Table of Contents
Water has historically played a significant
role in shaping the geopolitical boundaries of the Middle
East. Few realize that the lines on present day maps of the
region are, to a great extent, the result of a continuous
parade of water related wars, occupations, cease-fires and
imposed peace plans. Today's boundaries in the Middle East
are, primarily, artificial frontiers imposed within the past
75 years by distant foreign powers.
Water considerations continue to inhibit
regional cooperation and agreement. To a large degree, water
resources in the area have been taken over by force and
military action. Accordingly, the interrelationship between
water resources, conflict, competing ideologies, nationalistic
agendas and basic human needs cannot be overlooked. Unless,
this complex interplay is taken into consideration during
future plans, water issues will guide the peoples of the
Middle East into further conflict.
Past attempts at solving water disputes have,
for the most part, failed. Previous solutions were too often
based on political objectives, securing the emergence of the
State of Israel and ensuring adequate resources for its
projected growth. The need for a more satisfactory plan is
beyond dispute. Such a plan must account fairly for the needs
of the region's neighbor states. To do so, an exploration of
the the contexts of previously proposed solutions is
enlightening. Previous mistakes are revealed and a new path
forward begins to emerge.
Geographical Palestine has a rich history of
agricultural productivity. Soils and climatic patterns range
widely within a blockquote area, from fertile plains and hills
to stark deserts. That which is tillable depends on seasonal
rainwater, or, if irrigated, upon water from subsoil aquifers
or surface sources.
Most of the surface waters in Palestine lie
in the northern and north-eastern regions, with the headwaters
of the Jordan River System lying in Lebanon and Syria. The
Southern parts of the country, particulary the Negev area,
have been left dry.
To establish a Jewish State in Palestine, it
was deemed necessary to bring together large numbers of
immigrants and provide good land for cultivation, industry and
living. Palestine, as it was then, did not have the resources
to absorb the millions of Jews brought to fulfill this Zionist
dream. Thus, the Zionist Movement began studying ways of
developing the natural resources of Palestine to enable the
absorption of large numbers of Jewish immigrants.
Much of the initial research and data
collection was conducted by the British Royal Society and the
Zionist Movement, with the aim of assessing Palestine's
natural resource potential. The studies carried out mainly
concentrated on the area. Charles Warren, in 1875, estimated,
in The Land of Promise that Palestine and the Negev
could easily absorb 15 million people. From this point on,
efforts towards gaining control of the waters of Palestine
received top priority.
At the same time that Jews were aunching a
political campaign to establish a new home in Palestine, they
were also formulating plans to utilize the area's water
resources. After the declaration of the British Mandate in
1922, the Jewish Agency formed a special technical committee
to conduct studies on the utilization of water and irrigation
of unarable and desert land. This committee performed several
studies, with the assistance and cooperation of Jewish and
pro-Jewish experts and governments, in particular the British
Concurrently, to serve as a guide to future
political resolutions in the area, the British Mandate
Government carried out studies on water issues in Palestine
and East Jordan Valley. Most of the studies conducted were
used to evaluate both water plans designed by the Jewish
Agency and also the United Nation Partition Plan of Palestine.
The Arab inhabitants of the area, who opposed
previous water plans, found it imperative to protect their
water resources and thus, began designing their own plans.
Arab water plans necessarily contradicted the objectives of
others. Whereas, these water plans posed a direct threat to
Arab rights in the area, Jewish demand for water was
increasing, to essentially facilitate the absorption of new
Rising political tension in the region and
the lack of a solution acceptable to all parties, exacerbated
and eventually exploded into several rounds of water wars
between Arabs and Jews.
The following pages summarize the main water
plans and events which have taken place since 1922. Although,
many important events preceeded the British Mandate and
contributed vastly to the ideologocial underpinnigs which
supported later plans, post-1922 plans were critical in
shaping today's water crisis. Two important water-related
events highlight the British Mandate of Palestine, 1922 -
1948: the Rutenberg Concession and the Ionides
In 1926, the British High Commissioner
granted the Jewish owned Palestine Electricity Corporation,
founded by Pinhas Rutenberg, a 70 year concession to utilize
the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers' water for generating
electricity. The concession denied Arab farmers the right to
use the Yarmouk and Jordan Rivers' water upstream of their
junction for any reason, unless permission was granted from
the Palestine Electricity Corporation. Permission was never
In 1937, the government of Great Britain
assigned M. Ionides, a hydrologist, to serve as the Director
of Development for the East Jordan Government. His actual task
was solely to conduct a study on the water resources and
irrigation potentials of the Jordan Valley Basin. This study
served as a main reference in the preparation of the proposed
United Nations Partition Plan of Palestine.
