Water, Institutions and Development in Syria: a Downstream Perspective from the Euphrates and Tigris

Marwa Daoudy

This submission was presented at the WCD Regional Consultation, Cairo, Egypt, 8 - 9 December 1999

Introduction: Syria’s Hydrological Profile

As succinctly expressed by Saint-Exupéry, « Rather than being necessary to life, water is life itself ». This circumstance becomes of vital importance in an arid and semi-arid region such as the Middle East. In order to understand the economic and political issues at stake with respect to water conflicts in the Middle East it is however necessary to fully comprehend their geographic and hydrological dimensions. In a 1995 Survey, the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia noted that: «limited water resources, increasing water demand imposed by a rapidly growing population and development activities, and degradation of water quality all contribute to the problem of water scarcity in the ESCWA region. This is further complicated by the fact that substantial volumes of both surface water and groundwater are withdrawn from rivers and aquifers that are shared among countries within and outside the region. Moreover, land uses such as irrigation and range practices are leading towards desertification as a result of soil salinisation and overgrazing» (ESCWA, 1995). In addition, it is important to note that strategic, geopolitical and economic considerations become intertwined with hydrological factors..

This study will address the current water situation in Syria in terms of her national water policies, demands, and institutions. This is a necessary step that will eventually enable us to analyse the economic development needs and thus the political implications of water for Syria. The analysis will be based on, primary and undisclosed data collected from the Syrian Ministry of Irrigation, interviews with official and unofficial sources, studies carried out by governmental specialists (Ministry of Irrigation, Regional Office of the Arab Organisation for Agricultural Development, Office of Shared Resources), research centres based in Syria (the Arab Centre for the Study of Arid Zones & Dry Lands – ACSAD) and government organs (the Baath Arab Party). Water-related data is often adjusted to the audience (external, internal) as it is linked to national security issues. The data presented and analysed in this study has been obtained from official sources and cross-checked with unofficial internal expertise.

At the heart of the hydrological dimensions lies the complex issue of water stress which is influenced by arid climate conditions and removal or diversions from the basin. We will analyse the demand-  and  supply  -induced stress on water caused by population growth, increased per-capita activity and higher depletion than renewal of the resource. The water crisis on the Syrian side is a function of structural conditions and socio-economic policies (water-intensive agriculture). We can identify some major background factors, their interdependencies and their impact on the water development : climate impact (limited precipitations); quantity/quality (limited availability and increased demand ; impact of population’s growth ); level of country’s dependency on the River (main source, other resources available).

In short our objective is to highlight context-related issue-linkages by putting Syria’s water development in the perspective of Turkey’s upstream position and the GAP project in particular.

1) The Euphrates and Tigris Rivers

The Euphrates and Tigris Rivers both originate in the mountains of eastern Turkey. These rivers flow into Syria and Iraq and join the sea at the head of the Persian Gulf. The Euphrates enters Syria at Karkamis which is located downstream from the Turkish town of Birecik. It is joined by its major tributaries, the Balikh and Khabur, and flows Southeast before entering Iraq. The Tigris flows through Turkey until it reaches the border city of Cizre and eventually forms the border between Turkey and Syria for 39 km before crossing into Iraq. Within Iraq, several tributaries are gathered from the Zagros Mountains to the east (the Greater Zap, the Lesser Zap, the Adhaim, and the Diyala). The Tigris and Euphrates unite near Qurna, in Iraq, to form the Shatt-Al-Arab, which empties into the Gulf.

The Euphrates is the longest river (2,700 km) in Southwest Asia west of the Indus. Both rivers have seen the rise of ancient civilisations and the early development of irrigation practices during those periods (Sumer, Mesopotamia). The Euphrates Basin lies 28% in Turkey, 17% in Syria, 40% in Iraq and 15% in Saudi Arabia. It is estimated that Turkey contributes 88% of the annual flow while Syria contributes 12% (Beaumont, 1978). These figures are however disputed, some authors suggest that Turkey contributes 98% of the flow (Kolars, 1991). The Tigris is the second longest river in Southwest Asia (1,840 km)and its basin lies between Turkey (12%), Syria (0.2%), Iraq (52%) and Iran (48%). It is estimated that Turkey contributes 51%, Iraq 39% and Iran 10% of the annual flow. Indeed flow estimates appear to vary according to the source which is consulted. In addition, it needs to be recalled that some experts mention the natural runoff and others observed flows, or seasonal records instead of mean average flows. The rivers’ natural runoff in Syria is respectively estimated at 31,4 bcm (995 m3/s.) and 18,7 bcm (586 m3/s.) (Ministry of Irrigation, Planification Department, 1999). The following section will however focus on Syria’s water volume, on the basis of observed flows.

2) Syria’s Water Tables: The Euphrates/Khabur-Tigris Basins

All official reports of the Ministry of Irrigation divide the country into seven catchment basins along the geographical location of the water resources in the following manner: the Barada & Awaj, the Yarmuk, the Badia, the coastal, the Orontes (Asi), the Euphrates, the Khabur & Tigris basins.

