Differences between Egypt and Sudan over water are a major feature
of their bilateral relations, especially in periods of tension between the two
countries. This raises questions about the Nile being used as a tool to apply
pressure within the framework of these relations, particularly in the light of
recent developments in the two countries. While Sudan is currently experiencing
a crisis economically, politically and in terms of national integration, Egypt
has entered a stage of transition, and must face the accompanying economic,
social and political challenges. Moreover, there is now a lack of trust between
the Egyptian and Sudanese governments as well as feelings of frustration at the
popular level as a result of repeated failed attempts at integration and union.
This report looks at the disagreements that arose as a result of the 1929 and
1959 agreements on the utilization of the River Nile, examines the relationship
between the Nile and development and regional cooperation and proposes a number
of suggestions to overcome the political difficulties and complications in the
Nile Basin region.
The first agreement defining both countries' quotas of Nile water was signed in
1929. This agreement aimed at reconciling between the needs and demands of both
parties and set the annual quotas of Egypt and Sudan at 48 billion and four
billion cubic meters of water respectively. Consequent developments, however,
including the 1952 July Revolution, the independence of Sudan in 1956 and the
building of the Aswan High Dam, necessitated the reorganization of water
quotas, and a second agreement, which is still valid, was signed in 1959.
While the 1959 agreement did not stipulate any change to Egypt's quota of Nile
water, it set a more comprehensive legal framework for the organization of
bilateral relations concerned with the distribution of water. It also
underscored the historical rights of Egypt to the waters of the Nile. Many
Sudanese politicians objected to the agreement, as they had to the previous
one. Even now, both agreements remain a focus of criticism for a number of
political powers in Sudan, even if the basis for this criticism is more
political than legal or technical. This has naturally led to friction and
occasional deadlocks in the two countries' bilateral relations.
Both Egypt and Sudan depend on the Nile for development projects. Egypt
urgently needs to redraw its agricultural map in order to achieve
self-sufficiency and food security especially as many assessments indicate that
the real crisis in Egypt lies in the distribution of resources, not in their
availability. At the same time, Sudan's demands for development projects exceed
its current annual Nile quota of 18.5 billion cubic meters of water, and hence
the government needs to rationalize water consumption and set up efficient
irrigation networks.
Joint development projects could serve as a starting point for
Egyptian-Sudanese cooperation in the field of water utilization. Agreement has
already been reached on a number of such projects on the Upper Nile, to be
equally funded by both parties, though all but the Jonglei Canal project are
still in the planning stages. The Jonglei Canal project began in 1980, although
work was halted in 1983 as a result of the Sudanese civil war. This project
remains a model for joint initiatives to promote water security in the region,
though it also highlights the extent to which political restrictions can affect
development.
What is needed now are new plans for the utilization and management of the Nile
in order to prevent the eruption of regional disputes, particularly as it is
becoming increasingly difficult to apply an Egyptian-Sudanese agreement that is
not fully accepted by all the political powers in Sudan. Efforts also need to
be exerted to create a region-wide system for development encompassing all the
countries of the Nile Basin.
Cooperation between Egypt and Sudan over water could provide the impetus for
further strategic bilateral cooperation. This could be achieved through the
groupings of which both parties are members - the Joint Permanent Technical
Committee -formed according to the 1959 agreement- and the TechoNile grouping
-the technical aggregation comprising the countries of the Nile Basin for
development and preservation of the Nile environment-. Such cooperation could
also pave the way for more comprehensive arrangements with other countries of
the Nile Basin.
Cooperation in the Nile Basin needs to be widened to include coordination in
areas other than water utilization and thus achieve a balance of interests.
Ideally, this should be within the framework of a strategy of collective
development and supported by an institutional structure that aims to achieve
fair distribution of water on the basis of the actual requirements of each
country. This cooperation could take the form of a number of regional projects.
In order for regional cooperation to be a success, there should be a focus on
agricultural and infrastructure projects. There is also a need for research in
a number of areas, including means of decreasing water wastage in the swamp
areas and the feasibility of establishing both a navigational course in the
Nile and a free-trade zone. It is essential, however, that political formulas
serving single-party interests be avoided.
We can conclude that the absence of a comprehensive strategy for
Egyptian-Sudanese relations has resulted in the deferral of a number of
difficult issues, including that of defining Nile quotas. With regard to
Egyptian-Sudanese relations concerning the Nile, there are a number of points
worth noting:
1. Egyptian-Sudanese bilateral relations throughout history have been a series
of missed opportunities, as can be seen by looking at the amount of cooperation
agreements and projects that have been impeded by tense relations.
2. Politicization of the water issue seems to be a characteristic not only of
Egyptian-Sudanese relations, but of the relations between the countries of the
Nile Basin as a whole.
3. The weak economic abilities of both countries and their need to increase
their water quotas in the short run necessitate the urgent movement of Egyptian
diplomacy to coordinate regional cooperation.
4. Sudan and Egypt, of all the countries of the Nile Basin, have the greatest
need for water due to their dependence on irrigation from sources other than
rain.
In conclusion, in order for the differences over water quotas between Egypt and
Sudan to be overcome - as well as differences in the Nile Basin as a whole -
three main areas need to be addressed: the shackling of development interests
by political restrictions; discrepancies in the balance of power that lead to
the interests of certain parties being served at the expense of others; and the
institutional vacuum that has occurred as a result of weak coordination.