Published in 1939, the Ionides Plan
made three recommendations. Firstly, Yarmouk flood waters were
to be stored in Lake Tiberias. Secondly, the stored waters in
Lake Tiberias plus a blockquote quantity (1.76 cm/sec) of the
Yarmouk River water, diverted through the East Ghor canal,
were to be used to irrigate 75,000 acres (300,000 dunums) of
land east of the Jordan River. And finally, the secured
irrigation water of the Jordan River System, estimated at a
potential of 742 mcm, were to be used primarily within the
Jordan Valley Basin. [Ionides p.
Since the Jordan and the Yarmouk Rivers were
at that time still under the authority of the Palestine
Electricity Corporation, the plan was difficult to implement.
Zionist supporters worldwide were not
satisfied with the findings and recommendations of Ionides.
Their aspiration to utilize the Jordan River Basin for the
irrigation of the Negev and the southern parts of Palestine
was fulfilled by walterclay Lowdermilk . Lowdermilk was
commissioned by the United States Department of Agriculture to
conduct such a study.
Lowdermilk devised a plan calling for the
irrigation of the Jordan Valley; the diversion of the Jordan
and Yarmouk rivers to create hydroelectric power; the
diversion of water from northern Palestine to the Negev desert
in the south; and the usage of the Litani River in Lebanon.
In striking contrast to the Ionides plan,
Lowdermilk concluded that 1800 mcm of water is available in
the Jordan Basin for the purpose of irrigation. A canal was
recommended to connect the Mediterranean Sea with the Dead
Sea. Also, an authority similar to the Tennessee Valley
Authority should be formed to assume full control over all
activities concerning water resources. Such water management
would ideally ensure adequate water resources and job
opportunities for 4 million new Jewish immigrants in addition
to the 1.8 million Arabs already living in Palestine and East
Jordan at that time.
Control over the proposed project should be
solely in the hands of Jews, with a limited amount of input
allotted to the United Nations. Arabs unable or unwilling to
live under such conditions were to be transferred to areas
near the Euphrates and the Tigris Valleys. [Lowdermilk
Lowdermilk's plan and suggestions were
enthusiastically embraced by influential Zionists. Technical
experts subsequently contracted to Iimplement and interpret
this plan into feasible schemes. James B. Hays was selected
for this assignment.
The Hays Plan of 1948 called for half
of the Yarmouk River water to be diverted into Lake Tiberias,
replacing water diverted from the upper Jordan River, as
outlined in the Lowdermilk plan from which Hays worked. Two
additional stages were suggested to be implemented in the
future, although not stated, they most likely included the
diversion of the Litani River water into geographical
Palestine in order to be used for Israeli projects.
As a continuation of the Lowdermilk-Hays
Plan, the new government of Israel, soon after the War of
1948, began to prepare practical plans for the utilization and
control of the area's water resources. A Seven Year
Plan Happroved publicly in 1953, centered around the
diversion of the Jordan River water south toward the Negev
desert and establishing a unified and comprehensive water
network that would cover all parts of Israel.
In September 1953, the construction of the
National Water Carrier began and thus plans to divert
the Jordan River water, south to the Negev, were activated.
Diversion originated at the Banat Yacoub Bridge in the
demilitarized zone between Israel and Syria. After Syrian
objection to the excavation process, and United States'
economic sanctions against Israel, a temporary freeze on the
work at Banat Yacoub Bridge was announced in October 1953.
During the 1948 war, the Rutenberg
electricity generating plant was destroyed by the Jewish army
in an attempt to avoid exclusive Arab control over the use of
the Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers. The war forced a great number
of Palestinian refugees to flee and settle in the eastern part
of the Jordan Valley. The Jordanian Government and UNRWA (The
United Nations Relief and Works Agency) agreed to develop
irrigation schemes in the area to assist Palestinian refugees
to cultivate the land and resettle. For this purpose, the
Jordanian Government commissioned a British consultant, Sir
Murdoch MacDonald, to conduct a study on their behalf.