Syria’s Current Tables
Tables calculated and compiled by the author from referenced official sources.

Table 1 : Water resources in Syria (1995-2000)

Precipitations

49705 mcm

Groundwaters

6,865 bcm

Surface waters*

22,149 bcm

Total water volume

29,014 bcm

Total irrigated surfaces (est.)

1,260,000 ha

(*Mentioned as inclusive of Iraq’s share of the Euphrates)

Source : Syrian Ministry of Irrigation, 1999 (millions/billions of m3; hectares)

The total irrigated surface encompasses lands irrigated from dams, rivers and springs. The amount is distributed as follows: 560,000 hectares from surface waters and 700,00 from underground resources. Section 5 will further discuss water volumes and per capita shares in Syria.

2.1 The Euphrates Basin in Syria

The Euphrates Basin in Syria represents a surface of 51238 kms2 with a total of 18,669 mcm of surface waters and underground resources of about 1322 mcm. The Euphrates River (Furat in Arabic) is considered the main source of water in the Euphrates catchment basin. Official reports mention a decrease in the annual discharge at the Turkish-Syrian border from 1063 m3/second in 1982, to 698 m3/s. in 1984 with subsequent increases of 725 m3/s. in 1987 and 795 m3/s. in 1989 (Bakour, 1991). Depending on precipitations and extraction, the flow is now estimated to be at about 500-1000 m3/s. According to official Syrian sources, this is due to the still incomplete phases of the GAP (Interview with State Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1999). Other important rivers are tributaries of the Euphrates, such as its left bank Sajur River, and the Balikh and Khabur Rivers on its right bank. Though not directly linked to the Euphrates system in Syria, the Qweiq River becomes de facto an issue at stake. It originates in Turkey and 110 km. out of its 126 km flow in Syria. Continuous upstream extraction started to dry up the River in the 1940s (Kolars, 1991) and made it completely dry in the 1970s (Interview with M. Daoud, Official of the Ministry of Irrigation, 1999). The River’s waters were of vital importance to the drinking consumption of Aleppo; as a result, reserves from the Euphrates have since then been used to cover the needs of the city.

The following tables summarise data relevant to the Euphrates Basin.

Table 2 : Water resources in Euphrates Basin in Syria

Precipitations

10460 mcm

Groundwaters

1322 mcm

Surface waters

18,669 bcm *

Total irrigated surfaces

341003 + 6600 ha

Projected irrigated surfaces

614,804 ha

Potential agricultural surface

1,629,952 ha

Population

3,5 millions

*Mentioned as inclusive of Iraqi share

Source : Syrian Ministry of Irrigation, 1999 (millions of m3)

Table 3 : Water Uses in Euphrates Basin (Syria)

Industrial use

84 mcm

Agricultural /irrigation

4100 mcm

Domestic (drinking)

270 mcm

Total used

4454 mcm

Surface and groundwater uses.

Source : Syrian Ministry of Irrigation, 1999 (millions of m3)

2.2. The Khabur-Tigris Basin

The Tigris Basin in Syria is considered as a subsidiary of the Euphrates. The Khabur-Tigris Basin is situated in the Northeast part of Syria, with a total area of 21129 km2. Both the Sajur and Qweiq Rivers -which are tributaries to the Euphrates- flow into the Tigris River. The Tigris River (Dijleh in Arabic) lines the Turkish-Syrian border over 39 km of its length (1718 km) and 5 km with Iraq. Its natural runoff is estimated in Syria at 1600 mcm (50,7 m3/s). The Sajur River originates in Turkey with a total length of 108 km, of which 48 km flow into Syria. The total natural runoff is estimated at about 120 mcm. Following a mixture of dry periods and the launch of upstream water projects, the discharge of the Sajur has decreased over the years from 3.9 m3/sec. (1975) to 3.1 m3/sec. (1985) (Bakour, 1991), and reaches today an average annual flow of 20 mcm. According to Syrian sources, Turkey is constructing an upstream dam on the Sajur with a reservoir capacity of 100 mcm (Syrian Ministry of Irrigation, 1999). The Khabur River flows across the southern fringe of the Basin. It is fed by the Ras El Ayn spring which lies across the border between Syria and Turkey. The Basin’s population is estimated at about 1,020 million person (1995). Another tributary, the Balikh River, is dried up since the end of the 1980s by Turkey’s overuse of the underground springs on her side of the border. The Khabur River has also been drastically depleted by combined pumping across the common border by both Turkish and Syrian peasants. As a result, the Khabur had only of 30 mcm of water in 1998; this is particularly relevant when one realises that the Great Khabur Dam in Syria has a reservoir capacity of 605 mcm for the irrigation of an additional 50,000 hectares in the Khabur Basin (Syrian Ministry of Irrigation, 1999).

Table 4 : Water Resources in Khabur-Tigris Basin in Syria

Precipitations

8493 mcm

Groundwaters

3,225 bcm (withKhabur spring)

Surface waters

417 mcm

Potential surface for agric.

