817 59.6
 Birecik[*] 1,220 56.25 21.7
 Karkamis[**] 200 28.4 7.0
 
Syria Tishreen 1,300 70 18.6
 Tabqa (Al-Thawrah) 11,700 628 18.6
 Ba'ath 90 2.7 33.3
  Martyr Basel
 Al-Assad
 (Khabour River)[***] 605 92.5 6.5
 
Iraq Haditha (Qadasiyah) 10,000 550 18.2
 Habbaniyah 3,100 400 7.8
 
Egypt Lake Nasser  78,500 3,500 22.4
 
Sources: Kolars and Mitchell, Army Corps of Engineers, Ozal
and Altinbilek,
 
[***] Financial Times, G.W.R., p. 10 (Computations by Kolars.)
 
[*] under construction
 
[**] proposed

TABLE 2: Average Yearly Flows (cms) of the Euphrates River-1937-1963

(a period of generally low flows)
 
(27 year average flow = 854.6 cms = 27.0 x 10[sup 9]m[sup 3]/yr)
 
(Assumed storage 46.8 bcm = 1484 cms) (Turkey uses 450 cms/yr)
 
(Short & Long refer to values above and below 500 cms downstream)
 
Legend for Chart:
 
A - Year
B - cms
C - Downstream
D - Short (Turkey keeps 450/cms)
E - Long (Turkey keeps 450/cms)
F - Cumulative (Turkey keeps 450/cms)
 
 A B C D E F
 
Assuming 46.8 bcm
Live storage to begin
 
Assumed full storage at beginning of
series in cms +1484
 
1937 894 444 -56 -56 1428
 
1938 997 547 +47 -9 1475
 
1939 831 381 -119 -128 1356
 
1940 1165 715 +215 +87 1484[*]
 
1941 1120 670 +170 +257 1484[*]
 
1942 1032 582 +82 +339 1484[*]
 
1943 856 406 -94 +245 1390
 
1944 1056 60 +106 +351 1484[*]
 
1945 691 241 -259 +92 1225
 
1946 920 470 -30 +62 1195
 
1947 703 253 -247 -185 948
 
1948 1007 557 +57 -128 1005
 
1949 662 212 -288 -416 717
 
1950 753 303 -197 -613 520
 
1951 716 266 -234 -847 286
 
1952 932 482 -18 -865 268
 
1953 906 456 -44 -809 224
 
1954 1012 562 +62 -847 286
 
reservoirs empty beyond this point
 
1955 588 138 -362 -1209 0-76
 
1956 827 377 -123 -1332 0-199
 
1957 818 368  -132 -1464 0-331
 
1958 655 205 -295 -1759 0-626
 
1959 574 124 -376 -2135 0-1002
 
1960 826 376 -124 -2259 0-1126
 
1961 484 34 -466 -2725 0-1592
 
1962 692 242 -258 -2983 0-1850
 
1963 1356 906 +406 -2577 0-1444
 
[*] Additional surplus lost--assuming no additional storage.
This assumes Turkish retention of 450 cms. Cumulative downstream
losses = 1444 cms = approximately 45.8 x 10[sup 9]m[sup 3].
 
Source: Government of Turkey. Computations by Kolars.

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