The MacDonald Plan was finalized in
1951. It is considered a compliment to the Ionides Plan. The
plan called for Jordan Basin water to be exclusively used for
irrigation of both banks of the Jordan River by storing
surplus water from the Yarmouk River in Lake Tiberias and
constructing canals down both sides of the Valley. Arabs were
uneasy with the suggestion of the storage of water in Lake
Tiberias, as they were in previous plans.
Therefore, Arabs favored the plan put forth
by the American engineer M. E. Bunger a suitable
location for the construction of a water storage dam along the
Yarmouk River at the Moqarin area, where three valleys join
together. The impounded water would be diverted to another dam
at Addassiyah into gravity flow canals along the East Ghore
area in the Jordan Valley. The plan included two hydroelectric
generating plants at the site of the two dams to supply water
and electricity to both Jordan and Syria.
The Bunger Plan addressed several of Jordan
and Syria's needs and Iintended to resolve, to some extent,
the Palestinian refugee problem by Iincreasing the
productivity of available agricultural lands in the East
Jordan Valley and parts of Syria.
As soon as work began in July 1953, Israel
vocalized its concern about increasing Arab control over the
area's water resources. Israel objected on the grounds that
the original Rutenberg Concession gave it exclusive rights to
the Yarmouk River. As a result, pressure was exerted on the
United States Government and UNRWA to cease support for the
project. To the surprise of the Jordanian Government, work
halted soon thereafter and the project was terminated.
In October 1953, the United States prepared
the Johnston Plan as yet another attempt to solve the
area's water crisis. The rising tension caused by the Israeli
initiation of the National Water Carrier project, encouraged
the United States to mediate between the two parties. The plan
sought to satisfy the minimum requirements of riparian Arab
states, as well as Israel. Eric Johnston implemented a water
plan prepared by Charles Main , under the supervision
of the Tennessee Valley Authority. Essentially, the Johnston
Plan was a combination of the Lowdermilk-Hays and the
MacDonald-Bunger Plans. The new plan included water
distribution quotas of the Jordan Valley Basin, estimated at
1,213 MCM annually, among the riparian states. [Encyclopedia
of Palestine, p 153]
The plan was not well received by either
Israel or the Arab States. Consequently, Arabs and Israelis
submitted counter proposals for dividing water shares - the
Arab Technical Committee and the Cotton Plan
Development of Johnston Plan 1953-1955
Water = million cubic meters
thousands of dunams
* = an estimate
Because the available irrigation water in the
Jordan River Basin does not exceed a maximum of 1,213 MCM, the
Cotton Plan included, within its scope, the Litani River to
cover the water shortfall. The Cotton Plan allocated 400 mcm
of the Litani's water to Israel and 300 mcm to Lebanon.
The period between October 1953 and July 1955
was a negotiating and bargaining stage over the Jordan River
system. By the end of 1955, the Johnston Plan became more
favorable to Israel, whose share rose to 450 mcm while
Jordan's shares dropped to 720 mcm. [Brecker
The final form of the Plan, even though it
was rejected by Arab States, was used by the United States as
a basis for its future plans in the region. The failure to
reach bilateral agreement reinforced each country's
inclination to proceed independently.
In 1958, Israel reinitiated the National
Water Carrier project but with some technical changes and also
the Seven Year Plan was replaced by the Ten Year Plan.
The new plan shifted the diversion point to Eshrd Kinort,at
the north- west corner of Lake Tiberias. The new diversion
project was carefully designed in accordance to Israel's water
allocation in the Revised Johnston Plan. It also refrained
from invalidating its general principles.
Arab reaction to Israel's National Water
Carrier was to build dams on tributaries of the Jordan and
Yarmouk Rivers, thus reducing the water flow to Israel. In
1965, Syria began building dams to divert water from the
Banias and Dan Rivers in the Golan Heights. These headwater
diversions threatened to deprive Israel of 35% of its water
potential from the Upper Jordan. Israel, as a riparian state
of the Jordan Basin, considered this action an aggression on
its water resources and sent fighter planes to destroy working
Israeli occupation of the Syrian Golan
Heights in 1967 and subsequent control over the Jordan's
headwaters in the area ended Arab dreams and plans for
utilizing the water of the Jordan Basin.