1,438,000 ha

Total irrigated surfaces

404,702 ha

Potential irrigated surface

+ 210,000 ha (142,000 w/ Tigris)

Source : Syrian Ministry of Irrigation, 1999 (millions and billions of m3)

Table 5 : Water Uses in Khabur-Tigris Basin (Syria)

Industrial use

5 mcm

Agricultural /irrigation

3150 mcm

Domestic (drinking)

50 mcm

Evaporation

45

Total used

3250 mcm

Surface and groundwater uses.

Source : Syrian Ministry of Irrigation, 1999 (millions of m3)

3) Institution and Legislation, a Framework for Water Development

Contrary to conventional wisdom, water management in Syria is monitored in a structured and highly bureaucratic fashion. For example, it is unfortunate that due to the absence of reliable data, Syria is sometimes considered to have no defined water policy, no national plan and no central co-ordination (Gleick, 1993). The institutional arrangements, such as water laws, regulations and procedures have been modified during various periods. Water has long been considered to be a public commodity with no charges associated with its use. In fact, this has been the case ever since the first water law under the French mandate (Law no. 144 of 1925). A series of laws, from 1925 to 1982, have been issued to govern separate aspects of the water sector. For instance, Decision no. 320 (1926) defines the procedures for the utilisation of public sources ; Water Law no.163 (1958) defines the use of water for agricultural purposes while restricting the extraction of groundwater by license arrangements; and Law no. 3 (1972) regulates the establishment of dams for the storage of flood and surface waters.

3.1. Water-related Institutional Frameworks

Syria is furthermore one of the few countries in the region (with Jordan, Oman, Yemen) which has taken steps towards unifying and centralising its water authorities in order to improve institutional arrangements (ESCWA, 1998). The water-related acts were also unified into one law which covered issues of development, conservation and investments under Law No. 16 of 1982. This initiated the creation of a Ministry of Irrigation in 1983, with the specific task to co-ordinate and supervise all ministerial activities related to water consumption (industrial, agricultural and human) and irrigation (Ministry of Irrigation, 1999). It has also centralised the activities executed by existing institutions, such as the Ministry of Public Works, the Ministry of the Euphrates Dam, the Ministry of Municipalities and Rural affairs and the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian reform. In fact, interestingly enough, a separate entity was established in 1968 for the development of the Euphrates Basin which can be viewed as evidence of its strategic importance for national development.

An institutional framework was put in place by the Ministry and in some sense this served to underline the priority of the water sector. Further indication of the central importance of the water sector is provided by the fact that high-level officials have been designated to control the planning and monitoring institutions; notably the Prime Minister presides the Planning Supreme Council and the Agricultural Supreme Council. Survey and research tasks are executed by several Ministries, such as the Water Studies General Company (under the aegis of the Ministry of Irrigation), the Dept. of Irrigation and Water Resources (Ministry of Irrigation), the Regional Irrigation Departments and the Irrigation and Water Use Department (Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform). General companies engage in follow-up tasks for the implementation of projects (General Company of Irrigation and Construction as well as others), while the Ministry of Housing and Public Utilities is represented by provincial corporations. A special department was set up in affiliation with the Ministry of Public Works in order to address the pollution problem. So, for instance, the Water Fauna Law no. 30 forbids the drainage of industrial and laboratory sewage into the public water resources (article 22). The regulations published by the Ministry of Environment, in conjunction with the Ministry of Agriculture, are yet another consequence of efforts to combat pollution. These regulations are principally concerned with the effects of the drainage waters.

3.2. Low Water Charges

As in other parts of the Arab region, water is provided at low and subsidised rates in Syria. Water charges are maintained at low levels in order to diminish costs for low- income groups and their activities in particular sectors, such as agriculture. With the introduction of large irrigation schemes in the 1970s, Syria made extensive spending plans for the expected returns on investments. Consequently, cost recovery plans needed to be implemented to mitigate the effects of the spending spree. One of the ways in which the government decided to raise funds was to tax all agricultural, industrial or domestic water use. Among other things this entailed the levying of specific charges (introduced by Law No. 46 of 1972) for beneficiaries of government projects. Charges increased over the years from SP: 70 per hectare to SP: 1075 (Law No. 19 of 1989 & Act No. 128 of 128) for all users of small- and medium-sized dams. In contrast, landowners who have seen the restitution of part of their lands were only called upon to pay the costs (set by the Agricultural Supreme Council) associated with reclaiming these lands; the fees could further be paid in instalments over thirty year, free of interest. The government has also encouraged the use of modern irrigation techniques by farmers who were granted loans by the Agricultural Bank for their purchase. All water charges are, however, of nominal nature and do not reflect the actual costs of water supply. Also, cost recovery mechanisms are not optimal: irrigation charges do not include the capital costs of water supply and cover only a small portion of the current costs of water supply. The charges stand in proportion to the size of the irrigated area, and do not cover the quantity of water used. Landowners end up paying only 20 percent of irrigation costs (Bakour, 1991). On the other hand, no charges apply to the use of groundwater, nor are there pre-defined limits that regulate the quantity of water or the depth of extraction, thus, evidently, making over-pumping permissible (Bakour, 1991&1993). Decision no. 3072 of 1990 also indicates that domestic water charges are a –symbolic- contribution to the public water supply networks.

4) Institutional, Economic & Environmental Problems

The figures below (Table 4) make clear that water demand for the next ten years is expected to increase. In this connection, population projections are estimated at 16,228 millions (2000) and 21,286 millions (2010) (Khoury, 1990). The urban share of the population was estimated to amount to 52 percent in 1996, at an annual urban growth rate of 3,5 percent (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1996). We can, however, note that the latest national census exceeded these ranges with a Syrian population already reaching 17,540 millions (Al Thawra, 1999).

Table 6: Syria’s Water Demand per Sector (current & projected).

Sector Withdrawals

Mcm/year

Total Water

Demand

Per Capita

M3/person/year

 

Actual/projected

Domestic

Agriculture

Industrial

Mcm

IRWR

ARWR

1990

650

6930

146

7726

791

2134

1995-2000

821,8

11137,5

 

194,7

 

12176,6

477

1791

2010

1359,6

24138*

747,8

26245,4

300

1176

Calculations made by author on the basis of various sources : Khoury 1990, ESCWA Survey 1990, Ministry of Irrigation 1995 (the 2010 Water Demand for agriculture has been estimated on base year 1995 and projected goal of total irrigated area of 1500 kha).

4.1. The Need for a Water Policy Reform

A water policy reform, which includes the re-allocation of water from irrigated agriculture (considered economically inefficient) to industry and the improvement of legal water aspects, has yet to be introduced in Syria. This is particularly important since reducing the share of water allocated to agriculture is commonly acknowledged as a good way to lessen the dependency situation of a downstream riparian. The need to shift from supply to demand management and abrupt irrigated agricultural practices has been advised by experts (Naff, 1994; Allan, 1994 & 1998). Demand-management also depends on control of population growth, the restructuring of the economy, redistribution of supplies, and the use of water conservation techniques vs. supply management which can affect water supply by increasing the catchment of winter floodwater, reclaiming wastewater or desalinating. Some experts suggest a combined supply- and demand management approach (Naff, 1994).

Syria does not appear to have an incentive to adopt a demand management approach under conditions where there are considerable supply opportunities to exploit (Euphrates basin). On the other hand, the value of agriculture, in and of itself, by far exceeds its economic value; like in many developing countries, it is « culturally embedded, highly symbolic, political and militarily significant » (Naff, 1994). The significance of agriculture has to be viewed against the background of national objectives such as food security, a policy priority which has symbolic overtones and which, moreover, is intimately connected with efforts to enhance economic growth and maintain independence. In addition, there are social dimensions which can explain why agriculture continues to be of high import. For instance, a particular social aspect of agriculture is that it prevents mass exodus of the rural population to the already burgeoning cities.

4.2. Water and Soil Quality

According to some Syrian officials, there should be changes in the established national water policy, but it is not suggested that it would be desirable for the country to modify national economic priorities as a consequence of the supply- and demand management debate in the developed countries. Nonetheless, it is stressed that the existing water supply should be optimised and that there should be a reduction in the amount of water resources used for agricultural purposes (estimated at some 90 percent out of total water consumption). For example, it is suggested that, water losses can be limited by redesigning crop rotations per basin, or improving the drainage networks assigned to irrigation, and by introducing drip irrigation (Bakour, 1991 & 1994). Following an agreement with the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), drip and sprinkler networks were provided to farmers with loan repayment schemes of 3 to 5 years. Officials now speak of roughly 30% of the country’s irrigation networks as part of the recent introduction of water-efficient techniques (Interview with A.A Masri, Director of International Waters, Syrian Ministry of Irrigation, 1999). Unofficial sources point out, however, that only a very small percentage of the irrigated surface is already efficiently irrigated. Overuse of water in the agricultural sector has led to depletions and deterioration of the groundwater’s quality, as well as a deterioration of the quality of soil. The Near East, and Syria in particular, is a region subject to salinisation and accumulation of gyps (Ghadban, 1995), mainly in the Euphrates Basin. One of the measures necessary to prevent irrigation-induced water-logging and salinisation in arid and semi-arid regions is the installation of drainage facilities which allow for cleansing of excess salts from the plant root zone. Thus, specific programs to rehabilitate water supplies were introduced, with the construction of water impoundment structures and conveyance systems for water irrigation (as in Egypt, Iraq, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) (ESCWA, 1998). These efforts on the part of Syria have been reflected in reports from international agencies which have informed that Syria « topped the list of countries within the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia re-using drainage and waste water when it recycled 1.45 billion cubic metres in 1997 » (Arab News Channel, 7 January 1999). However, much more time and investments are needed to be able to progress with land reclamation and soil improvement. This has led, for example, to a drastic re-evaluation of the targeted surface to be irrigated in the Euphrates Basin, from 740,000 ha as originally planned in 1965, to 640,000 today. Besides the amount of precipitations and crop evapotranspiration, the quality of soil has impacted on the amount of water needed per irrigated hectare. The Euphrates Basin is estimated to need about 15,000 m3/hectare (Interview with M. Daoud, Ministry of Irrigation, 1999) because of gypsoferous soils and water losses. This figure should be compared to other regions within Syria where irrigation requires between 6,000 to 10,000 m3/hectare (Syrian Ministry of Irrigation, 1999).