In 1969 Israel bombed the East Ghor Canal in
Jordan, keeping it out of order for four years. After secret
negotiations between Jordan and Israel in 1969-1970, Israel
permitted the repair of the East Ghor Canal while Jordan, in
return, reaffirmed its adherence to the quotas of the Revised
No water plans were devised after the
Johnston Plan of 1954. However,many events have taken place
which have altering water distribution quotas. Since the 1967
occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights,
Israel vastly expanded its control over water resources in the
area,to including Mount Hermon, West Bank aquifers and the
entire length of the Jordan River. As an outcome of the 1982
Israeli invasion of South Lebanon, Israel extended its command
even further, to include part of the Litani River. Israel's
strategy is to control and derive maximum benefit from all
water resources in the occupied territories.
According to 1991 figures, Israel consumes
1,655 mcm of both surface and ground water. Of this amount,
950 mcm originates in neighboring Arab States, Golan Heights
and the West Bank. Whereas, only 155 mcm of water orginating
in the West Bank actually remains there. A considerable amount
of this water is consumed by Israeli settlements and
kibbutizim inside the West Bank itself (Figure 3).
The failure to reach binding agreement on water
rights among the riparian states of the Jordan River System
may be examined in relation to international water law.
Riparian states have failed to abide by the general principles
of internatinal water law, and have thus, contributed greatly
to the difficulty of solving today's water crisis.
Although international water law is still
underdeveloped and not uniformly adhered to, the following
principles are normally observed by the world community:
- An equitable share of water is entitled to each basin
- Actions which damage the land or property of one state,
must be avoided and if not, compensated for.
- Every state must notify others of any actions which may
- Basic water resource data should be shared.
- All basin states should share in the developing and
protecting shared water resources.
- All disputes should be resoved by without resorting to
If the general principles of international
water law were adhered to, it is likely that many of the past
water related conflicts would have not taken place.
Nevertheless, the following analysis attempts to assist in
answering the question, why previous water plans failed.
dream of the Zionist Movement to settle millions of Jews in
geographic Palestine, placed an unsustainable demand on all
its natural resources and the resources of neighboring states,
as well. In order to do so, Jews sought control over the
headwaters of Jordan-Yarmouk River System and the Litani River
Chaim Weizman wrote to the British Minister
David George, describing the minimum requirements of a Jewish
State in the land of Palestine and explaining the Jewish
perspective on the issue of water, stating that:
The whole economic future of Palestine is
dependant upon its water supply for irrigation and for
electric power, and the water supply must mainly be derived
from the slopes of Mount Hermon, from the headwaters of the
Jordan and from the Litani River in Lebanon ... We consider
it essential that the Northern Frontier of Palestine should
include the Valley of the Litani, for a distance of about 25
miles above the bend, and the Western and Southern slopes of
Mount Hermon." [Jewish Observer, p. 22]
Such ambitions completely neglected Arab
historic rights, and were thus rejected once they were
incorporated into many of the proposed water plans. Both the
Lowdermilk and Hays Plans called for Jewish control over
headwaters in the area, as well as the Litani River. The Plans
also called for the diversion of and storage of Arab river
water (Jordan and Yarmouk) in the Israeli controlled Lake
Tiberias. Even though in 1944, at the time of the Hays Plan,
the Arabs constituted about 69.6% of the total population of
historic Palestine, the Plans allowed Jews to assume full
control over the water projects. Consequently, Arabs were
prevented from irrigating vast areas of rich land in the
The scarce water resources of the Jordan
River Basin were threatened by Israeli plans to irrigate and
bloom the Negev. The National Water Carrier, included in the
Israeli Seven Year Plan, Cotton Plan and the Revised Johnston
plan, proposed to divert this water exclusively inside the
Green Line. This was unrealistic to the Arabs as it dropped
water levels of the Jordan River and prevented Arab farmers,
on both sides, from cultivating their lands.
The Arab inhabitants of the
land of Palestine, who historically had control many of the
plans that where threatening their civil rights. The Arab
population recognized that accepting such plans would enable
aggressive violations of their water rights and threaten the
survival of the projects they supported on the Jordan River.