4.3. Institutional Problems

Syria is in the process of enacting a comprehensive water code. However, modern water legislation is required in order to address the integrated development and management of water resources, as well as policy formulation and implementation, guidelines for national utilisation (of all natural and non-conventional water use priorities), water ownership, jurisdiction of authorities responsible for controlling utilisation, protection, pricing, and beneficial uses, as well as the issuing of user permits, and provisions for conflict resolution (ESCWA, 1998). One of the institutional problems that Syria is confronted with is the multiplication of entities which result in duplication of functions. Notably, institutional shortcomings are also sometimes acknowledged in internal reports. For instance, in opposition to the present situation where the water sector in Syria is being governed by several complementary laws and regulations, some officials point to the need for centralising all legislation under one water code (Ghadban, 1993) . Such a code would address all procedural aspects linked to water use and its impact on quantity and quality, while at the same time serving to enhance horizontal co-ordination between various entities. But as noted by several surveys, « water legislation enforcement remains one of the major obstacles to optimal development and management of water resources in the region » (ESCWA, 1998). In addition, problems of enforceability prevail for certain matters, such as regulations against pollution, the destruction of networks, and licensing for wells. Internal reports recommend the « application of the existing regulations with extreme severity against the destruction of the irrigation networks and pollution of the waters » within the Orontes Basin (Ghadban, 1995). It is also emphasised that there is a need to sanction violations and more efficiently regulate the extraction of groundwater resources in the Yarmuk Basin due to the impact on « drainage of the many springs being fed from within the catchment » (Ghadban, 1995).

5) National Goals: Food & Water Security vs. Water Stress

Poverty, food insecurity, and environmental degradation are recognised as critical development problems and often considered to be priority issues on the agenda for international development; especially in the wake of the International Conference on Nutrition (ICN, 1992), and the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, 1992). The Arab League has also adopted a regional goal of Arab Food security (AFS) and Arab Water Security (AWS) for the year 2000 and beyond (Khoury, 1990). In effect, food imports within the ESCWA region increased by 2.5 per cent in 1994, amounting for US$ 11.8 billion (ESCWA, 1995). The self-sufficiency ratio for cereals dropped from 78 percent in the early 1970s to 48 percent in recent years (Khoury, 1990). Syrian internal reports attribute these problems to two factors. In the first place, annual population growth is estimated to some 3.36 percent, and secondly, food imports are increasing as a share of the country’s overall imports (Ghadban, 1995).

5.1. Food and Water Security

Concerns over food security stand in direct relation to water security (Naff, 1994). A distinction is made by international agencies (FAO) between renewable and non-renewable internal water resources, (IRWR) and actual renewable water resources (ARWR). The internal renewable water resources are water sources that are generated from endogenous precipitation (surface run-off and groundwater recharge inside the countries' borders) ; the actual flow (ARWR) is the actual maximum amount of water, theoretically, available. Actual flow takes into account abstraction in upstream countries and the volumes allocated through formal or informal agreements or treaties between countries (FAO, 1996). The internal renewable water resources per inhabitant in the Near East are among the lowest in the world. Syria can be categorised as an intermediate country in so far that it to a large extent depends on upstream countries (mainly the Euphrates from Turkey), for its renewable water resources, estimated to some 80 percent but on the other hand it is located upstream from other countries that depend on the same rivers (Iraq). The Syrian total water volume is estimated at about 29 bcm, with 13 bcm as IRWR and 16 bcm in ARWR -inclusive of Syria’s share of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers.

5.2. The Definition of Water Stress

Syria is endowed with important resources. As we have seen, the country benefits from the abundant waters of a major river such as the Euphrates. However, the description of Syria as a water-rich country has to be tempered. Based on the past experience of moderately developed countries in arid zones, some international agencies (UNEP/UNDP/WB) have adopted a benchmark for water supply, estimated to some 1,000 cubic metres per capita, and yearly. Below this rate, most countries are expected to experience chronic water scarcity on a scale sufficient to impede economic development and harm physical health. Less than 1000 m3/head/year is required to render the Syrian population self-sufficient in terms of food consumption. The per capita share is estimated to be lie between 160-200 litres/person/day. This is less than half of what the average western country uses, which is considered to fluctuate around 400 litres/day. In 1992, the UNHCR called for a minimum allocation of 15 litres/per/day. For the sake of comparison, the US residents’ share has been estimated at 410 litres/per/day of municipal water and 6000 litres/per/day when taking into account the industrial and agricultural uses; on the other hand, other countries population, such as Peru and Sudan subsist on less than 15 litres/per/day (Roberts, 1998). The per capita share in Syria has declined over the last fifteen years from 1320 m3/year (1976) to 791.7 m3/year (1989), to 761 m3/year   (1993) (Bakour, 1991; Ghadban, 1993), to 477 m3/year  (1996). These amounts should be viewed in light of two sets of figures, on the one hand the FAO criteria for (per capita) internal renewable resources, and on the other hand the figures can be compared to actual per capita renewable water resources which amount to 1791 m3/year. As a comparison, Turkey’s per capita share is estimated at about 2800 m3/s. (Republic of Turkey, 1999), and Iraq’s at 2300 m3/s. .

One gauge could be considered, such as the international standards set by the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (1997). In principle, then Syria constitutes a medium to high water-stressed country, where withdrawals approach 40 percent of the water available (see Table 5). This report distinguishes four categories of water stress based on the amount of available freshwater that is used, which varies from low water stress (use in the range of less than 10 per cent), moderate water stress (use in the range of 10-20 per cent), medium-high water stress (use in the range of 20-40 percent) and high water stress (use of more than 40 percent). This means that there is an urgent need for intensive supply- and demand management. Current user patterns and withdrawals may not prove sustainable, and water scarcity could limit economic growth.

Table 7 : Overall Water use by sector (1999) mcm/year

Domestic

844,4

7,5%

Agriculture (irrigation)

11136,5

91%

Industry

194,7

1,5%

Total water used

12175,6

100 %

Annual renewable water resources

29014

Withdrawn :

42 % *

Source : Syrian Ministry of Irrigation, Planification Department, 1999 (millions of m3)

* Calculation on the basis of total water volume : 29,014 bcm (Table 1)

The pursuit of the food security objective has meant heavy subsidisation of agriculture. Moreover, in terms of economic efficiency, it is problematic that 90 percent of total water consumption is allocated to agriculture because agriculture’s contribution to GDP is relatively lower than industry’s contribution to GDP. Food security has become one of the most important aspects in developing the Syrian economy; a goal which is clearly stated in internal reports as well as external interventions. The objective of food security is presented as a crucial part of "national security" as countries are sometimes confronted to situations where they have means for food imports but are prevented for political reasons (Interview with N. Kaddur, Syrian State Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1999). Following the launch of the Arab Food Security Strategy Program in 1982, the Nutrition Section of the Ministry of Agriculture launched a national survey (1988), which was able to assess the existence of a food gap - e.g., the discrepancy between actual food consumption and UN standards for subsistence level food consumption - of 20 to 30 percent (Ghadban, 1995). UN standards are set at 2250-2400 calories/day. By 2010, priority was given to expansion of irrigated areas at a rate of 200,000 ha/year, with the aim of reducing dependence on fluctuations in rainfed cultivation (Ghadban, 1995). Thirty-three percent of the overall surface can be cultivated, and out of this area sixteen percent has been irrigated (Bakour, 1991; Ghadban, 1995). It is however noteworthy that the surface used for irrigation was doubled between the 1970s (472 thousand hectares) and 1999, a period for which estimates are set at 1,260,000 hectares (see Table 1).

5.3. The Construction of Dams, a Tool for Food Security

Two main avenues have been advocated for the purpose of achieving food security, internally and externally. As elucidated under Section 3, Law no. 3 of 1972 is representative of the policies undertaken by developing countries during the seventies – to construct small, medium-sized and large multi-purpose dams as storing facilities for floods and surface run-off, rivers and winter flowing streams. In the first place, rapid implementation of the ongoing irrigation projects, is argued to increase the irrigated areas in the Jaghjagh and Upper Yarmuk areas and obtain 6300 hectares (Ghadban, 1995). Secondly, the introduction of improved technological methods is expected to increase production per irrigated hectare from 3,5 tons/hectare to 5 tons (Ghadban, 1995).

Today, Syria has a total of 156 dams (Syrian Ministry of Irrigation, Planification Department, 1999). Dams on the Euphrates are the largest dams in Syria with a storage capacity which exceeds 1 billion m3. The construction of the Tabqa dam was launched in 1968 in line with the policy objectives at that time. Another dam, Al Baath Dam, was constructed downstream below the Euphrates Dam. It was intended to satisfy multiple needs such as to maintain a constant flow for the electric turbines of the upper Dam, and to irrigate and produce energy. The Tishrin Dam, at the Turkish-Syrian border, was launched in order to generate electricity and store the waters. The construction was ended in October 1999; the dam will be fully operative within four years. However, twenty years after the start of large-scale projects, internal reports highlight a preference towards small surface dams which turn out to be relatively cheaper while at the same time generating greater benefits (Bakour, 1991; Interview with M. Daoud, Syrian Ministry of Irrigation, 1999). The following table establishes the characteristics and multi-purpose functions of the dams in the basin.