On the other hand, the occupying authorities
of Palestine supported the establishment of a Jewish State and
provided secured natural resources for its projected
development. In order to actualize this objective, the British
Government neglected the Arab presence in the land. Decisions
regarding water plans and water rights in area were taken
solely by the British Mandate or French. Palestinians, in
particular, were not consulted regarding any of the proposed
plans, both during and after the Mandate period. The Revised
Johnston Plan, which is still in effect tody, neglected to
mention the Palestinian people. Undoubtadly, this is one of
the most blatant violations of water rights of region's
Throughout the Mandate period, the British
Government granted the Jewish people many privileges,
including control over the natural resources in the area. In
1926, even though Arabs constituted a majority of the
population with 749,402 inhabitants out of a total of 898,902,
Jews were granted the following:
- A 70 year concession to utilize The Jordan and Yarmouk
Rivers' water. [Rutenberg Concession].
- A Concession for reclamation of the Huleh Lake and
swamps. The Concession were resold to the Jews for a 70 year
- Utilization of Al Oja (Yarkon) River in Jaffa area.
- A 70 year concession to utilize the Dead Sea water to
produce salts and minerals.
- Concession of oil prospecting in Palestine.
Although, all of the Yarmouk River's and most
of the Jordan River's water is located inside Arab
territories, the concession, later known as the Rutenberg
Concession, to utilize this water was given solely to the
Palestine Electricity Corporation. Profits of this project
were shared between the British Government and the
Corporation, depriving Arab countries their rightful share of
The Lowdermilk Plan was even more extreme and
unjust. After presenting his plan, Lowdermilk suggested that
if the Arabs are unable or unwilling to live in an industrial
developed Jewish state, then they should be transferred to
areas near the Euphrates and the Tigris Valleys.
Although the Lowdermilk-Hays project
neglected the rights and furthermore the presence of the Arab
inhabitants in the area, it served as a reference point for
almost all of the future Israeli schemes and also to the
Partition Plan of Palestine. The Zionist Movement forced the
Lowdermilk-Hays plan onto the table of those partitioning
Palestine in 1947. Dr. Immanuel Newman, President of the
Zionist Organization of America, confirmed this by stating:
"Those who had been responsible for working out
details of the United Nations Partition plan, were familiar
with the basic aspects of the Lowdermilk-Hays project and
took it largely into account in drawing the boundaries of
the new state". [Saliba,
The Zionist Movement, since its establishment
in 1882, vocalized its aim of settling the land of Palestine
and controlling its natural resources. This desire to control
the natural resources was considered intolerable by the Arabs.
The Jewish claims to the Land of Palestine,
significant parts of the Arab States of Jordan, Lebanon and
Syria and their plans to seize control over its natural
resources created a rift of mistrust and hatred between the
Arabs and the Jews.
Since most of the schemes where hostage to
political agendas and geographical fears, they could not
possibly succeed unless all the parties concerned accept them
and commit to cooperate and maintain them. This was a major
factor in the rejection the Johnston Plan. The Plan was
rejected by the Arab States due to political fears since it
grants Israel de facto rights over Arab water resources in the
area. Georgiana Stevens, one of Eric Johnston's assistants,
The Arab Government could not bring themselves
to give acceptance to an arrangement that would also help
Israel's development .. [and] accept a plan that was
tantamount to tacit acceptance of Israel's existence .. thus
the momentum achieved during the Johnston negotiations died
p. 32, 33].
Plans were devised by only one of the parties
involved. A total absence of cooperation among the riparian
states lead to the failure of these plans.
To achieve political aims, many of the water
plans lacked technical and scientific objectivity and were
therefore difficult to apply. Scientific data, such as the
estimation of water potential in the area, was not accurate
and consequently, most of the schemes were technical failures.
In the Lowdermilk Plan, which was a reference
to all later Jewish/Israeli water plans, the total irrigation
potential was estimated as 1.2 million dunums (300,000 acres).
This figure is almost double the area of irrigable land in the
Jordan Valley. Such a falsified estimation created a
substantial surplus, allowing irrigation water to be used
elsewhere. This surplus is utilized in, for example, the "out
basin" Negev area, presently used to grow roses and "to make
the desert bloom".