Table 8: Existing Dams in the Euphrates Basin

Dams

Storage Capacity

Energy

Irrigation

Euphrates (1978)

14,10 bcm 

Irrigation :

800 MW

644,000 ha

Al Baath (1990)

90 mcm 

75 MW

NO - Bay regulating dam for Euphrates Dam

Tishrine (1999)

19 bcm

1,6 MW

NO

Sources : Ministry of Irrigation (1999)

Notably, both the desire to reach a multilateral water-sharing settlement, as well as the need to pursue negotiations with Turkey to reach an understanding on the quantities to be shared common waters are objectives which stand in direct relation to the food security goal (Bakour, 1991; Ghadban, 1995; Hasbani & Masri, 1995) . Therefore, in pursuit of national development, the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers are of great significance. It is important to recall that discharges from these basins and their tributaries represent 72 percent of the country’s total emissions and that 80,3 percent of Syria’s water resources are located outside its territorial bounds (FAO, 1995). In addition, the total area cultivated under the Euphrates-Tigris basins constitutes about 27 percent of the total irrigated area (See Tables 1 & 2).

5.4. Food Security vs. Water Stress

In recent years, water-stress has affected Syria’s capacity to acquire food security. Until recently, cereal production was growing at a rate of 5-8 percent yearly, and barley production estimates for 1995 amounted to 10 percent more than production levels in 1994. The increase even resulted in serious storage problems and consequently some of the stock was shipped to Lebanon were it was milled (ESCWA, 1995). However, recently foreign reports have shown that the aggravated drought situation is severely affecting grain crops and forcing sale of livestock causing a downward spiral in prices. Since late 1998, rainfalls in the vicinity of Damascus has been held to have amounted to only one-third of normal rainfall. According to these same foreign sources, the country is foreseen to import about 500,000 tons of grains in 1999 (Arab News Channel, 16 March 1999). This has also carried the result that for the first time in ten years, the government has envisaged to import barley. At the same time, however, local reports mention that despite the drought, "Syria will manage to produce 2.0-2.5 million tons of wheat under irrigation…This quantity, plus about four million tons in storage from previous years, will cover more than two years of domestic consumption.". (Arab News Channel, 16 March 1999). Meanwhile, due to policies which significantly increased cotton plantation, these crops soared to record highs in 1997 (FAO, 1998). The favourable performance in agriculture contributed to GDP growth at 6 percent in 1995 (ESCWA, 1995).

Conclusion: Water Resources Vulnerability, Economic Development vs. Power Relations

his analysis has focused on hydrological elements, because an understanding of these factors is imperative to any account of the interaction amongst the Actors in the Euphrates and Tigris Basins. A combination of endogenous (e.g., climatic, institutional, economic) and exogenous (e.g. upstream extraction) factors have created a condition of medium- to high level stress (as depicted above- Syria’s Water Tables). As has already been elucidated, the Euphrates and Tigris waters are significant for issues of national development as well as water- and food security objectives.

In this relation, the importance of the right to freely access and, generally, to retain control over water is exacerbated for a country in a situation of economic development. In other terms, it is imperative for a country to control the long-term supply of water in order to successfully pursue long-term policy objectives in favour of economic development. In this connection, precise indicators have been constructed in order to record Syria's water-resource(s) vulnerability (Gleick, 1993). As is made apparent from the tables, Syria extracts 42 percent of water out of total renewable water supply which implies that is a country with average to high water-stress. For instance, we have already made clear that Syria allocates 90% of its overall water consumption to agriculture, but that more efficient use of water resources could be achieved by allocating a greater share to industry. However, any attempt to diversify and widen the base for industrial production would inevitably transfer resources from agriculture into industry. Such a re-organisation of economic life would constitute a major undertaking for any developing country and thus entail the delineation and implementation of large-scale and relatively more capital-intensive projects. The upshot to this discussion is that in order to make it worthwhile to shift resources between sectors and, thus, transform the economy, it is absolutely crucial to exercise control over the water supply, especially when the high dependence on surface water, originating externally to the country (80%), exacerbates the importance of retaining control over waters for national development plans. Syria has extensive plans for the irrigation of 640,000 hectares in the Euphrates Basin which depend on, the supply of regular flows from the Euphrates and its tributaries as well as, the 210,000 hectares in the Khabur-Tigris Basin (see Tables 2 & 4 ).