The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry's
evaluation of The Hays Plan noted that,
"The [British] Water Commissioner is doubtful of
the validity of the use to which much of the data accepted
by Mr. Hays and predicted by Mr. Savage is
put".Also the report stated that :
Without close checking and reference to more
detailed information that is now available, it is impossible
to accept the estimated costs of the [Hays's] scheme ... The
scheme envisages the irrigation of two and a half million
dunums with nearly two thousand million cubic meters of
water a year ... It cannot be agreed that this continual
flow would be available for use in a dry year after allowing
for losses in transmission ... This and many other features
in the scheme demand very careful scrutiny. The dams
proposed at Hasbani, Yarmuk and Beisan and their
complementary canals, the elimination of the present
hydro-electrical works at Jisr Majami', all highly expensive
items, will not, it would seem, ensure an increased water
supply of more than a few cubic meters per second. The
quantity of storm-water available of storage in hill
reservoirs has been estimated optimistically, ... This and
the economic implications of the proposal to convey
irrigation water from the Lebanon to the Egyptian frontier
cannot be accepted without further examination."[Survey of
Palestine p. 413]
The idea of diverting and storing Yarmouk
River water in Lake Tiberias, mentioned in Ionides, Hays,
MacDonald and Johnston Plans, was technically and
scientifically unacceptable. Lake Tiberias water is saline,
exceeding 300 ppm, while the Yarmouk River's water does not
exceed 80 ppm. Storing water in Lake Tiberias would increase
the salinity of water used for irrigation and agricultural
purposes by Arabs. Also, the high evaporation rate and water
loss in Lake Tiberias may reach as high as 300 MCM each year,
while such loss would be reduced if water was stored in a site
along the River's route.
Several water plans failed to take into
consideration the existing geopolitical boundaries and
cease-fire lines. Arab water control stations, such as dams,
hydroelectric plants, and water reserves, were often designed
to exist outside Arab boundaries. The storage of Yarmouk River
water in Lake Tiberias is one clear example.
Therefore, not only the Ionides, Hays,
MacDonald and Johnston Plans were technically and were
scientifically inaccurate, but they also neglected the
geopolitical boundaries between the Jewish/Israeli State and
the rest of the Arab States.
It is unfortunate that none of the water
plans prior to 1953 were conducted by Arab experts. The plans
commissioned by Arab governments were conducted by non-Arabs.
The Arab commissioned MacDonald Plan and Bunger Plan were
conducted by a British and American experts, respectively. The
lack of expertise prevented the Arabs from formulating plans
in accordance to their needs and aspirations.
A binding agreement regarding water rights
among the riparian states in the region has never been
obtained. With the constantly changing political Land
demographic conditions as well as de facto boundary
alterations in the area, water distribution quotas and schemes
must necessarily adapt and develop. The current
disproporational distribution of water resources is no longer
sustainable. In the past, unsustainabilty has grown into
conflict. Hopefully today, the use of force and military power
to gain control of water resources is no more acceptable to
the international community.
It is time for this community to take action,
reversing unjust water distribution and ensuring a fair and
ecologically sound future. Without a clear and equitable
settlement of the water crisis combined with an increasing
demand for water, will eventually exacerbate into yet another
war driving at control another's water resources. A water war.
- A Survey of Palestine, Anglo
American Committee of Inquiry, The Government Printer,
Palestine 1946, Vol.1
- Basheer, Nijim, 'Water Resources in
the History of the Palestine-Israel Conflict, GeoJournal
April 21, 1991, P. 317-323.
- Brecker, Micheal, Decisions in
Israel's Foreign Ministry, New Haven,CT, Yale University
- Dillman, Jeffrey, Water Rights in The
Occupied Territories, Journal Of Palestinian Studies,
Vol XIX No. 1, Jerusalem, Autumn 1989.
- Encyclopedia of Palestine,
Palestinian Encyclopedia Committee, Damascus 1984, Vol 1.
- Gleick, Peter, Water and Conflict,
submitted to "Environmental Change and Acute Conflict",
Canada, June 15-19, 1991.
- Ionides M. G., The Water Resources Of
Transjordan and Their Development, London 1939.
- Jewish Observer and Middle East Review,
London, Nov. 16, 1973.
- Lowdermilk, W.C., Palestine, Land of
Promise, Harper and Bros, New York 1944.
- Main, Charles, The Unified
Development of the Water Resources of the Jordan Valley
Region, Gordon Clapp, Boston, MA: United Nations, 1953.
- Saliba, Samir N., The Jordan River
Dispute, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968
- Stevens, Georgiana, Jordan River
Partition, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1965.