By virtue of crossing national boundaries, water forces riparian states into a situation of interdependence. This mutual dependency is aggravated by the fact that the three immediate countries (Iraq, Syria & Turkey) concerned by the "fugitive" (Fredericks, 1996) nature of the Euphrates and Tigris River waters have, as of yet, not succeeded in reaching a comprehensive water-sharing agreement (Daoudy, 1996). Consequently, these waters are of utmost importance for each of these countries. It is therefore unfortunate that more than thirty years of negotiation (1962-1993) have only served to yield bilateral and provisional treaties between Turkey and Syria (1987), as well as between Syria and Iraq (1989). Turkey has agreed to let a minimum of 500 m3/sec pass by the common Turkish-Syrian border while it was filling the Ataturk Dam reservoir and Syria has committed to give 58% of all incoming waters to Iraq. In fact, Turkey is building its G.A.P Project which consists of 22 dams (of which two are already constructed) and 19 HEPP (hydroelectric power plants) whose ultimate purpose will be to irrigate 1,7 million hectares (9,7% of Turkey’s total surface) and produce 27 billion kilo watt hours annually, i.e. the equivalent of 22% of its total hydro-electric potential. I will now proceed to summarise the positions evoked by Syria and Turkey. The Turkish government argues that construction of dams is beneficial to all parties. If large fluctuations can be regulated upstream, then the flow to downstream countries will also be stabilised over time and constant supplies maintained under conditions of drought. Incidentally, this a classical instance of the argument put forth by upstream countries in general. Turkey argues that, by way of sovereignty, it has the right to freely develop waters which originate on her land and that Syria and Iraq do not have any rights over Turkish waters. Finally then, Turkey has suggested that Syria's irrigation networks are inefficient and that these networks waste over 50% of the waters through evaporation (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999). Syria, on the other hand, argues that an agreement that addresses the needs and use of all riparians needs to be based on the internationally recognised principles of International Law which establish the principle of "equitable and reasonable uses". These widely accepted principles were codified in the UN Convention of 1997 which had crystallised all principles linked to the non-navigational uses of international watercourses (UN General Assembly, 1997). Syria is one of the eleven countries who signed the Convention and Syria ratified the Convention in 1998 (Syrian Arab Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999). Syria thus further argues that it entered into provisional agreement in 1987 in order to allow Turkey’s development and accepted to settle for 500 m3/s. as a provisional clause while Turkey was filling its Ataturk Dam. Syrian officials also claim to have invited Turkey, through their embassy in Ankara, suggesting to revive negotiations which have been interrupted since 1993 but have received no answer. Complaints on their part were also conveyed to Turkey when the waters of the Tigris River were cut for one week in September 1999, in order to fill the Ilisu Dam’s reservoir (Interview with N. Kaddur, State Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1999). Syria suggests that Turkey is in effect controlling the supply of waters that Syria is legally entitled to use and control, and that these waters represent 66% of its total water supply. In effect, the GAP project can be expected to extract 50% of the average flow of the Euphrates at the common Turkish-Syrian border (528 m3/sec, i.e. 16,651 mcm out of a flow estimated at about 31,4 bcm), thus leaving a remaining of 500 m3/s. to be divided between the two downstream countries.

In effect, the Turkish data show that existing dams on the Turkish portion of the Euphrates (Keban, Ataturk, Karakaya, Birecik and Karkamis dams) are scheduled to irrigate a total of 1,024,000 ha (Republic of Turkey, MFA, 1999); as for the Tigris Basin, the 5 dams will irrigate a surface of 456,664 ha when they have been finalised (Republic of Turkey, MFA, 1999). The flow from the Euphrates tributaries are also put at risk since Turkey is constructing a dam on the Sajur River; on the other hand, the Tigris River, which will be impacted, has not been addressed within the Joint Technical Committee of the tripartite negotiations. Early on, the principle was to focus on the Euphrates River first. Also, the G.A.P. does not seem to have envisaged the issue of drainage waters; in effect, the Syrian portion of the Euphrates and its tributaries from Anatolian lands are expected to be polluted at 35% by insecticides and herbicides (Kolars, 1991). International organisations such as Greenpeace have shown concern about the pollution of underground resources across the Turkish-Syrian border (Al Hayat, 1996).

Opportunities for co-operation do exist as is reflected by the constructive dialogue that has taken place throughout the years amongst water engineers and negotiators from both sides. Unfortunately though, such progress has been superseded by a politicisation of the process. The link between water and power is reflected in the use of power strategies, such as party arithmetic (Turkish/Israeli alliance ; Israeli private investments in the G.A.P.), the inclusion of other issues (Orontes River by Turkey, Sandjak of Alexandretta/Hatay Province by Syria) and the use of bargaining chips (Syrian support to Kurdish rebellion to reverse its downstream dependence). This was also made clear by accusations by the Syrian Minister of Defence -that Israel was using Turkey to pressure Syria into territorial concessions (Arab News Channel, 1998). As a matter of fact, links between Turkey and Israel have been strengthened since 1993 with the signature of many agreements providing for military training, defence, industrial co-operation and trade. Recent official encounters have also revived previous suggestions on possible imports of plastic barges filled with water to Israel (Al Sharq, 1999; Le Temps, 1999) and investments by Israeli and American companies to accelerate the GAP Project (Al Mustaqbal, 1999). However, despite Turkey’s threats of war in October 1998, the expulsion of Kurdish rebel leader Ocalan from Syria and his later capture by the Turkish authorities, has shifted pressure away from Syria, and official calls were made on Turkey’s side for the implementation of "positive" ties with neighbouring Syria (Arab News Channel, 1999). Under these circumstances, it is clear that renouncing discretion over water policies could be equated to relinquishing control over development policy objectives. To conclude, the negotiation process between the three riparians needs to be revived. In this connection, it will be important to assess the impact of, Turkey’s projects on Syria as well as, Syria’s projects on downstream Iraq. Any agreement with long-term perspectives should be contingent upon mutual rights and mutual obligations, and only then can a new vision pave the way for an agreement based on equality, respect and effective recognition for harmonious coexistence.

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